Date: Thu, 18 Apr 1996 17:08:30 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: Splits in the working class



Adam thinks that because it is in the long range and universal class
interests of men, whites, firstw orld workers, etc. to unite with women,
Blacks, and third world workers that there is no contradiction at all
between any of their interests. He notes that if the bosses can use
dividea nd conquer everyone loses. Women don't get abortion rights, while
first world male workers don't get higher wages, etc. Quite right. But
this is just to say that what we have is a prisoner's dilemma. If each
does what it is individually as opposed to collectively rational for him
or her to do, everyone ends up worse off. But here's the point: it _is_
individually rational for everyone to look out for him or herself or his
or her narrow group. These interests are real. 

To see this, look at the prisoner's dilemma again. Suppose women support
male worker's demands for higher wages, taking time awy from their
pro-choice struggles to do so. The rational thing for the male workers to
do is to accept the help but not to reciprocate by taking time away from
their own struggles. That way they get the benefit without the cost. And
vice versa. So, the rational thing for both is foe neither to help. Of
course this is collectively irrational. But it is individuallly rational.

That's in partr why cross-0group class unity is so hard. Sure there is a
lot of sexiusm and racism among the while male workers and a lot of class
prejudice (and racis,) among mifddle class feminists. But underlying the
irrational and prejudicial reasons for lack of cooperation is the real
clash of shoirt term interests. That's a main reason that this problem is
so intractable. 

To defeat it, we need either to change people's motivations, making them
care about the payoff to other sub-class groups (or individuals in their
class) or change the payoff matrix, making it rational for people to act
collectively in a class-universal way. Both of these are very hard to do.
Adam's view ids defective because it overstates how easily such changes
will be. For him. all we have to do is get rid of mistaken ideas and
prejudices. (Not that that's so easy.) What the RCT approach urged here
suggests is that one reason it's hard is that these are based in part on
real interests and moreover that even if these prejudices are cleared away
there will remain the real short term and parial conflicts of intereswts.

It is not an answer to this to say,as Adam does, that acting on short
term, partial, individually rational motivations produces sub=optimal
results. That's a theorem of course, it's the Prisoner's Dilemma. The
reason the PD is so hard is that it's ratiuonal to act in away that
produces suboptimal results.

For those who do not know the terminology, the PD is a central threoem of
game theory. It;s so called because we make the point by telling the
following story. A and B are prisoner, held by the cops, seperately and
with no means to communicate. Moreover theyw ill have further contact, so
their decision herew ill not affect their future interactions. Thgey are
individually rational, wanting what's best for themselves and not caring
about what happensto the other guy unless that affects them. They each
want to spend thre least amount of time in jail. The situatoon is that the
cops have enough evidence to pin a lesser offense (1 year in jail) on both of
them, but with the testiminy of the other they can pin a greater offense
(3 years in jail) on the one being testified against. If one testifies and
the other doesn't, they will let the guy whoi rats off (0 years in jail)
and slam the other. If both testify they will give each 2 years in jail.
What to do?


Here's the matrix:


			A doesn't rat			A does rat


B doesn't rat           Both: 1 year			A goes free, best
			2nd best for both		B gets 3 years, worst


B does rat		B goes free, best		Both, 2 years
			A gets 3 yrs, worst		3rd best for both

So what to do? A thinks, either B rats of he doesn't. If B doen't rat.
If B doesn'r rat I certainly should, because  then I go free, whereas if
we both keep our mouths shut we both get 1 year, our second best, and more
importantly my second best outcome, and the otherway I gewt my best.

If B does rat then I also should, because if I don't I get my worst
outcome, whereas if I do I get my third best. 

So I should rat in any case.

B of course thinks the same way, so we end up in cell 4, both ratting.

Some important differences between this game and the intra-class conflict
games. First, in many cases the the latter the parties can communicate and
will have further contacts. This won't be their ownly interaction. Second,
there are more than two players. Third, the payoff matrix is a lot more
complicated. That means we cannot transpose the PD directly to the real
life context. But it doers indicatea  structural tendency that helps
explain why the intra-class conflicts of interests are so persistant and
so difficult.

--Justin




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