File spoon-archives/marxism2.archive/marxism2_1996/96-04-19.143, message 31


Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 18:50:47 -0600
Subject:  McDonough - Rogers 1


From: 	Lisa Rogers
To:   	TERRENCE.MCDONOUGH-AT-UCG.IE
Date: 	Wednesday, March 6, 1996 9:03 am
Subject: 	Re: TREE Article part 2 of 3 -Reply

TM: Risk aversion is unobservable and makes any observation
consistent  with the hypotheses.  Those who share more are simply
more risk  averse.  The evidence for this?  They share more.  The
argument is  circular.

LR: 'Risk aversion' is not meant psychologically.  It is a
description of behavior.  I don't see the circularity, and I am
interested in figuring out what you mean by this.  'Risk averse
behavior' is that which yields a daily harvest quantity of lower
variance, compared to a behavior which yields a higher variance in
daily harvest.  That's how it is defined and measured.

It matters because variance in daily or weekly, etc. food intake can
affect fitness, somewhat independently of average food intake.  Also,
variance may be associated with mean in various ways, i.e. a high
variance strategy might have higher or lower mean return than a low
variance strategy.  Does that clear it up, or do you still see
circularity?  or what?


TM: [re: tolerated theft] This observation is inconsistent with
explaining behaviour where the  entire catch is shared out to others
and the hunter consumes none of  it.  Only a custom of reciprocity
explains this.  Since this is one  end of a continuum of sharing
behaviour, failure to explain this  means failure to explain all
other sharing behaviour.

LR: Any explanation of anything must explain everything?  Hmmm.  What
about the fact that "reciprocity" fails to explain persistent one-way
transfers without return?  Also, I?m looking to understand general
trends, not to "explain" each and every act with a single hypothesis.
 I think that several different 'mechanisms' of food-transfer are
operating simultaneously, and the minimal point I'd like you to
consider is that "reciprocity" alone cannot account for the
observations.  

Also, R is often used in a very fuzzy way, so that it is not clear
exactly what the criteria are that something must meet in order to
support the hypothesis of "reciprocity".  I have done this, detailing
the observational differences that must be met in order to
distinguish between reciprocity and tolerated theft, for instance,
and I find that it is not easy, the observed behavior looks largely
similar either way.  The vast majority of ethnography does not
collect the kind of data that is required to support either
hypothesis unequivocally.

Besides, if there is sufficient payback in some other way, wouldn't
you be willing to go downright hungry?  Be aware that we are not
content to say 'well, there must be something in it for him', we want
to see just what is it that _is_ in it.  


TM: So the forager is maximizing whether taking defendable (personal 
nutritional intake) or undefendable prey (allies).  All behaviour is 
explained.  Therefor none is explained?

LR:  Again, "explanation" is not stopping at asserting
"maximization", far from it.

TM:  Is this [re: why men hunt] an argument about the acquisition of
status?  Since status  exists in most primate groupings, this is
presumably inherited  instinctual behaviour.  If so, it is not
rational maximizing  behaviour.  The instinct may be consistent with
maximizing  reproductive success but that is a different argument.  

LR: First, it is very important to understanding this work to know
that we have done away with traditional ideas of "inherited
instincts" and their alleged opposition to "rational maximization". 
The very concept of "instinct" is misleading and not useful, and
evolutionary ecologists have given up the word entirely, in my
experience.  "Nature vs. nurture" has similarly been reconceptualized
and the useless term dropped, the ideas are quite re-cast now, as
they should be.  

But, for the sake of brevity and a direct answer, let me just say
yes, to the extent that anything is "inherited" evolutionary theory
itself provides the warrant for expecting that any propensities are
likely to be fitness-serving.  Including the likelihood that one will
_not_ seek "status" if it is _not_ related to fitness in one's
specific circumstances.  Rather, I'd redirect the question to why the
specifics of "status" take the various forms that they do.

The argument about 'why men hunt' is partly an argument about the
_different_ fitness effects that any one behavior [such as gaining
many friends and allies] can have, depending on whether it is done by
women, men, old or young.  It is also an argument about why hunting
_of large game_ or of other _high variance_ resources is socially
rewarded.

TM: Here the grandmother is engaging in altruistic behaviour.  It may
contribute to reproductive success, but this is not rational 
behaviour.  In terms of conflict of interest between individuals, how
are her personal interests served?

LR:  She gets more grandchildren by assisting her daughters with
their reproduction.

Thanks for comments,
more later,
Lisa




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