Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 13:50:47 -0500 (EST) From: Luis Quispe <lquispe-AT-blythe.org> To: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu Cc: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu Subject: Armed Struggle: Balance & Perspective [From El Diario International No. 28, February 1996. To subscribe to EDI, write or call to: BP 705, 1000 Bruxelles 1, Belgium. Telefax:32-2-6494156] ARMED STRUGGLE: BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE In the first part of this article we referred ourselves in detail to the increasing development of the militarization of Peru. We conclude that this fact is directly linked to the phenomenon of the people's war led by the Communist Party of Peru (PCP). As a conclusion we pointed out that the revolutionary war and the militarization of the State are elements of one single political phenomenon. Now it is our turn to show that the Maoist guerrilla, recovered from the hard blow which the capture of president Gonzalo in l992 meant, is intact and continues steadily on its course to conquer power throughout the country. Our purpose is to show that the publicity around the "defeat of Shining Path" emanates and is the product of a well planned disinformation campaign. A fabrication answering to the wider ranging plans of psychological warfare implemented by the Peruvian government with the support of North American experts. It becomes important to explain how this disinformation campaign by the government was structured. It is necessary to see the elements integrating and participating in this psycho-social warfare. Starting from understanding the government's strategy in the field of propaganda, we can better understand the current situation and perspectives of the armed struggle. THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN WARFARE Modern wars are waged on two fundamental terrains: military and propaganda. The written press, radio broadcasts, cinema and mainly television are in the hands of the State mighty weapons aiming, not at the heart of the conflict, but at its brains. They seek to remold how people think. They manipulate the will of the people and at their own will change reality to suit their aims. Disinformation campaigns, by a myriad and one tricks turn defeats into victories, and the most abominable of causes into just and blessed causes. Peru is no exception. The internal warfare being waged since 198O, is waged too in the propaganda and military terrains. For the past 15 years, the administration of turn (Belaunde, Garcia Perez and Fujimori) include within its counterinsurgency plans gigantic disinformation campaigns. Ceaselessly they have announced the "defeat" of the Maoist guerrilla, the "splitting up of Shining Path," the "death of Guzman" and plentiful other farces, some of which fell on their face as soon as they were fabricated. The disinformation campaign acquires greater intensity after September of 1992, when antiterrorist police captures the chief of the revolution in Peru. The axis of this campaign centers on the "defeat of Shining Path." It pretends to show that without the physical presence of its leader, the PCP will not be able to withstand the offensive of the repressive forces of the State. This strategy is based exclusively in the manipulation of information. Through "reports," altered figures, film staging and other resources of modern information techniques, a fragmented, split up, aimless and fully agonizing and militarily defeated "Shining Path" was fabricated. We plainly lost track of how many times the regime and its publicists have proclaimed victory over the people's war and the PCP. Nobody in Peru has the facilities to calculate even approximately how many tons of paper and ink have been used to publicize the end of the Maoist guerrilla. THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCY SERVICES (SIN) AND THE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION The psycho-social warfare is designed as an axis which puts into motion the strategies labeled by the regime "the living and democratic forces of society." Under this euphemism they refer to the means of communication, polit cal parties, churches, religious sects, pseudo-popular organizations, industrial and trade unions, "non-governmental organizations" (NGO's), and so on. Starting from the new counterinsurgency plans it will be the Armed Forces and the National Intelligence Service (SIN) who will decide what gets published and what Peruvians will be able to read. On 16 January 1993, Fujimori warned that "any information which is not in agreement with that in the Possession of the SIN, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense and the government, must be properly evaluated " (El Comercio 18 January 1993.) Within the structure of the psycho-social warfare, a primary role is reserved to the media of communications and the NGO's devoted to study the subversion. These reinforce their links with the government and support the plans and actions conducted by the Armed Forces and the SIN. Both the press and some key NGO's, which since 1980 take an active part in the counterinsurgency war, become key players of the military and psycho-social strategy by the State. As we can see further on, it will be the press and the "analysts" of the "sendero phenomenon" who will fabricate the great government victories and will announce again and again the defeat of "Shining Path." Replace handsome Don Juan Tenorio by the midget skunk Fujimori, and we can hear Zorrilla impeaching him: los muertos que vos matais gozan de buena salud! [Those dead you have killed indeed enjoy good heath!]