Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 21:35:36 -0500 (EST)
From: Justin Schwartz <jschwart-AT-freenet.columbus.oh.us>
Subject: explanation




In the following, Lisa denies in effect that there is any explnatory
priority to anything in the explanation of behavior. This in effect denies
the possibility of general explanations of behavior. That is a position
some people maintain. Donald Davidson, Berkeley Dept. of Phil., is a
leading advocate of this view. (He's a particular bugbear of mine.) It's
not one I accept. 

I think one reason Lisa and other may be attracted to this view is the
mistaken view that asseting that anything (such as economics) has
explnatory priority means either:

(a) that the explaining level eliminates the explained level, so that to
say that some ideology has an economic explanation means in effect that
ideology is really nothing but economics, or

(b) that the explaining level fully determines the explained level,
without the explained level interacting with or affecting the explained
level, so that (in the economics-ideology case), ideology is epiphenomenal
(in philosophy jargon).

Neither of these views are attractive. But neither of them are required by
the claim that economics (say) explains ideology. 

With respect to (a), we can say that ideology has independent sources aprt
from the economy, and has aspect that the economy does not explain. But to
say that the economy explains why, for example, bourgeois societies
produce bourgeois ideology (and not vice versa!) only requires us to
maintain that the economy is in some relevant respect primary, so that we
have the asymmettry the claim demands. 

One way to get this in thisd
particular instance is to use a quasi-Darwinian explanation. We can say
that different economies exert selection pressures that favor certain
ideologies and disfavor others. We can usually specify the
microfoundations of this process wityh reasonable certainty. It's no
accident that the bourgeoisie, in their funding of universities, etc. will
tend to prefer thinkers who propound views favorable to their interests.
This is quite consistent with the appeal of these ideologies having other
sources as well. But it allows us to understand why bourgeois economics is
the primary explanation of their predominance in bourgeois society.

As to (b), it's clear that the reason that the bourgeoisie like certain
ideologies is that these do in fact tend to promote their interests over
the long run. And (as I found out to my misfortune) they dislike
ideologies that oppose theor interests. But that means these ideologies
must affect the economy, by providing it with legitimation and support. So
the ideologies are not and accnot be epihenomenal. The selection
mechanis, requires taht they interact with the economy, just as the fact
that it is a selection mechanism ensures its priority.

Now I have not demonstrated that the economy is primary in the specified
sense. I have just suggested a sense in which it could be it
unoffensively primary.

--Justin
On Fri, 16 Feb 1996, Lisa Rogers wrote:

> 
> Reasonable theories of psychological development are all about the
> ways that material circumstances interact with a responding/active
> psyche.  This is we are shaped by / adapt to our situations.  Those
> material circumstances include the exact behaviors of parents, in
> terms of care-giving, which parent does it [if any], every attitude
> of dis/approval, reward and punishment, that is meted out to
> everything one does, including facial expressions, etc.  
> 
.....

> The things that people think, imagine and desire are shaped by these
> processes, so there is no way to separate 'socio-economic causes' and
> 'ideal'/ mental causes of new 'subjectivities.'
> 
> I don't think I'm contradicting Jukka, really, but expanding on the
> point of anti-economistic or anti-'mechanistic' thought, in a way
> that relates to subjectivity/socialization.  But none of it is
> 'ideal', to me, not at all non-material.
> 
> Does this make sense to you, Jukka?  Or anybody?
> 
> Lisa
> 
> 
> >>> J Laari <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi>  2/15/96, 01:04pm >>>
> [snip]
> I understood that the second factor (socialization) behind new 
> subjectivities has been articulated earlier in Guattari-Negri book:
> that new forms  of subjectivity (including socio-cultural perception
> and the like  'cognitive' aspects) have been partly caused by changes
> in families and  their structures (on the one hand, more both parents
> working, on the  other more single parent families), partly by
> developments in 'media' -  films and records, radio and television &
> al. Of course there's much  more to this but that should do this
> time. 
> 
> Combine that to changes in organization of work and you'll get
> picture  slightly different to that of early 20th century fordist
> world of wage  labour. [snip]
> 
> And somehow that seems to be connected to the fact that  people see
> new political and other oppurtunities in areas where 'trad. 
> politics' haven't reached its grasp. 
> 
> Phenomenologist, perhaps, would say that our 'life worlds' have (a) 
> changed, and (b) multiplied [snip]
> 
> [snip] it isn't enough to chase socio-economic causes to several new 
> phenomena (including those mentioned by G-N). The other dimension
> should  be considered too - shall we call it 'ideal' or something
> like that?  That's because what people think, imagine, want, lust
> etc. counts too. It  has to be included in the whole picture.
> Otherwise our view remains kind  of 'mechanistic' or one-sided. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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