Date: Sun, 7 Apr 1996 23:54:03 -0400
Subject: More on Modernism, Reason and Myth


As a preface to what follows, I want to begin by affirming the quality of the
discussion we have undertaken here, and by saying that in having to answer
the objections thrown up by many on the list I have had to clarify and
develop my own thinking. This is the type of intellectual exchange on which I
thrive, and of which I have so little in my daily life. In my daily work,
there is more political engagement, in my classroom, school, community and
union than I know what to do with; what I hunger for is the opportunity to
develop my ideas and analysis with others who understand the issues which
seize my imagination. I will take up the comments of Justin, Rahul and Ralph
in that order, since they comment on each other's pieces.

On Justin's response:
------------------------------
I deny unequivocally that what I wrote was "an attack on reason," as Justin
would have it. It was an attack on a particular conception of reason, one in
which rational choice theory is heavily invested, and I guess I stepped on
Justin's rational choice toes. (But I am in the middle of the Spring break,
with an unusual ability to write longer pieces, and I plan a piece on
democratic principles on which Justin and I will probably agree.) 

Justin: "Leo says that the opposition between reason and rhetoric cannot be
sustained." Not to put too fine a point on it, but I spoke of the oppositions
as reason and myth, logic and rhetoric. They are certainly parallel, even
homologous oppositions, but the discrete terms are not interchangeable. The
nature of Hobbes' argument is of relevance to this claim, contrary to
Justin's claim. Justin wants to reduce my argument to a deductive syllogism,
in which Hobbes' use of rhetoric is the main premise, but he fails to note
that the argument takes a different, inductive form at this point. One piece
of logical evidence that the polarized opposition between logic and rhetoric
can not sustained is the inductive evidence that authors which make the most
forthright and overt claims for pure logic and its importance use rhetoric in
that very same arguments to make their points -- this is true not only of
Hobbes, but also of Locke and a host of others. In this vein, I agree
entirely with Jukka that Ralph is often a master of the rhetorical, and that
his piece in defense of Enlightenment Reason was marked precisely by his
rhetorical skill -- something which I admire. In this respect, he is very
much like Hobbes and Locke. (BTW, I know that an inductive argument is not as
strong as a deductive argument, but it is certainly not refuted by treating
it as if it were a deductive argument.)

Justin then engages in a leap of logic to the effect that since I argue
against pure and homogeneous conceptions of logic and Reason which conceive
of rhetoric and Myth as completely opposed 'others', I believe that "there is
no distinction" between the two. This is simply not the case: the question is
how to conceive of the opposition. In my view, Justin, following rational
choice theory in the tradition of Hobbes and Locke, conceives of the
opposition in the form of  a dualism, with mutually opposed poles, while I
see it as a duality, with interpenetrating opposites. (I might even call my
conception of the opposition dialectical, except that would involve a long
diversion into an explanation of how that dialectic is not Hegelian and
Marxian, and thus, how I do not expect a synthesis of these two elements.)
Analytical distinctions, whether they be between logic and rhetoric or
something else, are precisely just that: they draw an artificial line in
thinking and conversation to help clarify a problem. It is the conceit of
rational choice theory (and their ancestors Hobbes and Locke) that their
analytical distinctions are something more, a reflection of how human social
practice takes place.

I suspect that Justin has a fundamental objection to the notion of
hermeneutical prejudice with which I opened my posting, since it clearly
points to the interpenetration of logic and rhetoric. (But it is a little
difficult to throw Gadamer and Riccoeur into the post-modernist stew as
enemies of Reason, isn't it?) The virtue I see in Ralph's presentation, that
he wears his hermeneutical prejudices on his sleeve, is precisely because he
makes them obvious for all to see, and thus, for all to situate themselves in
reference to; also, he uses them as a springboard for serious thinking and
investigation. (And BTW, I have no problem in adding Ralph's description of
his own personal experiences to his hermeneutical prejudice.) The sub-text of
Justin's argument is that prejudice is always a break on emancipation, and
that the notion of enabling prejudices is an oxymoron. (Justin: "Doubtless
standards of rationality change over time and are no less subject to critique
than the material to which they applied. Doubtless they are historically
conditioned and full of prejudices that we cannot see from within them...)
But I see such prejudices as amalgams of various elements, some logical and
some extra-logical, and as unavoidable elements in any intellectual
endeavour. Hermeneutical prejudices certainly can be criticized, and logical
argumentation is one way to do so; but the notion that it is possible to be
outside of the hermeneutical circle, to be without prejudice, is, I insist,
unsustainable. As a teacher, I have found that the most productive and honest
way to engage students and to teach them how to think critically is not to
present one's arguments as if it were simply the result of pure logical
reasoning (and thus, implicitly, the only right way to think about a
particular issue), but to present both one's  hermeneutical prejudices and
one's arguments, and to allow them to assess the two in combination.

