Date: Wed, 17 Apr 1996 22:56:16 +0200 To: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu From: Luciano Dondero <DOND001-AT-IT.net> Subject: DEMSOC-L More on Mexico (fwd) >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Tue, 16 Apr 1996 20:54:25 EDT >From: Dan La Botz <103144.2651-AT-COMPUSERVE.COM> >To: Multiple recipients of list SLDRTY-L <SLDRTY-L-AT-LISTSERV.SYR.EDU> >Subject: Mexican Labor News and Analysis #7 > >Dear Robin and others, > The following is Mexico Labor News and Analysis #7, April 15, 1996. > Best, > Dan > >MEXICAN LABOR NEWS AND ANALYSIS >Vol. I, No. 7, April 15, 1996 > > Year Long Struggle Ends > ROUTE 100 WORKERS AND GOVERNMENT > APPEAR TO HAVE RESOLVED CONFLICT > by Dan La Botz > After more than a year of struggle, the workers of the >former Route 100 bus company and the Federal District appear to >have come to an agreement. The struggle began in April of 1995 >when the Federal District privatized the state-owned bus-company >Route 100 and laid-off about 12,000 workers thus eliminating >their independent union (SUTAUR). > The terms of the agreement provide that the union will >receive control of three of the several bus companies which will >replace Route 100, workers will receive additional severance >money, and there will be a legal review of the charges against >the 11 leaders and advisors of SUTAUR who are currently held in >prison. The latter point is understood to be tantamount to >amnesty for the SUTAUR leaders. > The union has lifted its "planton," or sit-in, in front of >the Federal District offices, and several union members and >supporters have ended their hunger strikes, the longest having >gone on for forty days. > Nevertheless, the final negotiations are not concluded, and >a group called "Renovacion 2000," claiming to represent 4,000 >members and retirees of SUTAUR (what appears to be a great >exaggeration), has demanded to participate in discussions with >the government. > Given the Mayor's long-history of manipulation and >maneuvers, one hesitates to call the matter finished until the >prisoners have been released, the companies turned over to the >union, and the workers have received their checks. >Why Did They Settle? The Union > Why, after a year of bitter struggle, did the Federal >District government and the SUTAUR leadership finally settle? For >over a year the great majority of the union members refused to >sign away their rights to their jobs and accept their severance >pay. The independent bus drivers' union showed a remarkable >tenacity throughout 370 some days, with hundreds of >demonstrations and militant confrontations with the authorities. >But finally the long battle had taken its toll. > But in the last few weeks the workers' unity began to break >down in two different ways. First, hundreds of SUTAUR members, >perhaps in the end as many as 3,000, felt forced by circumstances >to sign away their jobs and accept their severance pay--though >many of those remained active in the movement. > Second, just in the last two weeks, for the first time since >the fight began, an opposition group representing several hundred >SUTAUR members formed and called for an end to struggle. It seems >that faced with the possibility that its forces, which had held >together so remarkably, would finally begin to break up, the >SUTAUR leadership decided to settle on the best terms possible. >Of the original 12,000 SUTAUR workers who originally lost their >jobs a year ago, 9,000 continued the battle until the end. >Why Did They Settle? The PRI > The PRI-government had its own reasons for settling the >strike. First, of course, was the fact that the SUTAUR workers, >though their leaders were jailed and the members frequently >beaten in confrontations with the police, refused to be starved >into submission. SUTAUR members would not go away. > Second, however, was the political situation. In the state >of Guerrero on the Pacific Coast, there were a series of >political assassinations and massacres, the largest at Aguas >Blancas involving the murder of 17 people, which led President >Zedillo to force the resignation of Guerrero's governor Ruben >Figueroa Alcocer. In Tepotzlan in the state of Morelos, an hour >from Mexico City, the police fired into a crowd killing one man >and wounding several others. The PRI governed both states. > Evidently the Institutional Revolutionary Party leadership >and President Zedillo, who ultimately controls the Federal >District and its Mayor, appear to have decided that at this time >he could not afford yet another confrontational and potentially >explosive situation continuing in Mexico City itself. > Third, Zedillo and the Institutional Revolutionary Party >(PRI) and its government have attempted to negotiate a series of >agreements both regionally and nationally, supposedly to reform >and democratize the state. In Chiapas, the government is >currently negotiating the issue of democracy and justice with the >Zapatista Army of National Liberation. At the national level the >PRI-government has just revealed the political reforms it worked >out principally with the Party of the Democratic Revolution. >Zedillo