From: lquispe-AT-nyxfer.blythe.org (Luis Quispe)
Subject: PERU: Report on the Civil War (I)
Date: Mon, 19 Feb 1996 00:27:33 -0500 (EST)
[From El Diario Internacional, No. 27, January 1996.
BP 705, 1000 Bruxelles 1, Belgium. Luis Arce Borja, Editor,
Telefax: 32-2-6494156]
REPORT ON THE CIVIL WAR
PERU: FUJIMORI'S ABYSS
(Part 1 of 3 articles)
The supposedly "defeat of Shining Path" and the "economic succes" are
the two main axes of the Peruvian regime's disinformation campaign.
These two propaganda elements help to show today's Peru as some sort
of earthly paradise where the economic crisis and internal strife are
things of the past. Since 1992 there is not a single day without someone
in the regime "showing" the "Sendero's death throbs." At the same
time it is said to exhaustion that Peru lives an "economic stability never
before experienced in its history." True or false?
The subject and aim of this report is to clarify and debunk this pack of
lies by the Peruvian regime. Let's analyze rigorously the specific
subjects:
1) the process of militarization of the country;
2) the current situation of the Maoist people's war; and,
3) the regime's economic policy. As we develop these subjects we will
show how the publicity around the "defeat of Sendero" and the
"economic success" are a farce staged to serve the yanqui imperialism
and the Peruvian regime's strategic counterinsurgency plans. We will
prove that neither the guerrilla was liquidated, nor has Peru has solve
its deep economic crisis nor has changed its character of a militarized
country facing an internal civil war.
PERU'S MILITARIZATION AND THE KINGDOM OF PEACE
Since September 1992 Fujimori constantly declared that by July 1995
"Shining Path would be annihilated" for good. "Before 1995 comes,
Peru will be a country completely at peace," he said many times. To
yield credibility to such offer he pointed out that 95% of the
"Senderista leaders" were either dead or had been captured by police.
Fujimori's speech, structured like official cue card, also helped the high
military command who, with similar words, proclaimed their
"victorious" battles against Maoist subversion.
"That's why we think that by 1995 we will have annihilated Sendero,"
said by 28 July 1993 general Nicolas Hermosa Rios, chairman of the
Armed Forces Joint Command. On his turn and guided by the same
script, Vladimiro Montesinos, personal advisor to Fujimori and main
character in the National Intelligence Service (SIN) asserted on 7 June
1994: "... peace and tranquility have been restored throughout most of
the country ..." (1).
MILITARIZATION AND INTERNAL CIVIL WAR
We are now in 1996, that is, almost 4 years have elapsed since the
capture of the leader of the Maoist guerrilla. Have the PCP
(Communist Party of Peru) and the guerrilla been liquidated as claimed
by the Peruvian regime? Has the internal civil war ended?
The true of the matter is that in 1996 Peru finds itself more militarized
than it was in September 1992. It preserves neatly its character as a
country under internal civil strife. This situation can be seen in the
military and political characteristics of today's Peruvian society.
Specifically this reality is shown by three concrete situation:
1) the quantity of territory and population who are and live in zones
declare to be under "state of emergency";
2) the accelerated growth of the repressive apparatus of the State
(armed and police forces and paramilitary groups such as the
"rondas"); 3) the massive increase of military and defense
expenditures in the State's budget.
TERRITORY AND POPULATION UNDER MILITARY TERROR
The quantity of territory and population placed under the brutal rule of
the military has continued to increase. Millions of Peruvians are living
amidst the terror imposed by the political military commands. In the
regions and localities under state of emergency, civilian authorities are
mere figureheads: real authority, political as well as military, is
exercised by the members of the Armed Forces; judges, mayors and
governors (prefectos) do what the army wants.
In 1991, 48.7% of Peruvians (10,881,131) lived in areas declared as
emergency zones. In 1995 it was 58.0% (11,300,400), that is more
than 50% of Peruvians. This situation is seen even in the capital city,
whose population exceeds 6 million.
