Date: Sun, 17 Mar 1996 14:55:58 -0500 (EST)
From: Luis Quispe <lquispe-AT-blythe.org>
To: daxtell-AT-connix.com
Cc: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu, kriordan-AT-eden.rutgers.edu
Subject: Armed Struggle: Balance & Perpectives


[From El Diario International No. 28, February 1996. To subscribe to
EDI, write or call to: BP 705, 1000 Bruxelles 1, Belgium.
Telefax:32-2-6494156]

                 ARMED STRUGGLE: BALANCE AND PERSPECTIVE

In the first part of this article we referred ourselves in detail to the
increasing development of the militarization of Peru. We conclude that
this fact is directly linked to the phenomenon of the people's war led by
the Communist Party of Peru (PCP). As a conclusion we pointed out
that the revolutionary war and the militarization of the State are
elements of one single political phenomenon.

Now it is our turn to show that the Maoist guerrilla, recovered from
the hard blow which the capture of president Gonzalo in l992 meant, is
intact and continues steadily on its course to conquer power throughout
the country. Our purpose is to show that the publicity around the
"defeat of Shining Path" emanates and is the product of a well planned
disinformation campaign. A fabrication answering to the wider ranging
plans of psychological warfare implemented by the Peruvian
government with the support of North American experts.

It becomes important to explain how this disinformation campaign by
the government was structured. It is necessary to see the elements
integrating and participating in this psycho-social warfare. Starting from
understanding the government's strategy in the field of propaganda, we
can better understand the current situation and perspectives of the
armed struggle.

             THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN WARFARE

Modern wars are waged on two fundamental terrains: military and
propaganda. The written press, radio broadcasts, cinema and mainly
television are in the hands of the State mighty weapons aiming, not at
the heart of the conflict, but at its brains. They seek to remold how
people think. They manipulate the will of the people and at their own
will change reality to suit their aims. Disinformation campaigns, by a
myriad and one tricks turn defeats into victories, and the most
abominable of causes into just and blessed causes.
Peru is no exception. The internal warfare being waged since 198O, is
waged too in the propaganda and military terrains. For the past 15
years, the administration of turn (Belaunde, Garcia Perez and Fujimori)
include within its counterinsurgency plans gigantic disinformation
campaigns. Ceaselessly they have announced the "defeat" of the Maoist
guerrilla, the "splitting up of Shining Path," the "death of Guzman" and
plentiful other farces, some of which fell on their face as soon as they
were fabricated.

The disinformation campaign acquires greater intensity after September
of 1992, when antiterrorist police captures the chief of the revolution in
Peru. The axis of this campaign centers on the "defeat of Shining
Path." It pretends to show that without the physical presence of its
leader, the PCP will not be able to withstand the offensive of the
repressive forces of the State. This strategy is based exclusively in the
manipulation of information. Through "reports," altered figures, film
staging and other resources of modern information techniques, a
fragmented, split up, aimless and fully agonizing and militarily defeated
"Shining Path" was fabricated. We plainly lost track of how many
times the regime and its publicists have proclaimed victory over the
people's war and the PCP. Nobody in Peru has the facilities to
calculate even approximately how many tons of paper and ink have
been used to publicize the end of the Maoist guerrilla. 
  
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCY SERVICES (SIN) AND THE 
MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

The psycho-social warfare is designed as an axis which puts into
motion the strategies labeled by the regime "the living and democratic
forces of society." Under this euphemism they refer to the means of
communication, polit cal parties, churches, religious sects,
pseudo-popular organizations, industrial and trade unions,
"non-governmental organizations" (NGO's), and so on. Starting from
the new counterinsurgency plans it will be the Armed Forces and the
National Intelligence Service (SIN) who will decide what gets published
and what Peruvians will be able to read. On 16 January 1993, Fujimori
warned that "any information which is not in agreement with that in the
Possession of the SIN, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Defense and the government, must be properly evaluated " (El
Comercio 18 January 1993.)