apparently wanted to end the conflict with CEDAR before >unveiling his "democratic reforms." >Significance of the SUTAUR Struggle > The SUTAUR struggle has been one of the most important, >probably the most important labor union struggle of Mexico in the >1990s. A year-long battle by 12,000 workers in the heart of >Mexico City, SUTAUR's fight put working class politics and issues >in the newspapers and on radio and television nearly everyday. >Strikers, their spouses and children, appeared in feature stories >and every op-ed page was full of opinions. > The privatization of Route 100 was characteristic of the >economic model known in Latin America as "neo-liberalism." The >SUTAUR issues were typical and representative of dozens of other >similar struggles in Mexico: the privatization of a state-owned >industry, in this case public transport; the destruction of an >independent labor union and its contract; an atmosphere of >violence and repression. The violence in this case was >exceptional involving the beating of union activists, the jailing >of 11 union leaders and advisors, the suicide of the head of >public transportation, the murder of the prosecuting attorney and >the assassination of a judge sympathetic to the union. SUTAUR >came to symbolize the struggle of Mexican workers against neo- >liberalism and its effects. > SUTAUR's struggle led to the creation of a broad solidarity >movement for the independent union, both within Mexico and around >the world. In Mexico, many other independent unions and >democratic currents rallied to the support of SUTAUR. Independent >university unions and other independent unions such as the >Authentic Labor Front (FAT) came to the defense of SUTAUR. >Internationally SUTAUR received help from unions in various >countries, most notably perhaps, from the American Federation of >Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) of the >United States. Amnesty International and other human rights >organizations criticized the Mexican government for its treatment >of SUTAUR. > SUTAUR's fight also sparked an attempted reorganization and >reconstruction of the independent unions. On May 1, 1995, when >the "official" unions of the Congress of Labor (CT) and the >Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) decided not to carry out >the usual May Day or international labor day march, SUTAUR and >its allies took to the streets, together with many other >organizations. Out of that experience came the "Intersindical >Primero de Mayo," or the May 1st Coordinating Committee of >unions, an attempt to form an alternative central labor body of >independent unions and democratic currents in "official" unions. > Other Mexican and international labor unionists, peasant >organizations, non-government organizations, and human rights >groups rallied to the side of SUTAUR primarily to defend an >independent union and its workers from attack by the state. Such >support was all the more remarkable because of SUTAUR's long- >history of hostility to and criticism of all other labor and >political organizations. > SUTAUR's leadership, made up entirely of members of the >Independent Proletarian Movement (MPI), a neo-Stalinist political >sect, viewed all other political organizations as either sell- >outs or traitors. In the past SUTAUR shunned the very kind of >working-class and social coalitions which came to its aid. >Unfortunately, there is no indication that the experience of this >struggle has changed the minds of the SUTAUR leadership or its >membership, which remains contemptuous of the rest of the labor >movement. > Nevertheless, SUTAUR's struggle shows that it is possible >for an independent union--at least a large one with long >experience in an important economic area--to struggle and >survive. But to do so it must expect everything from the >employers and the state: beatings, jail, and even murder. SUTAUR >provided an heroic example for other Mexican workers, for workers >in the United States and Canada, for Latin American unionists and >workers around the world. > ### > TEN PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS JOIN > IN NATIONAL PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS > April 10, the anniversary of the assassination of peasant >leader Emiliano Zapata by the founders of the modern Mexican >state 77 years ago, is a traditional date for the workers of the >countryside to demonstrate. Often the "official" or government >controlled National Confederation of Peasants (CNC) has channeled >these demonstrations into support for the Institutional >Revolutionary party and the government. > This year, however, ten independent peasant organizations >coalesced to organize demonstrations in Mexico City and other >parts of Mexico to demand improvements for the rural workers. The >joining together of these ten groups for this day of protest >represents an important if tentative step forward for the >independent agricultural workers and peasants unions. >In Mexico City > At the Monument to the Revolution in central Mexico City, >the ten peasant organizations called for a 100 percent increase >in government