Then, if there is no internal warfare and of "Shining Path was erased
from the map," why have the regions under declared state of
emergency been expanded? Why then isn't Peru demilitarized? (See
Table 1).
THE GIGANTIC MILITARY APPARATUS
Official propaganda claims that "Shining Path" has been liquidated, but
curiously the military apparatus of the State (Armed Forces, police and
paramilitary forces) keeps growing without bounds. In 1995 all
military, police and paramilitary (civil defense committees, rural and
urban rondas) forces totaled 627,000 effectives. This situation places
Peru as one of the most militarized countries in South America, second
only to Brazil: a country with a population of 161.4 million (nearly 7
times that of Peru) and a territory of 8,511,965 square kilometers (6.6
times Peru's) which has a total military and police force of 680,000
(see Table 2).
The militarization of the Peruvian State does not result from
geopolitical factors nor of Peru implementing a military supremacy
policy in the region, Peruvian militarization results exclusively from the
internal People's War. It is directly linked to two principal phenomena:
1) The advancement of the Maoist insurgency, which forces the State to
amplify and strengthen its military apparatus; the State, made
vulnerable by an enemy that moves around the entire territory, attempts
to contain the development of the armed struggle by way of repressive
actions;
2) The counterinsurgency strategy requires, for its implementation, that
all military and civilian institutions of the State be placed under the
centralized leadership of the armed forces; in this case the so-called
"civil power," represented by the Executive Power, Parliament, the
Judicial Power, the National Electoral Jury, political parties, and so on,
are turned into mere decorations and subject to the will of the military.
Within that same phenomenon, the military concept of "National
Defense" acquires a significance strictly of fighting subversion, which
is labeled the "internal enemy." One of the signs of this change the
expansion of military power. The Armed Forces expand their activity
to all aspects of society and the State ( (political, economic, social, and
cultural.) Part of the changes introduced as "national defense" is direct
military control of the civilian population as well as trying to
compromise them in the State's counterinsurgency strategy. Hence the
"civic actions" being implemented by the Army and whose main targets
are the poor peasantry and the population of urban shanty towns and
working class neighborhoods.
MORE THAN 400,000 PARAMILITARY.
One of the elements expressing this phenomenon and the relationship
between militarization and counterinsurgency warfare is seen in the
increase of paramilitary groups (self-defense committees and rondas)
organized and led by the Armed Forces. It's important to look closer to
this problem:
The "self-defense committees," the rural and urban rondas, are copy of
the "strategic village" concept established by yanqui imperialism in the
Vietnam War. In Peru these have been used since 1983 on the
counterinsurgency war.
Starting from the administration of Fernando Belaunde Terry
(1980-1985), continuing with Alan Garcia Perez (1985-1990) and now
with Fujimori since 1990, the rondas, self-defense committees and
other groups of armed civilians, have served as auxiliary forces in
anti-guerrilla warfare. Its members, mostly drafted by force, are part of
the military contingent used by the regime to fight the insurgency.
Whether as cannon fodder, or as forces supporting the military, they
are part of the State's repressive apparatus.
FUJIMORI AND THE RONDAS.
The current regime is the one giving great impulse to the self-defense
committees and rondas in the countryside and in the city. Since 1991,
Fujimori in person is the one distributing combat weapons to these
paramilitary groups. Alan Garcia did it before him. Decreed laws are
dictated placing them under military command control. According to
government directives, "the committees complement and support the
functions of self-defense and development fulfilled by the armed and
police forces." Starting in 1991 young men are able to fulfill their
Compulsive Military Service duty in the self-defense committees or
rondas.
Another modality of paramilitary is organized by the municipal ties and
known as "Serenazgo" (night watching). Unlike the ronderos of
members of defense committees, these "serenos" wear uniforms and
receive a salary for their repressive activities. The extension of the
militarization of the country is seen also in the new Organic Law of the
National Police, which enables the youth to fulfill their two
years of Compulsory Military Service in the police forces.
