Date: Sat, 27 Apr 1996 15:25:55 -0700 (PDT) From: James Miller <jamiller-AT-igc.apc.org> To: marxism-AT-jefferson.village.Virginia.EDU Subject: nicaragua NICARAGUA Louis responded to my last post on Nicaragua. Here he refers to the record of the SWP (of the US): >Louis: I was referring to your organization not you personally. They took >a workerist abstenionist attitude toward Central American solidarity >during the 1980s and bear some responsibility for US imperialism's victory. Judging from my political experience in the 1980s, the SWP was very active in the Central American and Nicaraguan solidarity work. But I don't think it would be profitable to attempt to argue on the Marxism List about the quantity and quality of the SWP's participation during that period. You just end up with an unresolvable dispute over specific events that may or may not have occurred in the past. It is better to discuss ideas. Then Louis responded by summarizing some of the points he had posted previously to the list: >Louis: You were moving into a new house and off the net when I covered >this subject in elaborate detail. Basically I said that the FSLN adopted a >position that reflected perestroika. The position of your organization >was that Nicaragua should have followed the "Cuban road". That indeed was >the intention of the FSLN when they came to power, although the tempo >would have been a lot slower for a number of reasons. I also explained >that Lenin and Trotsky thought that socialism in the USSR was not >feasible unless revolution was successful in western Europe. Lenin >specifically said the USSR would "perish". The assessment that the FSLN adopted a position that reflected perestroika is one way of putting it. It points to the reformist slant that was introduced increasingly in the late 1980s in the political line of the FSLN. As far as the "Cuban road" is concerned, it should be clear that neither the FSLN nor the SWP expected the Nicaraguan revolution to simply copy the Cuban. It's just that it was projected that the revolution would go on to overthrow capitalism, as was done in Cuba. This is what the FSLN's program called for, and it would have been the best outcome for the world's working people. Louis then talks about the relation of Nicaragua to the USSR: >Nicaragua, unlike Cuba, could not rely on a USSR that was rapidly >aligning itself with the US on foreign policy questions. Nicaragua, >unlike Cuba, was not an island and could not be insulated to the same >degree from counter-revolution. The CIA-backed contras had been pushed back >but a new contra force with no ties to the CIA was already re-assembling in >the north. Nicaragua was in a state of total economic collapse and the >population was war-weary. These were the objective conditions: complete >isolation internationally, total economic collapse and a population >exhausted by civil wars for the better part of twenty years. This tiny >nation whose gross national product is less than what the US spends on >blue-jeans each year was supposed to accomplish something that Lenin >thought the USSR *could not*. I think it is true that the conditions at the end of the Contra War (1986-87) were much as Louis describes them. But the picture he paints is one-sided. In our review of the Nicaraguan situation at that time, we must keep in mind the fundamental resource of the revolution: the masses themselves, their consciousness and dedication; and their revolutionized organizations: the agricultural and industrial unions, the women's organizaton (AMNLAE) the Sandinista People's Army and militas, and the Sandinista Defense Committees. The revolutionary transformation of the consciousness of the people was the promise for the future. I do not think this consciousness had deteriorated to the point where--no matter what the FSLN did or said--the revolution was lost. There was still a chance for the revolution to move forward, provided that the leadership could stay the course (and there was no leadership other than the FSLN). But they didn't stay the course. No one can say for sure how long it would have taken for the Nicaraguan revolution to establish a worker's state. But given the FSLN's adoption of "perestroika," it soon became a moot point. In order to keep the revolution moving forward toward its historic objective, you would have needed a leadership that was committed to that perspective. But the FSLN, under heavy pressure, abandoned it. Certainly, no one expected the Nicaraguan revolution to accomplish something that the Russian revolution could not, as Louis argues. Whether a worker's state could have been established, and how long that might take, are not the issue. The issue is whether or not the revolutionary leadership remains committed to the perspective of fighting for the victory of the masses of working people over their domestic and international exploiters. The Cubans showed that it is possible to overthrow capitalism in a poor and backward country. But this doesn't mean that it would be as easy in Nicaragua as in Cuba. Could the Nicaraguans have received the same kind of aid from the USSR that the Cubans received in the 1960s? No. This only means the conditions were more difficult. The Cubans gave material aid to Nicaragua, and were in a position to give more, but the Sandinistas moved away from their Cuban ties in order to strengthen relations with West European countries. Louis goes on to make a characterization of my political consciousness: >Miller, an ultraleftist, ignores the objective conditions and from his >comfortable new house in Seattle declares that the only way forward was >the "Cuban road". Groups like the American SWP and the English SWP are >confident that victory is always possible if the vanguard is resolute >and revolutionary-minded. This is not a Marxist approach, it is >petty-bourgeois idealism. Sometimes objective conditions make further >advances in the class-struggle impossible. It's true I have a comfortable house in Seattle. But in mentioning this, I hope Louis doesn't mean to suggest that U.S. workers should move