Finally, on this particular point, it is interesting to see how Justin's
argument, having set up a straw version of my argument, comes close at
several points to what I actually argued. To wit: "the critique to which
these standards are subject are rational ones--historically limited, etc.,
but not simply a matter of rhetorical appeal." and "this, too, is a rational
test, not simply a matter of rhetorical appeal." But who ever took the
positions  that 'rhetoric was everything, or that logic was nothing but
rhetoric in disguise'? Certainly not me. And I would add that the actual
point Justin makes -- "not simply a matter of rhetorical appeal" -- is a far
cry from rhetoric-free logic, which is the claim that he started out to
prove. 

There is an interesting correspondence here, I would suggest, between
Justin's rational choice model of logical argumentation and Habermas' notion
of an idealized speech situation. Justin might very well reject the specific
model of Habermas as ahistorical, but he implicitly adopts an
extra-historical vantage point -- for what is logic free of rhetoric, but
extra-historical? And what is Justin's Enlightenment narrative of overcoming
prejudice with logic, admittedly step by step and still incomplete, but the
forward march of Reason? Hegel is smuggled into rational choice theory.

The other major point that Justin takes on is this: "Leo suggests that the
reason-rhetoric dichotomy is somehow tied to the demonization of the Other,
and in particular the non-European, probably female Menace. How he gets this
>from Hobbes, or his use of myth, beats me..." This is a long discussion, and
some of the points Justin raises, like the interrelationship of the gender
opposition with the reason-rhetoric opposition, need some in-depth
discussion. I would agree with some -- but not all -- of his formulations on
this count. Too many discussions of this issue are crude and reductive in the
extreme, and Justin's approach is thoughtful. But I would like to take a
different tact on this question.

The work of Foucault (and to a much lesser extent, Derrida) on 'madness' and
the history of its treatment in the West provides a clear illustration of how
a particular conception of rationality, that of a singular, homogeneous
reason, involves the separation, isolation and sequestration of the 'other'
who stands outside of this norm. The fact that simple-minded
"post-modernists" read this as a condemnation of reason in general means
nothing more that they have failed to understand the terms of the critique,
and that they remain on the modernist intellectual terrain of a rigidly
polarized dualism between logic and rhetoric. They have simply reversed the
terms of valorization. Justin and I can agree that the notion which posits
reason or logic in general as somehow intrinsically male, or white/European,
or heterosexual, or bourgeois is an eminently silly and stupid position, and
the corresponding notion that reason and logic in general must be rejected in
the interests of the advance of the struggle against sexism, racism,
heterosexism and class rule is pernicious. I have no problems with Justin's
formulation that "After all, every group has some standards of argument, and
in fact these standards are necessary to have coherent discussion at all. To
the extent that we can understand others at all, that's evidence that we have
enough shared in the way of standards to communicate, among other things,
about what those standards should be."

Precisely because there is not one universal standard of communication, one
ideal speech situation, but rather different culturally specific standards,
there is something to the critique of reason and logic conceived in a
particular, homogeneous way. That, and nothing more, is the claim I would
make here. And it is really not that hard to tease out that critique from the
narrative of leviathan interpretation I recounted. Note that in the classical
Judaic and Christian interpretations of the Bible, there are a plurality of
reading methods -- Gregory the Great, for example, distinguishes between at
least three different types of interpretation. It was the modernist
Calvinists who reject the plurality of reading methods, especially the
metaphorical and figurative (as human interventions in God's word), and
insist upon one singular, homogeneous method of interpretation, the literal
reading. Those who reject this singular method become the irrational, the
superstitious, the unenlightened, the purveyor of fables -- the 'other'. And
so, in a time of the increase of anti-Semitism throughout Europe (for reasons
that are far too numerous to discuss here),  the classical, figurative
interpretation of leviathan is attributed entirely to the Jewish tradition.
 
The construction of the Jew as modern 'other' (a category quite distinct from
pre-modern conceptions) is part and parcel, I would argue, of the historical
movement which established a particular concept of a homogeneous, singular
rationality within Christianity. (It is not necessary, I believe, to rehearse
here the Weberian analysis of the connection between Calvinism and the modern
homogeneous mode of rationality.)

(Parenthetically, there is some very interesting work on the connection
between the modern conceptualization of madness and the modern construction
of the 'other'. Sander Gilman's work on Judaism and madness is especially
good.)

On Rahul:
--------------
Rahul writes: "All this by analyzing Hobbes, a man concerned to justify the
divine right of kings -- perhaps not the most appropriate or emancipatory
exemplar of enlightenment."

Sorry, but this is just plain wrong. Hobbes almost lost his head after the
Restoration because Leviathan was often read, with some very good reason, as
justifying obedience to the Cromwellian reign. There is a great deal back and
forth on this among the Hobbes scholars, but it involves which side of the
fence most of Hobbes' posterior occupied during the Civil War and the
Interregnum -- there are no grounds for the notion that his main intention
was a defense of divine right. Moreover, the whole thrust of the shift to the
idea of a social contract, of which Hobbes was one of the first exponents,
was to reflect, in theory, the change from a mode of legitimation based on
the sacred (divine right) to a mode of legitimation based on the will of the
people. Indeed, insofar as there is a consensus among Hobbes scholars, it
would tend in the direction of seeing him as one of the very first modern
political thinkers.