    Within the structure of the psycho-social warfare, a primary role is
reserved to the media of communications and the NGO's devoted to
study the subversion. These reinforce their links with the government
and support the plans and actions conducted by the Armed Forces and
the SIN. Both the press and some key NGO's, which since 1980 take
an active part in the counterinsurgency war, become key players of the
military and psycho-social strategy by the State. As we can see further
on, it will be the press and the "analysts" of the "sendero phenomenon"
who will fabricate the great government victories and will announce
again and again the defeat of "Shining Path."
Replace handsome Don Juan Tenorio by the midget skunk Fujimori,
and we can hear Zorrilla impeaching him: los muertos que vos matais
gozan de buena salud! [Those dead you have killed indeed enjoy good
heath!]. But just how does the government's propaganda machine
works? As examples we will mention the works of three notorious
NGO's and one magazine (Caretas). Desco, Ideele and PeruPaz (1) are
the most important Peruvian NGO's devoted to study the subversion.
Periodically they present ample and "documented" report on political
violence. Said reports are taken, in Peru and abroad, as most rigorous
and objective with respect to the insurgency. Whatever version these
institutions come up with, will be diffused by the mass media in Peru
and abroad. These "valuable" reports, which appear to be serious and
well based, come from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Defense and the SIN. None of these institutions and none of the
mainstream media in Peru conduct any kind of independent study on
the subversive activity. All this is reduced to propagate figures and
statistics elaborated by the government.

               INVESTIGADORES OR FORGERERS?

Let's see how "Ideele" does its work. Since 1992, this magazine has
been devoted to falsify the figures concerning the Maoist insurgency. It
did before 1992 also, but not so unabashedly. Then, for instance, to
Ideele in the year 1992 the insurgency carried out 1,968 actions (164
per month). In 1993 it pointed out that the insurgency carried on 1,028
actions (85 per month). In 1994 it told us there were only 613 actions
(51 per month). At first glance, and taking as true the figures given by
Ideele, we'd have to conclude insurgency in Peru is in a catastrophic
decline.

Starting from the accounting of actions done by this magazine one
would have to admit that the counterinsurgency policy of the Fujimorite
regime has been a success, because it reduced the number of actions
>from 164 per month in 1992 to only 51 per month in 1994. "Ideele," as
part of its disinformation campaign, enhances its credibility and
scientific approach by way extremely attractive, artistically and
otherwise, graphs and charts, in full color and, though no Mickey
Mouse is yet used to relieve the readers' boredom, there is always a
future; these colorful fireworks "prove" the inevitable demise of the
guerrilla.

But, what is the truth as supported by facts? In a confidential report,
not much publicized, (2) the Armed Forces admit that in 1992 the
guerrilla did 2,992 actions (249 per month), that is, 1,024 actions more
than reported by Ideele. The same report says that in 1993 the guerrilla
did 3,670 actions (305 per month). That is, not less than 2,642 more
actions than the "scientifically elaborated" figure given by "Ideele." For
1994 the Armed Forces report shows that for the 8-month period from
January to August the guerrilla did 1,299 actions (162 per month). This
means more than 5 guerrilla attacks every 24 hours. (See Table 1.)

"For a sample, one button is enough," we could decree after having
quoted the magazine Ideele. The technique this magazine uses for its
disinformation work comes from a counterinsurgency manual in
intensive use by the Peruvian media. This situation is summarized as
follows by Ideele itself: "With the support from the communications
media it has been possible for the past few months to cast outside the
front pages the most serious terrorist attempts being committed ... As
part of the same psycho-social campaign we have managed to create a
victorious image over the subversive groups, which is significantly
greater than the real victories that have been achieved." (3)

                   THE SAME DESTINATION.

The works of "Desco" and "Perupaz" follow the same direction as
"Ideele." These two NGO's employ the same kinds of tricks as Ideele
so as "to defeat Shining Path." In January-August 1994 (8 months) the
aforementioned Armed Forces report shows 1,299 actions. But what is
the version by these two NGO's? 
In the same period "Desco" delivers a "report" registering only 511
guerrilla actions (64 per month). Less than half the figure reported by
the Armed Forces! In turn in the 7-month January to July period
Perupez reports only 289 guerrilla actions (41 per month), which is
only 25.5 % of the actions accounted by the government. And Ideele
only reports 460 actions (57 per month). How's that for objectivity?
That is Fujimori's style of winning wars. (See Table 2.)

How come these NGO's, the magazine Caretas and the entire Peruvian
press, accustomed to repeat like parrots whatever version they receive,
fully masticated, by the Armed Forces, dared to ad lib from the official
script?

The answer is simple: the much publicized "defeat of Shining Path"
becomes absurd if the number of guerrilla actions reported by the
Armed Forces for the period 1992-1994 gets published. A figure
which, he might add, is sure not to include 100 % of actual guerrilla
actions by the PCP, but which nonetheless helps us to debunk the myth
about "Shining Path has been defeated."