into less comfortable accommodations. With regard to our confidence that victory is always possible if the vanguard is is resolute and revolutionary-minded, Louis thinks that this is a non-Marxist approach. But I believe it is the sine qua non of Marxist politics. If we don't think that victory is possible, then we can just hang it up. This doesn't mean that victory is guaranteed by a certain time, or that sacrifices will not be required; but it does mean that without a resolute revolutionary vanguard, the question of victory or defeat cannot really be posed. You can't have a revolution without a revolutionary leadership. In 1987, the Sandinistas had just achieved the strategic defeat of the Contra armies. It was a great revolutionary victory. The existing Contra remnants at that time posed no serious military threat, although it required the continued deployment of a relatively small part of the Sandinista People's Army in the North. The proof of the victory was the demobilization of the bulk of the army troops. They were no longer needed. This victory in itself was a part of the foundation for continued forward momentum in the revolutionary process. The troops themselves were loyal to the revolution and were ready for a new assignment. But they were simply demobilized and nothing was done to employ them or organize them. The solution to the economic crisis in 1987 should have been the continuation and deepening of the revolution's previous anti-capitalist course: deepening the agrarian reform to absorb the surplus rural population and increase the production of food, increasing the regulation and control of capitalist enterprises to ensure that they served the interests of the Nicaraguan population, and strengthening the system of rationing to sustain the basic needs of the population. These measures point to placing the needs of the masses on a higher priority than the needs of the capitalists and landlords. But the continued enforcement of the revolutionary worker and peasant economic measures provoked clashes between the classes, and more and more posed the question of which class will rule. The Sandinistas knew all this in advance. They initially projected a revolutionary worker and peasant strategy to take power and advance toward socialism. This is what they did in the early 1980s. The reasons for their initial successes, including the victory over the Contras, was that they had the backing and support of the bulk of the workers and peasants of Nicaragua. The revolution was an inspiration to them, and it provoked them to participate, to get active, to contribute and to sacrifice. In the final analysis, it is this mass activity and revolutionary consciousness that is the only true resource, motive and product of the revolution. Everything else flows from that. The revolutionary economic and political policies that had been implemented in the early years of the revolution had shown their efficacy. But the FSLN turned away from this course, stopped the land reform, catered more and more to the needs of the capitalists and landlords, and turned to the free market in goods and services instead of making despotic inroads into the rights of private property. Internationally, the Nicaraguan government adopted the orientation of reliance on loans and aid from imperialist Europe, instead of reliance on internationalist Cuban aid and the international movement in solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution. Then Louis says: >The perestroika course of the FSLN was clearly wrong but it was >understandable. The "forward march, onward to victory" approach >recommended by Miller is not only wrong, it is arrogant. The best that >the FSLN could have accomplished in the late 1980s was a mixed economy >that would remain in a "maintenance" mode until the international >political context was more favorable. This, of course, is what is happening >in Cuba today. Cuba is allowing more and more foreign investment, private >enterprise and other neo-NEP measures. Class divisions are appearing and >prostitution and other social ills are on the increase. The assessment of what Cuba is going through today that Louis presents here has some truth to it. But it should be pointed out that the Cubans abolished capitalism. The Nicaraguans didn't. The Cubans can institute neo-NEP measures because they have a worker's state. The Nicaraguans never had a worker's state, so were never in a position to institute NEP-type measures. The NEP is a policy that can be instituted only in a worker's state. Finally, Louis argues: >The defeat of the revolution in Nicaragua was inevitable given the >international framework. If the FSLN had merely confronted domestic >reaction, there is no question that the revolution would have moved >forward on all fronts. The FSLN had nothing in common with the Spanish >Popular Front or Allende's government. The fact that shifted to the right >proves nothing except that the leadership was fallible unlike Miller and >his band of 500 obscure and irrelevant dogmatists. The defeat of the revolution was not inevitable. Only if you argue that the embrace of reformism by the FSLN was inevitable, can you argue that the defeat of the revolution was inevitable. But if you want to know what might have happened had the FSLN stayed the revolutionary course, you can't say for sure what would have happened. But if the adoption of reformist politics by the FSLN was inevitable, does this mean that revolutionary parties will inevitably degenerate when the going gets tough? I don't think we can say that. If that is the perspective for the future, then we can't hope to defeat imperialism. Rahul posted this question: >I thought the SWP position (I got this from ISO members in Austin) was that >Cuba was a "state capitalist" society. Here Rahul confuses the SWP of Britain with the SWP of the U.S. In the U.S., there is no more enthusiastic supporter of the Cuban revolution than the SWP. Jim Miller Seattle --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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