investment in the countryside, to equal 3 percent >of the Gross National Product, or 65 billion pesos. > The peasant organizations also called for changes in Article >27 of the Mexican Constitution in order to protect the "ejidos," >or collectively owned farms, and Indians' communal properties. >The independent peasant unions demanded changes in the >constitution to give Mexican citizens a "right to food." The >peasants demanded respect for human rights, and expressed their >solidarity with the struggles of urban and industrial workers. >The peasant workers' groups called for a meeting with government >officials to deal with these issues. >Manifesto: "Dear General Zapata..." > A manifesto by the 10 organizations titled "Parte de Guerra >al General Emiliano Zapata" and written in the present tense as a >military communique to the dead general, wrote that the >government was "allied with the other side, with your old >enemies, General Zapata, with the gringos, the bosses, the >bankers and reactionaries who organized in the National Action >Party. This government demands savings and sacrifice to get out >of the crisis, but doesn't come to us or listen to our ideas, it >prefers to go on protecting the landlords, politicians and the >earning of the bankers. Its strategy is to hang us economically >in order to force us to rent or sell our collectively owned lands >(ejidos)." > Peasant leaders and activists express the hope that the ten >independent organizations which joined together for the national >day of protest will be able to join in other on-going activities >or perhaps in a coalition. > The ten organizations which participated were: Coalicion de >Organizaciones Democraticas Urbanas y Campesinas (CODUC); Central >Campesina Cardenista (CCC); Central Independiente de Obreros >Agricolas y Campesinos (CIOAC); Coordinadora Nacional Plan de >Ayala (CNPA); Union Campesina Democratic (UCD); Union Nacional de >Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autonomas (UNORCA); Union >Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas (UNTA); Union General Obrero >Campesina Popular (UGOCP); Coordinadora Nacional Santa Cruz >(CNSC) y Confederacion Agrarista Mexicana (CAM). >In Chiapas > At the same time in Chiapas, about 80 organizations which >participate in Aedpch (the Democratic State Assembly of the >People of Chiapas) and supporters of the Zapatista Front of >National Liberation (EZLN) mobilized several thousand indigenous >peoples and peasants in demonstrations throughout the state in >remembrance of Zapata. EZLN supporters also founded the National >Indigenous Network made up of Indian organizations throughout >Mexico. > In response both to the peasant organizations' pressure and >to the growing misery in the countryside, president Zedillo >announced an emergency program costing 1,137,000 pesos to create >temporary jobs in the countryside. The program funded through the >government's PROCAMPO program will provide jobs for 10,000 >agricultural engineers to help deal with problems of soil >erosion, the use of fertilizers, and irrigation. >Agricultural Catastrophe > Mexico's farmers and peasants find themselves in an economic >and social crisis which has become a genuine social disaster. The >fundamental reason for the crisis is Mexico's inability either to >modernize agriculture or to adapt traditional agricultural to >modern conditions, very much a long term problem going back to >the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920 if not before. But the short >term causes of the current problems are more specific. > First, as a result of the lowering of tariff and quotas and >the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement Mexico has >been forced to compete with foreign produce, and often found >themselves losing, particularly to U.S. agribusiness. Partly as a >result of that competition, Mexico's farmers and peasants were >forced deep into debt, fell far in arrears, and today many, >perhaps most, find themselves unable to pay. Wealthier farmers >and ranchers have organized the independent movement El Barzon to >demand the renegotiation of debts and changes in the government's >economic policy. The poorer peasants have organized through their >peasant unions to demand relief of one sort or another. Or in >Chiapas some poor peasants joined the armed rebellion of 1994 led >by the Zapatistas (EZLN). > Second, a few years ago former President Salinas pushed >through the Mexican legislature changes in Constitutional Article >27 which permitted the renting and selling of lands of the >"ejidos" or collectively owned farms. For many years before the >ejidos had been being sold off, by the Constitutional amendment >legalized the formerly illicit practice, and accelerated the >break up of the communal lands. > As a result, according to Rafael Jacobo Garcia, president, >and Federico Ovalle Vaquera, secretary general, of the >Independent Central of Agricultural Workers and Peasants (CIOAC), >more than a million hectares of peasant ejidos have been sold in >the last three years. (Hectare=2.471 acres.) Ovalle says that >this amounts to about 10 percent of