Date: Sun, 28 Apr 1996 20:54:43 -0400 (EDT) From: Louis N Proyect <lnp3-AT-columbia.edu> To: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU Subject: Nicaragua: A historic opportunity lost? In 1961, Fidel Castro announced to the world that he was a "Marxist- Leninist". This marked the beginning of a deepening of the Cuban revolution and a decisive move toward abolishing capitalist property relations. In the article "Historic Opportunity being lost" that appears in the book "The Rise and Fall of the Nicaraguan Revolution", SWP leader Larry Seigle renders his verdict on the Sandinista revolution: "The opportunity to extend the socialist revolution, the opportunity to join with Cuba in constructing socialism, is being lost. Unless there is a fundamental reversal of the course--unless the anticapitalist direction and actions of the early years of the revolution are reasserted--the government will be restructured and consolidated on the basis of the capitalist property relations that exist." Never once in this article or the book is there an attempt at a Marxist explanation of this turn of events. In 1979 there was a "good" FSLN that had just taken power. This FSLN, according to an SWP document of the time, had created a government whose foundations are "established by the revolutionary displacement of the bourgeoisie from political power, the assumption of that power by an administration based on the popular masses and that commands a new army, and the initiation of far-reaching changes in property relations." Then, sometime during the mid-1980s, the FSLN changed its mind for no explicable reason and started to accommodate to capitalism. It is astonishing to see a Marxist organization ignore the approach that Marx himself used in explaining counterrevolution within a revolution. Marx used the phenomenon of Thermidor to explain the retreat of the French revolution in the decades following 1789. Class relations in France favored a consolidation of bourgeois rule within the context of monarchical forms. Jacobin democracy went into retreat. Trotsky used Thermidor to explain the victory of Stalin in the USSR. In his "Revolution Betrayed", he rejected the idea that there was something unique about Stalin's character that could explain his success. His victory emerged out of changing social relations in the USSR. Trotsky said, "It was the friendly welcome of the new ruling group, trying to free itself from the old principles and from the control of the masses, and having need of a reliable arbiter in its inner affairs. A secondary figure before the masses and in the events of the revolution, Stalin revealed himself as the indubitable leader of the Thermidorian bureaucracy, as first in its midst." I have tried to explain the counterrevolution in Nicaragua in similar terms. However, Nicaragua's retreat is not the result of pressure from a Nicaraguan bourgeoisie within its borders. It stems from the combined economic and military assault from US imperialism that left the country battered and exhausted. This attack took place at exactly the same time that the USSR was dropping all ties to its socialist past and was willing to hand Nicaragua over to Washington on a silver platter. These are the material conditions that led to a shift to the right by the FSLN, not its loss of nerve. It was a change in the relationship of class forces internationally that led to Sandinista vacillation and, finally, retreat. In order to understand the objective factors which led to this defeat, it is not helpful to compare Nicaragua to Cuba. A better comparison would be with the USSR in 1921. Both countries had been through a costly civil war. Both were isolated economically and politically. The survival of the USSR depended on breakthroughs in the west. When such breakthroughs failed to materialize, the revolution went into a steep decline. Lenin was all too painfully aware of the precarious situation the USSR faced back then. Nicaragua's situation, as any reasonable person would recognize, was much worse in the mid-1980s than the one that Lenin had faced. The SWP was perplexed why the FSLN did not mobilize its membership and supporters to step up the attack on Nicaraguan capitalism shortly after the Sandinista army had defeated the contras. Seigle wonders why the Sandinistas simply didn't assign army veterans to go where they were needed most. He says Sandinista cadres were "ready to step forward into leadership positions in the ...government." The opposite was true. These Nicaraguans were ill-prepared. They lacked both the training and the experience to administer public affairs. Being a good soldier does not mean that you can be a good administrator. The biggest problem Nicaragua faced was its inability to move people into these types of positions. Lenin faced similar problems in the USSR. He commented in a late speech "Better fewer, but better", that "our state apparatus is so deplorable, not to say wretched, that we must first think very carefully how to combat its defects, bearing in mind that these defects are rooted in the past, which, although it has been overthrown, has not yet been overcome, has not yet reached the stage of a culture that has receded into the distant