According to official figures, in 1990 a little over 120,000 members of
the Self-Defense Committees and ronderos were accounted for. In 1992
this figure goes up to 191,000. By December of 1993 the number
reached 370,000. In 1994 the paramilitary increase to 376,027. And in
1995 their number reached 400,000 members. (See Table 3.)
TABLE I
TERRITORY AND POPULATION IN STATE OF WAR
(State of Emergency 1990-1995)
Year Population % total Territory Total %
(millions) km2
1990 10,881,131 48.7 410,152 31.9
1991 10,353,880 45.0 381,464 29.7
1992 10,226,117 44.0 324,388 25.2
1993 10.987.570 49.6 356,177 27.7
1994 10,415,692 47.0 325,348 25.3
1995 11,300.392 58.0 384,929 30.0
Sources:
--Senate Commission report January 1992.
--DESCO special report No. 43, November 1994.
--Peru in Numbers 1994 by Richard Webb and Graciela Fernandez
Baca.
--1995 figures are estimated based on information published on
magazine Resumen Semanal (Weekly Review) No. 813, 4 April 1995.
==============================
T A B L E 2
ARMED FORCES AND POLICE IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES (1995).
Country Population Armed Police Paramilitary Total
(milllions) Forces (1) others
Brazil 161.374 295,000 385,00 unkown 680,000
Chile 14.241 99,000 31,000 unkown 130,000
Colombia 35.101 146,000 87,000 unkown 233,000
Ecuador 11.721 57,000 270 unkown 57,270
Mexico 90.464 175,000 14,000 unkown 189,000
Argentina 34.254 67,000 18,000 13,240 89,240
Bolivia(4) 8.075 33,500 30,000 600 64,100
Peru (2) 23.515 135,000 92,000 400,000 627,000
Source:
--The Military Balance 1995-96, International Institute of Strategic
Studies, Oxford University.
--L'Annee strategique 1990. Les Equilibres Militaires 1989-1900.
(1) Only Peru officially discloses paramilitary groups as
part of its military
balance to the organizations devoted to the study of
world military problems.
(2) Figures for Peru are based on official data plus statements by high
chiefs of the armed and police forces.
(3) Argentina reports 13,240 coast guards, besides police and military.
(4) Bolivia reports 600 anti-narcotics agents, besides army and police.
================================
TABLE 3
SELF-DEFENSE COMMITTEES AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVE
RONDAS ORGANIZED AND LED BY THE ARMED FORCES
(1990-1994)
Year Committees and rondas
1990 120,300
1991 191,000
1992 370,000
1993 376,027
1994 400,000
Source: Ministry of Defense and Senate Special Commission. l992
Report.
Published on 9 February 1992 in La Republica.
--Statements by general Nicolas Hermosa Rios, General Commander of
the Armed Forces. Published on Interpress Services 10 December
1993.
--Joint Command of the Armed Forces. Published on Aprodeh 25
March 1994.
================================
TABLE 4
MILITARY EXPENDITURES 1990-1995 (in millions of US dollars)
Year Military expenditures expenditure each day
1990 1,250 3.424
1991 1,610 4.410
1992 1,450 3.972
1993 1,531 4.194
1994 1,646 4.509
1995 (1) 1,879 5.147
Source:
--The Military Balance 1995-96, publication by Oxford University.
--Peru in Numbers 1994, Richard Webb and Graciela Fernandez Baca.
--Magazine Nueva Sociedad (New Society) No. 138, July/August 1995.
(+) Data estimated by World watch Institute, Washington DC USA,
Statistical Summary 1995. (1) These 1995 military expenditures DO
NOT include expenditures resulting from the "war" with Ecuador in
January of last year. Several sources claim that the conflict with
Ecuador cost more than 10 million US dollars per day.
Continued...
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