Date: Mon, 16 Sep 1996 21:34:03 -0400 (EDT) From: louisgodena-AT-ids.net (Louis R Godena) Subject: Re: Trotskyism as anti-communist propaganda Hugh Rodwell raises so many important points in his lengthy rejoinder to my thread on Trotsky and his descendants ("Trotskyism as anti-communist propaganda"), that I will have to respond to them discursively, and probably in installments. While I look upon "Stalinism" as an important (and profoundly ambiguous) legacy of the world communist movement, I cannot assign the same significance to the stale and by now forlorn "Stalin/Trotsky Debate." I would hope that the numerous and vital issues arising from 1917-1991 could finally be cast, not as a conflict between two personalities possessing inviolable and categorical beliefs, but as a series of grave problems and historical achievements, interwoven into the fabric of Marxism and revolution that are pregnant with ramifications for the future of the Marxian project. An important example of this is certainly the issue of the Comintern and Chinese policy in the 1920s. Hugh, like most high-church Trotskyists, sees the issue in rather stark terms, and tells us: >... this split between the revolutionary Left Opposition and the >counterrevolutionary Stalinist majority marks the boundary between the >policies leading to the decapitation of the 1927 Chinese revolution by >Chiang Kai-Shek, to whose tender mercies Chinese Communists were *ordered* >to submit by the Stalinist Comintern, I find this view rather novel (though it is meat and drink among the epigoni) in light of what others have written who, certainly, were no admirers of either Stalin or the Comintern. E.H. Carr, for example (someone I know Hugh has some respect for) specifically denied this claim and gave short shrift to the writings of Chen Tu hsiu (the leading Trotskyist in China who later went over to Chiang and the imperialists), who apparently originated the anti-Stalin criticisms in 1926 from within the CPC. Carr dismisses him as "unreliable" (a claim, it is fair to note, that aroused the ire of Isaac Deutscher in a 1964 review of Carr's *Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926* in the TLS entitled "The Comintern Betrayed" [June 18, 1964]. Nonetheless, even the most virulently anti-Stalinist writers of our day--Adam Ulam, Robert Tucker, Richard Pipes, Robert Conquest, Dimitri Volkogonov, and Ronald Hingley---scarcely give it credibility. Only Deutscher, in his admirable *Stalin* (1949) makes an oblique reference to Chiang's "cruel" suppression of the "Communists who had served under him" (p 401). He does not elaborate, nor does he give any source for this statement. In fact, the account that follows is drawn largely from sources hostile to Stalin and, in the case of Trotsky's early support for the Chinese policy of the Comintern, from the Trotsky Archives themselves. This general view is reflected in the leading recent work on the subject, Han Suyin's magesterial *The Morning Deluge: Mao-Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-1954* (Boston, 1972). This should be read in conjunction with Trotsky's own *Criticism of the Draft Program of the Comintern, 1928* (I have the 1973 edition from Prometheus). If Hugh or anyone interested in this general topic has their own sources, please share them with us. The policy of including the Kuomintang in the Third International was Lenin's, not Stalin's. It was concluded in a period when revolution seemed to be in retreat throughout Europe. This alliance had the support of Trotsky himself who, even after urging an official break between the CCP and the Kuomintang, still advocated an alliance of some sort with Chiang Kai Sheck as recently as the month before the Shangai massacre [ "One can be an ally of Kuomintang, but an ally is to be watched like an enemy; one should not be sentimental about one's allies"]. Up until the end of 1926, in fact, the alliance seemed to be working fairly well. For the Kuomintang, Soviet experts and Soviet advice transformed it >from an impecunious clique of down-at-heels intellectuals jockeying for power with this or that warlord group into a modern well-organized party. Within Kuomintang, the Soviet model was created and refined--though not without serious flaws--in perfecting a technique for organizing amid the contradictions of modern Chinese society; the exploitation of the peasantry, the oppression of the growing working class by (mostly foreign) employers, the universal resentment against imperialism, and the like. For the Communists, too, there was in fact much to be gained, at least initially, by the united front policy. First of all, it gave the tiny Communist Party access to the mass of workers and peasants under Kuomintang control. In the period 1925-27, more than 10 million peasants had been organized in China by the Communists. The Party itself had grown from a few hundred to more than 60,000 by 1927. Mao himself was head of the Kuomintang's Peasant Movement Training Institute, and Chou En Lai head of its Military Institute. Too, there was a substantial left wing of the Kuomintang led by the widow of Sun Yat Sen, which in time provided the nucleus of arms and logistics for the fledgling Red Army (although it refrained from openly backing the Communists at the critical moment). It was Stalin's hope that Chiang would eventually be "squeezed like a lemon" and forced out of the leadership of the Kuomintang, to be replaced of course, by generals more to the liking of Moscow. It was a tenable strategy. Though, as in the case of Stalin's support for the creation of Israel in 1948, and the subsidizing of Egypt's Nasser in the early 1950s, it turned out to be a serious, even catastrophic miscalculation on the part of the Soviet leadership. But to categorically state that Stalin was "responsible" for the aborted 1927 "revolution" in China is to seriously distort history. It was an unfortunate but largely unforseen consequence of a policy which Trotsky himself had supported, with reservations, right up to the fatal moment. Louis Godena --- from list marxism-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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