past." Both Nicaragua and the USSR lacked the level of technological and a dministrative know-how to make steady progress, let alone great strides. Revolutionary zeal is no substitute for these skills. Another problem that Nicaragua in the mid-80s shared with the early USSR was economic collapse. The solution to the economic crisis in Nicaragua, according to Larry Seigle, was liquidation of the big farmers and ranchers, including those who sympathized with the FSLN . Their properties should have been turned over to the workers who would run them as socialist enterprises. There has been so much misunderstanding about Bolshevik attitudes towards this question that it would be useful to hear Lenin's thoughts on the rural bourgeoisie. Commenting on agrarian questions in 1920, Lenin said that the "expropriation even of the big peasants can in no way be made an immediate task of the victorious proletariat, because the material and especially the technical conditions, as well as the social conditions, for the socialization of such farms are still lacking." This describes Nicaragua's dilemma after the revolution and all through the 1980s, including the period immediately after the end of the contra war. Nicaragua, like the USSR, lacked the technical and social conditions to transform agriculture along socialist lines. I had direct experience with this problem. In recruiting agronomists and veterinarians for state farms in Nicaragua, it became immediately apparent that the sorts of skills that an American volunteer possessed could not easily be transmitted to Nicaraguan farm-workers. State farms in Nicaragua were large-scale, technologically advanced agribusinesses that the Somocistas had owned. When the reactionaries fled, their hirelings fled with them. Running these immense ranches or cotton plantations requires more than revolutionary zeal. As Lenin stated, it requires sufficient "technical" and "social" conditions. An ancillary question is not addressed by Seigle. What happens to the owners of expropriated farms and ranches? Many of these proprietors are deeply rooted to their holdings. Would they shrug their shoulders and say, "I guess if the revolution needs my property to be expropriated to achieve socialism, I'd better cooperate." This is not what happens, does it? Liquidation of a substantial class like this requires a massive campaign, including armed support, to make it succeed. Given the international context, such measures could only be characterized as an ultraleft adventure. The sight of farmers and ranchers resisting nationalization would have given Washington an excuse to step up the contra war again as well as given it a newly- created social base to recruit from. Even if the FSLN had moved ahead with such nationalizations, it would have not ended inflation, Nicaragua's basic economic problem. In the mid-1980s, the Nicaraguan currency had begun to be as unstable as the German deutschmark of the 1920s. I remember stopping at restaurants that one day to the next would raise the price of a meal. The working-class and poor of Managua could simply not keep pace with rising prices. War spending caused these rising prices. Underfinanced popular benefits such as nutrition and health also led to spiraling prices. Seizing someone's ranch would have absolutely no impact on this problem. Furthermore, the inflation tended to wear away at the base of support that the FSLN had enjoyed historically. This was obviously Washington's intention. Contra war and economic blockade could only result in inflation since the government needed to print money that had no underlying capital support. Inflation, in turn, causes mass suffering and discontent. Seigle tells of a conversation he had with a rural union organizer in Matagalpa who he describes as a "class-struggle fighter who has been through many battles." Seigle has some difficulty understanding why this revolutionary doesn't understand the wisdom of seizing the property of Nicaragua's rural bourgeoisie. The union organizer says, "We need peace...We need to buy some time under peaceful conditions to allow us to get the economy back on its feet." Furthermore, the European nations that Nicaragua relies on is pressuring them to tolerate the private sector. He concludes, with obvious common sense, that "Within this broader framework, confiscating this little farm just doesn't make sense." Seigle will have none of this. He says, "Many of us have heard one or another variation on these 'geopolitical' arguments. They disorient and confuse even revolutionary-minded workers who are trying to find a way to defend the revolution's conquest." It is simply amazing that a presumably Marxist thinker like Seigle would assign no weight at all to what he calls "geopolitical" arguments. Another way to describe geopolitical arguments is objective global conditions. Lenin, unlike Seigle, was acutely aware of the role they could play. In "Better Fewer, but Better", Lenin spells out the limitations that the imperialist nations have imposed on the USSR: "They failed to overthrow the new system created by the revolution, but they did prevent it from at once taking the step forward that would have justified the forecasts of the