Date: Tue, 30 Apr 1996 20:14:40 -0700 (PDT)
From: James Miller <jamiller-AT-igc.apc.org>
To: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU
Subject: nicaragua


NICARAGUA

   Louis posted a long message on Nicaragua, arguing against the
position adopted by the SWP in 1989. In the course of his message,
Louis refers to an article in _New International_, No. 9, entitled
"A Historic Opportunity is Being Lost," by Larry Seigle.
   I don't have time to answer all of Louis's statements, but I will
try to answer some of them, and give my own position.

   Louis says,

>I have tried to explain the counterrevolution in Nicaragua in similar 
>terms. However, Nicaragua's retreat is not the result of pressure from a
>Nicaraguan bourgeoisie within its borders. It stems from the combined 
>economic and military assault from US imperialism that left the 
>country battered and exhausted. This attack took place at exactly the 
>same time that the USSR was dropping all ties to its socialist past and 
>was willing to hand Nicaragua over to Washington on a silver platter. 
>These are the material conditions that led to a shift to the right by the 
>FSLN, not its loss of nerve. It was a change in the relationship of class 
>forces internationally that led to Sandinista vacillation and, finally, 
>retreat.

   It's true that Nicaragua was exhausted and battered, as Louis says.
If it were not for this, it would have been a relatively simple matter
for the Sandinistas to continue the revolutionary course upon which
they had embarked. Thus I recognize that the FSLN leaders succumbed
to very heavy pressure.
   But can it be said that their departure from revolutionary policies
was inevitable under the circumstances? I say no. If they had been
able to remain true to the Historic Program, it would have been a
very tough course to follow. But I think it would have been better
for Nicaragua had they been able to do it.
   By deepening the anti-capitalist measures to increase production
and provide for the needs of the population, making more and
more inroads into the rights of capitalist private property, they
would have been able to utilize the idle labor power to produce
badly-needed food, housing and other supplies. They would have
been able to utilize idle land to produce for the domestic and
international market. But the policy of "concertacion" and
reliance on the free market prevented the fuller utilization
of the country's resources.
   Had the FSLN encouraged, organized and inspired the masses
of the people after 1987, as they did before 1987, they would
have retained their confidence and support, and would have
been able to keep the motive power of the revolution active.
As it was, their orientation to reliance on capitalists, both
domestic and international, stifled the initiative, combativity
and ingenuity of the workers and peasants. Thus they opened
up the possibility of their electoral defeat in 1990.
   The situation was very hard. Thus the Sandinistas sought
international aid for Nicaragua. They turned to the West
European capitalists for aid, and made political concessions
to them in order to get the aid. At the same time, they turned
away from the Cubans. But was this a solution for the crisis
in Nicaragua? No. It only meant the restoration of ordinary
imperialist exploitation of Nicaragua. This was the result
of their turn toward bourgeois normalcy.

   Later, Louis argues:

>In order to understand the objective factors which led to this defeat, it 
>is not helpful to compare Nicaragua to Cuba. A better comparison 
>would be with the USSR in 1921. Both countries had been through a 
>costly civil war. Both were isolated economically and politically. 

   Two differences should be noted between the Russian and the
Nicaraguan situations:
   1. In Russia, the revolution had abolished capitalism and set up
a workers' state. In Nicaragua, this stage had not yet been reached.
This is why Larry Seigle used the expression "historic opportunity
lost." So the question remains: was it possible, given the circumstances,
for the Nicaraguan revolution to go ahead and create a workers'
state?
   2. In Russia, the counterrevolutionary Stalinization of the party
and government did not occur without a split in the leadership.
There was a small group of leaders, and many rank-and-file
communists, who wanted to continue the revolutionary course
of Lenin. In Nicaragua, however, there was no split. There was
no significant opposition from within the FSLN to the reformist
course adopted by the comandantes.

   Louis argues:

>SWP was perplexed why the FSLN did not mobilize its membership 
>and supporters to step up the attack on Nicaraguan capitalism shortly 
>after the Sandinista army had defeated the contras. Seigle wonders 
>why the Sandinistas simply didn't assign army veterans to go where they 
>were needed most. He says Sandinista cadres were "ready to 
>step forward into leadership positions in the ...government."

>The opposite was true. These Nicaraguans were ill-prepared. They 
>lacked both the training and the experience to administer public 
>affairs. Being a good soldier does not mean that you can be a good 
>administrator. The biggest problem Nicaragua faced was its inability 
>to move people into these types of positions.