the ejidal lands. Many >peasants have sold their land, being reduced to "jornaleros" or >day laborers, or leaving the countryside for the city, the >border, or the Untied States. > Third, parts of Mexico have suffered a deep drought, leading >to a decline in grain production and the death of many head of >cattle. Mexican Minister of Agriculture Francisco Labastida Ochoa >indicated that Mexico would have to import an additional 3 >million tons of grain this year because of the drought, bringing >the total of imported grain to 9 million tons. > The "official" or government-controlled National Peasant >Confederation (CNC) has called for an increase in government >programs for agriculture because of the "virtual stagnation" of >agricultural production. Between 1987 and 1993 the agricultural >sector grew by 0.9 percent annually, while the entire economy >grew by 2.4 percent and the population by 2.0 percent. > The disaster in the countryside, particularly in the arid >northern regions and in the poorest states of Central and >Southern Mexico, has led to an increase in poverty, to hunger, >and in some few cases even to starvation. Mexico's rural workers >stand on the edge of catastrophe. So, on April 11, 1996 ten >peasant organizations joined together to call for a change in the >direction of state policies to prevent the cataclysm in the >countryside. > ### > MAY DAY 1996-- > WHO'S MARCHING? > AND AT WHAT PRICE? > May Day in Mexico as around the world (except in the United >States) is the international labor day, harkening back to the >fight for the eight hour day in Chicago in 1886 and the martyrdom >of the leaders of the Haymarket demonstration. > In Mexico, early on the state captured the unions and turned >May Day into the "official" labor salute to the Mexican >President. For years the "official" unions have paraded their >members before the Mexican President, hailing the chief and the >Institutional Revolutionary Party. And nearly every year >independent unionists either attempted to enter the "official" >May Day March--and usually got beaten and bashed by the >"official" union goon squads and the police--or were forced to >hold an alternative independent union march or rally. > Last year, May Day 1995, the Congress of Labor (CT) called >off its march, and the independents took to the streets as unions >joined with social movements, non-governmental organizations >(NGOs) and opposition political parties to produced the first >real labor day celebration in decades. > A few weeks ago Congress of Labor president Rafael >Rivapalacio Pontes (in reality spokesman for Fidel Velazquez, >head of the Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM) announced that >the "official" unions would not demonstrate again this year. >However an opposition current within the official unions, the >Federation of Unions of Goods and Services (FESEBES), led by >Francisco Hernandez Juarez, and a broader group made up of >FESEBES and other "official" and independent unions known as the >"Foro Group" announced they would march. Rivapalacio then told >them that if they marched they would be expelled from the >Congress of Labor. > Now, however, Fidel Velazquez has spoken, announcing that >the dissident and opposition unionists can march without fear of >reprisal. Despite Velazquez withdrawal of the earlier threat of >expulsion, the whole business has revealed once again the >bureaucratic mentality of the CT and CTM leadership, and the >atmosphere of threats and intimidation which is responsible for a >good part of the famous "discipline" of the Mexican labor >federations. It is not the discipline of real union movement, but >the discipline of a conscript army where every officer hopes for >promotion and every soldier fears the stockade. > ### > Contract Settlements > And Strikes >Auto Industry > About 6,000 unionized workers and 600 casual workers at the >Ford Cuatitlan Izcalli plant settled their contract with the Ford >Motor Company of Mexico without a strike. The new contract calls >for salary increases of 26 percent, well above the average for >the industry and for workers as a whole. The contract was >negotiated by Juan Jose Sosa of the Confederation of Mexican >Workers. >Telephone Industry > Also without a strike, the Mexican Telephone Workers Union >led by Francisco Hernandez Juarez negotiated a new agreement for >its members, amounting to 20 percent in wage increases and 5 >percent in benefits. >La Jornada newspaper > The 300 workers at the LA JORNADA newspaper settled their >contract after a two-day strike, the second in the newspaper's >history. Workers received a 12 percent wage increase, and changes >in the contract providing for greater productivity bonuses. >Strike at Singer > Workers at Singer of Mexico went on strike on April 11, >demanding a 45 percent wage increase. The company had offered the >264 workers a 15 percent increase. The plant produces 270 sewing >machines each day, most of which are sold abroad in Latin America >and the United States. > ### > Authentic Labor Front: > Two Small Battles Continue > Workers associated with the Authentic Labor Front (FAT) >continue