On Ralph's Response:
--------------------------------
Ralph writes: "You don't seem to be paying attention... Do you think there is
a dark side to the enlightenment along the working class people who embraced
science and reason in order to emancipate themselves?  The issue is not just
the Enlightenment as something that happened to one small group of people at
one time... Enlightenment is an ongoing process, which changes with the
people who appropriate modernity for themselves. You missed the entire point
of my post, didn't you?

And further: "Do you think that the reactionary culture of ignorance
exploited by the Christian Coalition or the Nation of Islam is academic?
 Leo, I am offended by your point of departure. You must think I am playing
games.  When I step outside of my door into the culture of poverty every day,
I come face to face with the consequences of the violation of the human
mind."

I don't think that I missed the entire point of Ralph's posting. What I tried
to do was find a way to affirm a great deal of it, but show why I felt that
it was necessary to go beyond the Enlightenment -- and in particular the way
in which it conceptualized reason and logic -- in order to realize its
promise. That was certainly done at a relatively high level of abstraction,
but I think that the form was in part dictated by the level of abstraction in
Ralph's posting. I chose to lay out the argument with respect to Hobbes' use
of leviathan precisely because I wanted to avoid operating solely at the
meta-theoretical level. That did not strike me as an academic game, but
rather as a way to get a fresh look at an issue we tend to approach with some
very fixed frames. It certainly was not meant to offend. I am afraid that
Ralph feels I did not appreciate his posting, and that is not the case. If I
did not think it important and serious, I would not have taken the time to
write such a lengthy take on the issues it raised; if I had ignored it,
Ralph's complaint would make more sense to me. From where I come, engagement
in a serious conversation is the most sincere sign that one values what the
other party said. If I misunderstood I'm sorry, but Ralph, I just don't get
how you reach the conclusion that I think you are a dry logician. It ain't
so, brother.

I will gladly take up the issue of how this relates to the obscurantism
of the Nation of Islam, the Christian Coalition, et. al. which Ralph poses in
this reply. There are some differences between Ralph and myself here, but
there is also a great deal of common ground. If I am not completely mistaken,
we share in common that much of the inspiration for the development of our
political thinking comes out of ruminations on the practical, political
situation in which we live and work, and we share a common distaste for left
academic formulas on inner city life developed at a great distance in
relative comfort and with little real, first hand knowledge of or respect for
the real people in those contexts (ie, the celebration of riots as some form
of popular rebellion). Perhaps I should have pointed out that these elements
were as much part of one's hermeneutical prejudices as one's reading and
conversational habits and preferences.

But as I think about it, the ways in which I deal with the obscurantism of
the Nation of Islam, Five Percenters, Israelites and a host of other similar
sects that are found in the inner city is remarkably consistent with the
arguments I made here. I don't find it particularly useful to treat these
views, when they appear in my classroom, as simply errors of logic or
reasoning. Take the conspiracy theories that surround AIDS. They are an
amalgam of a lot of different things, a lot of which fits this notion of
backwardness and superstition -- some of it is the most rank racial
stereotypes (the worst white racism, with just inverse valorization), some of
it is the most silly and unscientific theories, and some of it is the most
bizarre caricatures of how the mechanisms of power works. But there is
something else also going on here: we live in a country where less than a
half-century ago secret medical experiments were still being carried out on
unknowing African-American subjects (the Tuskegee Syphillis study).
African-Americans, along with other people of color and gay men, are
disproportionately infected with HIV, and there is a definite relationship
between who is infected and how the disease has been approached. Like all
'myths', these conspiracy theories gather their power precisely because they
offer an explanation, however distorted and pernicious, for these realities.
Unless a way is found to address these realities, both in action and in
alternative world views, all of the explanations of the errors of logic and
reasoning will go nowhere. There is a very precise correlation in American
history between the decline of potential if interracial political movements
of progressive change and the turn of significant numbers of
African-Americans to Farrakhans and their ilk.

How do I respond to suggestions that white people are devils? In a number of
ways, depending upon the context. With humor ("Did I forget to cover up my
horns this morning?"), by simply saying that it is not worthy of a serious
argument (an approach which involves an invocation of classroom authority),
by an extended rhetorical/analytical analysis which unpacks the implications
of the view. The last makes the most effect, since it forces the use of
critical faculities. It goes like this: What is a devil but, as we know from
Genesis, a fallen angel; thus, for the white man to be the all-powerful
devil, attacking and undermining black folk at every turn, he must first have
been an angel, a creature of all-powerful good. Indeed, there is a lot in the
ways in which the Nation of Islam organizes itself, down to the suits and
bowties, which suggests an adulation of a certain image of white folks. But
aren't white folk like any other folk, capable of doing both good and evil?
And a very important part of my ability to make progress on these fronts
rests on the quality of the relationship and trust I have established with my
students.

I think that this last set of points may be worth further investigation --
what lessons do we draw from our actual practice here? This set of responses
has gone on long enough.



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