   Every real revolution inspires millions of ordinary people to
rise above their former humble roles in society, and take on
new tasks. The Nicaraguan revolution was no exception. The
point here is that, prior to 1987, the FSLN took many measures
that facilitated the process of individual and collective self-
development among the masses, but after 1987, it turned away
>from these policies.
   Not all the war veterans were prepared to function as
administrators. That's not the point. But some of them were,
having gained leadership experience, confidence and technical
knowledge in the course of the war. And other veterans had
other leadership capacities that could have been put to use. But
the point is that, whatever capabilities that had been developed
among these fighters, there was now nothing for them to do,
given the decisions made by the FSLN leadership.
   With regard to administration, practical experience is very
important. But this experience can be gained by commited
revolutionary fighters, if that perspective is maintained. No,
it can't be done overnight. But it can be done. The Russian and
Cuban revolutions both faced the problem of having to rely
on bourgeois experts while the workers went through the
process of developing their own fighters as technicians and
managers. In Russia, the process could not go far enough before
the privileged elite displaced the workers' vanguard from the
exercise of political power. In Cuba, the transition was made
successfully enough to avoid degeneration, though is still
incomplete.

   Louis says,

>Both Nicaragua and the USSR lacked the level of technological and 
>administrative know-how to make steady progress, let alone great strides. 
>Revolutionary zeal is no substitute for these skills.

   But the Bolsheviks went ahead and took the steps necessary to
form a workers state, in spite of the backwardness of Russia. The
Sandinistas did not take this step. But suppose they had done so.
Technical progress would not have come easily or quickly, but
Nicaragua was not totally without resources. And had they
struggled for revolutionary international aid, they could have
gotten a lot more from Cuba than what the received. Also, many
solidarity organizations around the world were providing
technical assistance, and much more could have been achieved
along these lines had the Sandinistas not changed their line.

   Louis says,

>This describes Nicaragua's dilemma after the revolution and all 
>through the 1980s, including the period immediately after the end of 
>the contra war. Nicaragua, like the USSR, lacked the technical and 
>social conditions to transform agriculture along socialist lines.

   The answer to the agricultural crisis in 1987-88 was not to
transform agriculture along socialist lines, rather it was to
continue the agrarian reform that had already been
started. This land reform was terminated in 1988 in spite of
the fact that landless peasants were demanding land. The
land reform gave land to landless peasants and made growing
crops possible on land that had been idle. With the land reform
suspended, you had idle land and idle peasants. This was done
in the name of the alliance with the "patriotic producers,"
i.e. capitalists and landowners.

   Louis poses this question:

>An ancillary question is not addressed by Seigle. What happens to the 
>owners of expropriated farms and ranches? Many of these proprietors 
>are deeply rooted to their holdings. Would they shrug their shoulders 
>and say, "I guess if the revolution needs my property to be 
>expropriated to achieve socialism, I'd better cooperate." This is not 
>what happens, does it? Liquidation of a substantial class like this 
>requires a massive campaign, including armed support, to make it 
>succeed. Given the international context, such measures could only be 
>characterized as an ultraleft adventure. The sight of farmers and 
>ranchers resisting nationalization would have given Washington an 
>excuse to step up the contra war again as well as given it a newly-
>created social base to recruit from.

   The question of the confiscation of land is one that, in my
opinion, could have been handled very well by the FSLN, given
their political knowledge and experience. The land reform cannot
be envisioned as an across-the-board expropriation of all
large landowners. The Nicaraguan experience in the early
years of the revolution showed how land reform could be
done. Expropriations were selective. It was not a question
here of a new departure in land reform, but one of staying
the revolutionary course, deepening it. The Contras had
already been defeated. A new contra war was not in the
works. Landowners who lost all or part of their land could
be asked to stay on as managers. If they didn't like that,
they could do something else. But the fate of individual
landowners is not important. What is important is whether
the exploiters retained the power to deal heavy blows to
the revolution. And the fact is, that, after the Contra war,
they did not, at least in a military sense. And their social
and economic power was vulnerable to the forward
momentum of the anticapitalist measures of the FLSN
government, had that momentum been sustained.

   Then Louis says:

>Even if the FSLN had moved ahead with such nationalizations, it 
>would have not ended inflation, Nicaragua's basic economic problem. 
>In the mid-1980s, the Nicaraguan currency had begun to be as 
>unstable as the German deutschmark of the 1920s.

   The answer to inflation in prices of basic goods was rationing.
The rationing was implemented early in the revolution, and was
very successful. This should have continued and deepened. The
move toward the free market, dictated by the FSLN, jettisoned
the programs that could have been continued to feed and clothe
the masses. Deeper anticapitalist measures, in the long run,
would have opened up the possibility to control the currency,
as was done in Russia and Cuba, etc.