fights for basic labor union rights at two small >workplaces, one in Leon, Guanajuato and the other at San Juanico >in the State of Mexico. > In Leon, workers at Transportes "Los Angeles" continue to >fight for their jobs and their independent union. Management >fired the workers after they attempted to organize the union, so >far the state labor boards have provided the workers with no >relief. > In Mexico City, workers at the Zinc plant which produces >zinc powder for use in the manufacture of automobile tires >continue their fight for an independent union. Last Thursday >workers at the plant had a hearing at the Federal Labor Board >(Junta Federal de Conciliacion y Arbitraje) but neither the >employer not the "official" CTM union showed up for the hearing. >The Junta's summons server said that he had been unable to find >the employer in order to serve the summons, a typical delaying >tactic in Mexican labor relations. The union told the judge it >would take him by the hand to find their boss. > ### > Social Statistics > Stock Market and Peso Both Up-- > Workers, Peasants and the Poor, Still Down > The Mexican stock exchange reached historic highs in early >April, and the Mexican peso recuperated a tiny bit of its value >vis-a-vis the dollar. But most Mexican businesses have not yet >recuperated, the crisis continues. Most Mexican workers, peasants >and the poor are no better off. >UNEMPLOYMENT > In 1995, 1,677,000 Mexican workers lost their jobs. (Renato >Davalos, "Bajo 19% la Inversion Publica; Desempleo de 1.6 >Milliones," EXCELSIOR, 2 April 1996.) Just to take one example, >from one sector, in 1995 8,300 bank workers lost their jobs. >(Veronica Valdes G., "Despidieron a 8,300 empleados bancarios en >95," UNOMASUNO, 3 April 1996). However, in March open >unemployment in Mexico City fell by 1.2 points, to 10.4 percent >of the economically active population. (Rafael Gimenez and >Guillermo Aguilar, "Baja desempleo en el DF," REFORMA, 12 April >1996). >WAGES AND SALARIES > A number of recent studies indicate the Mexican workers' >wages have continued to fall. A study by the Multidisciplinary >Center of Analysis (CAM) of the Mexican Autonomous National >University (UNAM), found that between December of 1987 and april >of 1996, the minimum wage registered an accumulated loss of 65.5 >percent. In the same period of time the shopping basket of 31 >basic goods and services has risen in price 913 percent while the >minimum wage has risen only 249 percent, thus leading to a 67.5 >percent loss in real purchasing power. Nearly all other Mexican >wages tied to the minimum wage. (Jesus Castillo, "Pierden minimos >65.5 percent," REFORMA, 15 April 1996.) > The office of the Mexican Federal Attorney for Consumers >reported that between January and April of 1996, the basic goods >and services registered extremely great increases. Chicken, for >example, increased in price by between 30 and 37 percent. >(Patricia Munos Rios, "Profeco: desorbitadas alzas en articulos >basicos," LA JORNADA, 11 Abril 1996.) The National Consumer Price >Index rose 2.2 percent in March in comparison with the month of >February 1996. The first trimester inflation rose to 8.35 >percent, and the annual inflation rate would be projected at >43.75 percent, according to the Bank of Mexico. (Roberto Aviles, >"Sube inflacion 2.2 en marzo," REFORMA, 10 April 1996.) >INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION > Unemployment and low wages and in part a reflection of low >levels of industrial production. Worst off is the construction >industry which is reported to be at its lowest point in the last >57 years, according to chamber president Fernando Acosta >Martinez. Construction's participation in the gross national >product fell last year by 22 percent. (Ignacio Herrera, "Sufre la >Industria de la Construccion su Peor Recession en 57 anos: >Acosta," EXCELSIOR, 4 April 1996.) > The overall industrial activity of Mexico fell by 0.2% in >January, compared with January of 1995. Construccion fell by 9 >percent for the year. (Juan Antonio Zuniga, "La actividad >industrial del pais descendio 0.2% en enero; se contrajo 9% la >construccion: SHCP," LA JORNADA, 10 April 1996.) > What has caused the decline of Mexican industry? A study by >the employer associacion Concanaco and INEGI, the Mexican >Institute of Statistics, found that the North American Free Trade >Agreement had had a negative effect on 59.83% of Mexican >commercial establishments. (Particia Munoz Rios, "El TLC resulta >negativo para el 59.83% de los comericantes del pais: Concanaco e >INEGI," LA JORNADA 16 April 1996.) >MAQUILADORAS > The one area which continues to grow is the maquiladora >sector. Maquiladoras, in-bond plants mostly owned by foreign >companies and producing almost exclusively for export, reported a >growth of 10.4 percent in January according to INEGI, the Mexican >Institute of Statistics. The total number of maquiladora workers >reached 692,142 persons. (J. Carlos Ocampo H., "Crecio 10.4% la >industria maquiladora en enero: INEGI," UNOMASUNO, 3 April 1996.) > At the same time the National Institute of Ecology (INE) >found that 