. But just how does the government's propaganda machine works? As examples we will mention the works of three notorious NGO's and one magazine (Caretas). Desco, Ideele and PeruPaz (1) are the most important Peruvian NGO's devoted to study the subversion. Periodically they present ample and "documented" report on political violence. Said reports are taken, in Peru and abroad, as most rigorous and objective with respect to the insurgency. Whatever version these institutions come up with, will be diffused by the mass media in Peru and abroad. These "valuable" reports, which appear to be serious and well based, come from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense and the SIN. None of these institutions and none of the mainstream media in Peru conduct any kind of independent study on the subversive activity. All this is reduced to propagate figures and statistics elaborated by the government. INVESTIGADORES OR FORGERERS? Let's see how "Ideele" does its work. Since 1992, this magazine has been devoted to falsify the figures concerning the Maoist insurgency. It did before 1992 also, but not so unabashedly. Then, for instance, to Ideele in the year 1992 the insurgency carried out 1,968 actions (164 per month). In 1993 it pointed out that the insurgency carried on 1,028 actions (85 per month). In 1994 it told us there were only 613 actions (51 per month). At first glance, and taking as true the figures given by Ideele, we'd have to conclude insurgency in Peru is in a catastrophic decline. Starting from the accounting of actions done by this magazine one would have to admit that the counterinsurgency policy of the Fujimorite regime has been a success, because it reduced the number of actions >from 164 per month in 1992 to only 51 per month in 1994. "Ideele," as part of its disinformation campaign, enhances its credibility and scientific approach by way extremely attractive, artistically and otherwise, graphs and charts, in full color and, though no Mickey Mouse is yet used to relieve the readers' boredom, there is always a future; these colorful fireworks "prove" the inevitable demise of the guerrilla. But, what is the truth as supported by facts? In a confidential report, not much publicized, (2) the Armed Forces admit that in 1992 the guerrilla did 2,992 actions (249 per month), that is, 1,024 actions more than reported by Ideele. The same report says that in 1993 the guerrilla did 3,670 actions (305 per month). That is, not less than 2,642 more actions than the "scientifically elaborated" figure given by "Ideele." For 1994 the Armed Forces report shows that for the 8-month period from January to August the guerrilla did 1,299 actions (162 per month). This means more than 5 guerrilla attacks every 24 hours. (See Table 1.) "For a sample, one button is enough," we could decree after having quoted the magazine Ideele. The technique this magazine uses for its disinformation work comes from a counterinsurgency manual in intensive use by the Peruvian media. This situation is summarized as follows by Ideele itself: "With the support from the communications media it has been possible for the past few months to cast outside the front pages the most serious terrorist attempts being committed ... As part of the same psycho-social campaign we have managed to create a victorious image over the subversive groups, which is significantly greater than the real victories that have been achieved." (3) THE SAME DESTINATION. The works of "Desco" and "Perupaz" follow the same direction as "Ideele." These two NGO's employ the same kinds of tricks as Ideele so as "to defeat Shining Path." In January-August 1994 (8 months) the aforementioned Armed Forces report shows 1,299 actions. But what is the version by these two NGO's? In the same period "Desco" delivers a "report" registering only 511 guerrilla actions (64 per month). Less than half the figure reported by the Armed Forces! In turn in the 7-month January to July period Perupez reports only 289 guerrilla actions (41 per month), which is only 25.5 % of the actions accounted by the government. And Ideele only reports 460 actions (57 per month). How's that for objectivity? That is Fujimori's style of winning wars. (See Table 2.) How come these NGO's, the magazine Caretas and the entire Peruvian press, accustomed to repeat like parrots whatever version they