Date: Fri, 21 Jun 96 12:19:50 GMT
From: Adam Rose <adam-AT-pmel.com>
Subject: Re: State capitalism?



Louis writes:
> I want to hone in on the role of the national bourgeoisie in places like
> Algeria during the anticolonial struggle. I am tentatively coming around
> to the idea that Nkrumah, Nasser, etc. are basically left-Bonapartist
> figures. For a time, the "socialist" states they rule over have all the
> outward guise of a state like Cuba, but the capitalist class gradually
> asserts itself and reconquers political power. Capitalist property
> relations which survive the anticolonial struggle serve as a power base
> for the national bourgeoisie which eventually displaces the plebian 
> governments of the early days of the revolution.
> 
> This is my theory. If the facts contradict the theory, I will have to go
> back to the drawing-board.
> 

Well, there's the question of whether the facts fit the theory.
But there's also the question of the political consequences of a theory.

I think the theory you have outlined still sees state property as basically
socialist, or at least sees ONLY private property as capitalist. This leads
in practise to a political softness on the representatives of the state -
whether it be Nasser or whoever. This first of all allows political forces
such as Islamic fundamentalism, who have a verbally revolutionary attitude
to that state, to grow, and then encourages the left to side with the 
representatives of the capitalist state against the fundamentalists - so many
on the left in Algeria and France, criminally, supported the recent coup.

There are a few more weaknesses :

1. Any theory along the lines of states in "transition", "bonapartism" ,
etc all suffer from the defect that most of these states were relatively
stable for a long period of time. When Marx or Trotsky talked about 
bonapartism they meant an inherently unstable state, a ball on the top
of the hill, as Trotsky put it. Egypt, for instance, carved out an important
sub Imperialist role for itself in the middle east on the basis of a significant
industrial base, and a relatively stable political leadership.

2. The impetus for the recent trend towards opening up these 
economies to the market, seeking alliances with the US, and privitisation,
is not coming from OUTSIDE the group who have ruled Egypt or India for the
past 40 years, it is coming from INSIDE this group. This seems to be to be
difficult to reconcile with the idea that the impetus come from some socially
different group, outside the people in charge of the state, somehow
associated with private industry. I have no figures to prove it, and it
is not central to my argument, but my guess is the two groups of people
in your analysis are socially speaking, even sociologically speaking, the
same class. The older brothers ran the business, the younger brothers
went in to the army.

3. Is all this really so different to the equivalent trends in advanced
capitalist countries ? I think not. The interests of the British ruling
class coincided with a certain degree of reforms and nationalisation
during the long boom. The practise of Labour + Tory governments reflected
this. Because of the depth of the crisis, and the increased integration of the
world economy, the practise of both Tory and Labour governments changed from
1977 ( not 1979 ! ) onwards.

In order to explain these ebbs and flows in the ratio between state + 
private ownership, in the case of the UK, there is no need to resort to the
theoretical desperation represented by the phrase "left bonapartism". 
Why is it the case for Egypt or Algeria ?

4. I notice you ignored my question : Is this a quantitative thing ? ( Fair
enough, you're getting a barrage of criticism of State Caps and not
much useful support from the orthodox trots ). I strongly suspect, despite
your insistence on concrete social analysis, you are now working to the
following formula :

100% state ownership, 0% private	=	socialism
70% state onwership , 30% private	=	left bonarpartism
50% state ownership , 50% private	=	capitalism

5. Oh, and a methodological point - the thing which matters most is where
the surplus comes from, not where most production is. Ancient Athens was
a slave state because this is how the ruling class extracted its surplus
even though most production was by more or less self sufficient farmers.
I strongly suspect that viewed in this light the shift from state ownership
to private ownership is even more pronounced - private capitalists only
buy the most profitable bits of state owned industry, after all.

6. And finally, there is the rather awkward case of Iran. Here there was
a classic "Permanent Revolution Deflected" , the working class playing
a central role in the revolution, created shoras, ie workers councils,
but prevented by various flavours of Stalinism from taking power. Instead,
Khomeini was able to take power. The interesting thing is that it resulted
in partial suspension of the laws of capitalism inside Iran ( laws against
usury ) and state control of industry. Really, the only major difference
between this regime and your "left bonapartist" regimes was the ruling ideology.
- the way it came to power and the structure of the post revolutionary economy
was very similar indeed.

Adam.

Adam Rose
SWP
Manchester
UK


---------------------------------------------------------------


     --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---