   After quoting Lenin on the limitations imposed by imperialism
on the Soviet workers state, from "Better Fewer, But Better,"
Louis continues:

>These are sobering words, aren't they? They have nothing in common 
>with Seigle's facile assurance that socialism in Nicaragua was on the 
>agenda and that the Sandinistas alone were responsible for its failure 
>to take root. Lenin in 1923 expresses pessimism about the USSR's 
>chances, while Seigle urges the Nicaraguans to press ahead. This 
>country, which in proportion to the USA had lost the equivalent of a 
>million people in civil war, simply needed to press ahead. Seigle 
>advised this country, which stood in total economic collapse and that 
>could no longer rely on a rightward shifting USSR, to escalate the 
>class war and liquidate the rural bourgeoisie.

   Seigle did not say that "socialism was on the agenda" for
Nicaragua, only that by fighting along a socialist course, the
Nicaraguan people could have made progress toward that goal.
   And Lenin was not pessimistic in 1923, he was realistic. He
was confident that socialism would prevail in the long run, but
the revolution had to function within very severe limitations.
Lenin never advocated giving up the revolutionary course, and
reinstituting capitalist rule. The Sandinistas, on the other hand,
turned away from the fight for socialism, considering that
course unrealistic.
   Seigle never "urged the Nicaraguans to press ahead." He only
pointed out, as I have done, that had they decided to press
ahead, it was possible to continue the revolution along the
lines previously established. To retreat from the revolutionary
course of the early years meant sacrificing the gains already
won, and liquidating the revolution, casting Nicaragua back
into the status of an ordinary Latin American bourgeois
republic. This is what happened.

   Louis argues that Nicaragua could not have expected to
receive Soviet aid. This is probable. But in 1989, it was not
yet obvious what changes were taking place in the USSR.

   Then Louis says:

>Nicaragua's revolution took place within the context of the collapse of 
>international communism. Not so long after the ink was dry on 
>Seigle's article, Yeltsin became the President of the USSR. Could 
>Nicaragua have "won the aid" of Yeltsin's Russia? The FSLN had a 
>much better sense of the drift of world events than the ultraleft 
>Socialist Workers Party.

   It should be pointed out that "international communism" did not
collapse. "International Stalinism" did. Louis knows the difference,
and I can't imagine why he said this.
   With the disintegration of the Stalinist monolith, the working
people of the world are in a better position to discover what
communism is. The false communism of the Soviet regime has
proved its bankruptcy in practice.
   To say that the FSLN had a better sense of the drift of world
events makes no sense. Are they better off now because they
decided to align with imperialism? Has that won them anything?

   Louis comments on the difficulties faced by revolutionists
in today's world situation, then continues:

>This unfavorable situation does not exist for the SWP and it doesn't  
>for a very simple reason. Groups such as these operate in a hothouse 
>atmosphere where every strike or every anti-imperialist outburst 
>represents the opening of a new revolutionary period. Unlike Lenin, 
>they see only advances, never retreats.

   I think the SWP is right in putting the emphasis on the revolutionary
potential that exists in the world today. The SWP does not claim that
every strike is the starting point of a new revolution, but it does 
argue that every strike can be the starting point of forward motion
in the class struggle. And the SWP encourages participation and
solidarity, so as to maximize the impact of every strike or other
progressive action.

   To sum up: the Nicaraguan revolution established a workers
and peasants government. Such a government represents the
interests of the toiling masses, and, as such, runs up against the
resistance of the exploiters. The existence of a workers and
peasants government intensifies the class struggle and poses
sharply the question: which class will rule? Thus the government
goes on to establish a workers state with a socialist orientation,
or is defeated, precluding the possibility of a workers state.
   The Nicaraguan workers and peasants government was
defeated, in part as a result of the retreat toward capitalism
carried out by the FSLN in 1987-88. If the Sandinistas had
decided to stick to their Historic Program, and continue the
revolution, it's possible that the workers and peasants
government would have been defeated anyway. In revolution
there are no guarantees.
   But we will never know what power the Nicaraguan still
possessed in that period, because that power was sacrificed
as a result of the retreat of the FSLN. I think the masses
of the Nicaraguan people were more demoralized by the
Sandinistas' abandonment of the revolution than they were
by the hardships of the struggle. In the final analysis, I think
it can be said that to continue the revolution in 1987 would
have been no more quixotic than was the seizure of power
in 1979.

   If anyone is interested in finding out more about the
position of the SWP on Nicaragua, I recommend reading
_New International_, No. 9, published by Pathfinder. This
text is not available in electronic format. Pathfinder can
be reached by internet e-mail at: pathfinder-AT-igc.apc.org

Jim Miller
Seattle


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