65.3 percent of the 1,408 maquiladoras surveyed could >not show the final and legal destination of dangerous toxic >waste. Such waste is now estimated at 16,054 tons annually. >Nearly one third of the plants return their toxic waste to the >United States, and 5.4 percent have legal locations in Mexico. >The rest have no explanation of what happens to their poisonous >industrial by-products. (Ethel Riquelme F., "INE: 65.3% de l,408 >Maquiladoras no Puede Comprobar el Destino de Desechos Toxicos," >EXCELSIOR, 4 april 1996.) >THE STATE OF THE WORKING CLASS > Poverty affects sixty million Mexicans and is producing >children with irreversible physical, mental and educational >deficits, according to Jose Alfonso Solorzano Fraga, president of >the Commission of Distribution and Management of Consumer Goods >and Services of the lower house of the Mexican legislature. The >state, he says, has proven unable to keep up with the problems of >poverty and is falling further behind. (Elizabeth Velasco >Contreras, "La Pobreza Afecta a 60 Milliones de mexicanos; Surgen >Generaciones de Infantes Minusvalidos," EXCELSIOR, 4 April 1996.) > According to Unicef, 30 percent of the children in Mexico >suffer from malnutrition. (Julieta Medina, "Sufre desnutricion el >30 percent de los ninos en Mexico.-Unicef," REFORMA 30 march >1996.) > Latin America has much lower productivity than the >industrialized countries according to a study by the Economic >Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). >Productivity is two to three times less in Latin America, says >CEPAL. ("Baja Productivity de Trabajadores de America latina: >CEPAL," EXCELSIOR, 4 April 1996.) > Two-thirds of Mexico's working class has either had little >or no education or has only finished primary school (6th grade), >according to the Mexican Institute of Statistics (INEGI). > Mexico's total population is 90 million, of whom 34 million >form the economically active population (or PEA). Of that 34 >million, 4 million have never had any sort of education; 7.4 >million never finished primary school (6th grade); another 7.16 >million have finished 6th grade; another 2 million never finished >secondary school (10th grade); and another 6.5 million did finish >secondary school (10th grade); just over a million never finished >preparatory school (12th grade); and finally 2.24 did complete 12 >grade. (Jaime Contreras, "Sin Instruccion o Apenas on Primaria, >18.5 Milliones de Trabajadores," EXCELSIOR, 3 April 1996.) > With no wages and little education, it is not surprising >then, that 21 percent of the Mexican population doesn't own even >one book, and 16 percent own between 1 and 5 books. Those who own >books are most likely to own a dictionary or a bible, according >to a study by Formacion de Ofertas y Publicos Culturales (Focyp). >(Renato Ravelo, "La gente en Mexico no lee; 21% de los mexicanos >carece de un libro," LA JORNADA, 16 April 1996.) > Another result of unemployment and low wages is the >persistence of child labor. Since 1992, the number of children >working in the streets of the Federal District which includes >Mexico City has increased by 20 percent. There are now about >13,000 children who work in petty sales, begging, and washing >windows in the intersections, according to UNICEF. ("Desde 1992 >aumento 20% el numero de los ninos que laboran en las calles del >DF; hay mas de 13 mil," UNOMASUNO, 2 April 1996.) University >investigators estimate that among the 40,000 agricultural >laborers in Baja California each year, between 18 and 35 percent >are children. (Antonio Heras, "En Baja California, hasta 35% de >los jornaleros son menores de edad," LA JORNADA, 15 April 1996.) > Yet another product of the economic crisis is an increase in >crime. In 1995 there were reportedly 599 crimes daily in the >country, an increase of 35.5 percent compared with the previous >year. ("599 delitos diarios en el pais durante 1995; aumentaron >35.5%," UNOMASUNO, 4 April, 1996.) > Mexico's prison population continues to grow beyond the >capacity of the penitentiaries. The penitentiary population of >December 1995 rose to 23,574 prisoners, an overpopulation of >2,026. ("2,026 internos, sobrepoblacion nacional en carceles: >Robledo," UNOMASUNO, 4 April 1996.) >SOCIAL STRUGGLE > In the first two months of 1996 Mexico City saw 292 >demonstrations involving 56,127 persons, the daily equivalent of >4.8 marches daily, according to the Secretary of Government of >the Federal District. In January alone there were 146 >demonstrations including sit-ins, marches, hunger strikes, >blocked streets and meetings--about 5 per day. February saw 136 >demonstrations. Most of the demonstrations could be attributed to >SUTAUR, the union of the bus drivers of Route 100. In January and >February, among political groups, the PRD held 116 >demonstrations, the PRI 13 and the PAN 1. Other groups held 140. >(Victor Ballinas, "Se realizaron 292 marchas en los primeros >meses del 96," LA JORNADA, 30 march 1996.) > End of Issue #7 > ### > > --Luciano Dondero-- --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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