socialists, that would have enabled the latter to develop the productive forces with enormous speed, to develop all the potentialities which, taken together, would have produced socialism; socialists would have thus proved to all and sundry that socialism contains within itself gigantic forces and that mankind had now entered into a new stage of development of extraordinarily brilliant prospects." These are sobering words, aren't they? They have nothing in common with Seigle's facile assurance that socialism in Nicaragua was on the agenda and that the Sandinistas alone were responsible for its failure to take root. Lenin in 1923 expresses pessimism about the USSR's chances, while Seigle urges the Nicaraguans to press ahead. This country, which in proportion to the USA had lost the equivalent of a million people in civil war, simply needed to press ahead. Seigle advised this country, which stood in total economic collapse and that could no longer rely on a rightward shifting USSR, to escalate the class war and liquidate the rural bourgeoisie. It was all very simple, you see. All they had to do was follow the Cuban road and "force" the USSR to support it. He says, "The Cuban workers and peasants began building socialism, earning authority and respect among revolutionary-minded fighters throughout the world. They stood up to imperialism, to the blackmail and aggression--as the Nicaraguans did in defeating the contras--and in the course of that fight they won the aid they received from the Soviet Union and other workers states." This is an astonishing statement, to say the least. Did the Cubans "won the aid they received" from the Soviet Union? Seigle doesn't seem to understand that the Kremlin does not operate on this basis. It operated solely on the basis of realpolitik. Whatever served the foreign policy needs of the USSR's was what they supported. The Cuban revolution took place within the context of the Cold War and the nonaligned movement. The USSR did not defend Cuba because of Cuban boldness. It reached out to Cuba the same way it reached out to Egypt and for similar reasons. Egypt was a useful ally in the strategically important Mideast, while Cuba could offer a listening-post into the United States. This island which was only ninety miles from the US had genuine strategic and military value. Nicaragua's revolution took place within the context of the collapse of international communism. Not so long after the ink was dry on Seigle's article, Yeltsin became the President of the USSR. Could Nicaragua have "won the aid" of Yeltsin's Russia? The FSLN had a much better sense of the drift of world events than the ultraleft Socialist Workers Party. Everybody except "Marxist-Leninists" like Seigle seem to recognize the direction of world politics today. Vietnam, China and Cuba make concessions each day to world capitalism while all of the workers states have either become capitalist or are rapidly evolving toward it. Social democracy all across the planet is shifting to the right and helping to undermine the social legislation which defined nations such as Sweden and West Germany. This unfavorable situation does not exist for the SWP and it doesn't for a very simple reason. Groups such as these operate in a hothouse atmosphere where every strike or every anti-imperialist outburst represents the opening of a new revolutionary period. Unlike Lenin, they see only advances, never retreats. The notion that a poor and isolated country like Nicaragua could achieve "socialism" is ludicrous. Lenin did not think that socialism could be built in the USSR unless it received help from a communist country with an advanced economy. To cite Cuba as an example for Nicaragua to follow is misplaced since the Cuban revolution developed under exceptional circumstances that will never be repeated. It is essential that Marxism re-evaluate many old shibboleths. The paradigm of socialist revolutions in underdeveloped nations is deeply problematic. The socialist revolutions of the twenty-first century will probably have an entirely different dynamic and character than the colonial revolutions of the 1950s, 60s and 70s. They will occur in advanced capitalist nations or they will have little chance of succeeding at all. To prepare for these momentous events, it is necessary to build a Marxist movement that is made up of the most critical-minded workers, farmers and intellectuals. This new Marxism will not arise out of existing "Marxist-Leninist" groups who have a tendency to anoint themselves as "vanguards" when their memberships number in the hundreds. This is not the method of Bolshevism, it is a sectarian approach that Lenin would have rejected. This new Marxism will learn from movements that have succeeded or partially succeeded in the recent past, such as the FSLN. The FSLN, the FMLN, the Workers Party of Brazil and other formations--whatever difficulties they encounter on the road to power or while in power--must be studied. We can still learn much from the movement that the FSLN built. It was non-sectarian but revolutionary. This combination will be essential. Louis Proyect --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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