receive, fully masticated, by the Armed Forces, dared to ad lib from the official script? The answer is simple: the much publicized "defeat of Shining Path" becomes absurd if the number of guerrilla actions reported by the Armed Forces for the period 1992-1994 gets published. A figure which, he might add, is sure not to include 100 % of actual guerrilla actions by the PCP, but which nonetheless helps us to debunk the myth about "Shining Path has been defeated." Through its specialized organs (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defense and SIN) the government accounts for less than 157 of the true quantity of guerrilla actions by the PCP. The public is given those more visible and high sounding actions which no one could be able to deny. For instance, in the period from 1980 to 1989 the PCP reports 121,544 guerrilla actions. In the same period, the Armed Forces report only 17,361 actions, or 14.3 % the number of actual guerrilla military and political actions by Perovian insurgency. (See Table 3.) To this must be added that no organ of the State has the capacity to know and keep track of the cover actions carried on by the Maoist guerrilla. Underground and secret political and ideological works are among the basic pillars of the PCP. By any chance is the government able to prevent Maoists from participating in workers strikes, in the work in shanty towns, in the schools, in State enterprises, and so on? Therefore, at best the "statistics" can deliver some index of the development of the insurgency, but without completely reflecting reality. No insurgency in the world can be considered "defeated" if it maintains, as in the case of Peru, a steady increase in the number of political and military actions (see Table 4). Nobody in Peru who isn't physically as well as mentally blind is able to assert that "Shining Path has been annihilated." We also must point out that a revolutionary war needs be considered according to circumstances surrounding it. In the case of Peru, the people's war has a protracted character and consequently the social classes sustaining the Peruvian State and its gigantic repressive forces will be defeated after a prolonged revolutionary period. To resolve the political problems of Peru by means of the war is a long road full of dangers and difficulties. Notes: (1) IDEELE, is a Peruvian magazine published by the Legal Defense Institute, an important NGO linked to the leaders of United Left (IU). It's devoted exclusively to "analyzing" the Maoist guerrilla. DESCO (Center of Studies of Promotional Development) is the largest NGO linked to what in Peru is known as the legal left or IU. This NGO shows profuse activity in the field of publications. PERUPAZ, is a publication of the Constitution and Society Institute, an NGO also linked to the official left. (2) Special Report No. 41, September 1994, page 15, delivers a comment about the confidential statistics of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces with respect to the insurgency. Special Report is a restricted distribution magazine and is published by DESCO, the largest "left" NGO in Peru. (3) Ideele magazine, No. 59-60, December 1993, page 26. TABLE 1 - INSURGENT ACTIONS AND MANIPULATIVE TRICKS Year Armed Actions Ideele Actions Caretas Actions Forces per month per month per month 1992 2992 249 1968 164 1968 164 1993 3670 305 1028 85 1028 85 1994 1299 (1) 162 613 (2) 51 949(3) 79 (1)Figures by Joint Command of Armed Forces Jan.-Aug. 1994 (8 months). (2) Ideele magazine No. 78, Aug. 1995. Figures Jan.-Dec. (12 months.) (3) Caretas magazine of 29 December 1994. Figures for Jan.-Nov. 1994 (11 months). TABLE 2 - ACTIONS IN 1994 ACCORDING TO "ANALYSTS" (Jan.-Aug.) Source Jan-August Monthly Armed Forces 1299 156 DESCO 511 64 IDEELE 460 57 PERUPAZ 289 41 The figures for Desco, Perupaz and the Armed Forces were published in the magazine Special Report No. 41 of September 1994. The figure for Perupaz is only for the 7-month period Jan.-July. Ideele magazine No. 78 of August 1995, article, "And in view of all this, what is Sendero up to?" TABLE 3 - INSURGENT ACTIONS 1980-1989 (Comparative Figures) PCP Per Cent (1) Armed Forces Per Cent (2) 121,455 100.0 17,361 14.3 Source: (1) PCP document, "Elections, No, People's War, Yes," May 1990. (2) Armed Forces. Figures by the Joint Command, published in Special Report No. 41, September 1994. TABLE 4 - INSURGENT ACTIVITY 1980-1993 (Three sources Year Armed Forces Ideele Caretas 1980 219 219 219 1981 715 715 715 1982 892 891 892 1983 1123 1123 1123 1984 1760 1760 1760 1985 2050 2050 2050 1986 2549 2549 2549 1987 2489 2489 2489 1988 2415 2802 2802 1989 3149 3141 2113 1990 2779 2779 2153 1991 2785 2144 2144 1992 2995 1968 1968 1993 3670 613 949 ================================Translated and published by The New Flag, 30-08 Broadway, Suite 159, Queens, NY 11106, USA. E-Mail:lquispe-AT-nyxfer.blythe.org --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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