Through its specialized organs (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of
Defense and SIN) the government accounts for less than 157 of the true
quantity of guerrilla actions by the PCP. The public is given those
more visible and high sounding actions which no one could be able to
deny. For instance, in the period from 1980 to 1989 the PCP reports
121,544 guerrilla actions. In the same period, the Armed Forces report
only 17,361 actions, or 14.3 % the number of actual guerrilla military
and political actions by Perovian insurgency. (See Table 3.)

To this must be added that no organ of the State has the capacity to
know and keep track of the cover actions carried on by the Maoist
guerrilla. Underground and secret political and ideological works are
among the basic pillars of the PCP. By any chance is the government
able to prevent Maoists from participating in workers strikes, in the
work in shanty towns, in the schools, in State enterprises, and so on?
Therefore, at best the "statistics" can deliver some index of the
development of the insurgency, but without completely reflecting
reality.

No insurgency in the world can be considered "defeated" if it 
maintains, as in the case of Peru, a steady increase in the number of
political and military actions (see Table 4). Nobody in Peru who isn't
physically as well as mentally blind is able to assert that "Shining Path
has been annihilated." We also must point out that a revolutionary war
needs be considered according to circumstances surrounding it. In the
case of Peru, the people's war has a protracted character and
consequently the social classes sustaining the Peruvian State and its
gigantic repressive forces will be defeated after a prolonged
revolutionary period. To resolve the political problems of Peru by
means of the war is a long road full of dangers and difficulties.

Notes:

(1) IDEELE, is a Peruvian magazine published by the Legal Defense
Institute, an important NGO linked to the leaders of United Left (IU).
It's devoted exclusively to "analyzing" the Maoist guerrilla.
DESCO (Center of Studies of Promotional Development) is the largest
NGO linked to what in Peru is known as the legal left or IU. This
NGO shows profuse activity in the field of publications.
PERUPAZ, is a publication of the Constitution and Society Institute, an
NGO also linked to the official left.

(2) Special Report No. 41, September 1994, page 15, delivers a
comment about the confidential statistics of the Joint Command of the
Armed Forces with respect to the insurgency. Special Report is a
restricted distribution magazine and is published by DESCO, the largest
"left" NGO in Peru.

(3) Ideele magazine, No. 59-60, December 1993, page 26.

TABLE 1 - INSURGENT ACTIONS AND MANIPULATIVE TRICKS

Year    Armed     Actions   Ideele   Actions    Caretas    Actions
        Forces    per month          per month             per month

1992    2992      249        1968    164        1968       164
1993    3670      305        1028    85         1028        85
1994    1299 (1)  162        613 (2) 51         949(3)      79

(1)Figures by Joint Command of Armed Forces Jan.-Aug. 1994 (8       
 months).
(2) Ideele magazine No. 78, Aug. 1995. Figures Jan.-Dec. (12          
months.)
(3) Caretas magazine of 29 December 1994. Figures for Jan.-Nov.       
1994 (11 months).

TABLE 2 - ACTIONS IN 1994 ACCORDING TO "ANALYSTS"
(Jan.-Aug.)

Source            Jan-August          Monthly
Armed Forces       1299                  156
DESCO              511                   64
IDEELE             460                   57
PERUPAZ            289                   41

The figures for Desco, Perupaz and the Armed Forces were published
in the magazine Special Report No. 41 of September 1994.
The figure for Perupaz is only for the 7-month period Jan.-July.
Ideele magazine No. 78 of August 1995, article, "And in view of all
this, what is Sendero up to?"

TABLE 3 - INSURGENT ACTIONS 1980-1989 (Comparative Figures)
PCP      Per Cent (1)     Armed Forces        Per Cent (2)
121,455    100.0             17,361              14.3

Source:
(1) PCP document, "Elections, No, People's War, Yes," May 1990.
(2) Armed Forces. Figures by the Joint Command, published in          
Special Report No. 41, September 1994.

TABLE 4 - INSURGENT ACTIVITY 1980-1993 (Three sources

Year Armed Forces     Ideele       Caretas
1980      219            219          219
1981      715            715          715
1982      892            891          892
1983      1123           1123         1123
1984      1760           1760          1760
1985      2050           2050          2050
1986      2549           2549          2549
1987      2489           2489          2489
1988      2415           2802          2802
1989      3149           3141          2113
1990      2779           2779          2153
1991      2785           2144          2144
1992      2995           1968          1968
1993      3670            613           949
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