Date: Tue, 09 Apr 1996 18:50:47 -0600 Subject: McDonough - Rogers 1 From: Lisa Rogers To: TERRENCE.MCDONOUGH-AT-UCG.IE Date: Wednesday, March 6, 1996 9:03 am Subject: Re: TREE Article part 2 of 3 -Reply TM: Risk aversion is unobservable and makes any observation consistent with the hypotheses. Those who share more are simply more risk averse. The evidence for this? They share more. The argument is circular. LR: 'Risk aversion' is not meant psychologically. It is a description of behavior. I don't see the circularity, and I am interested in figuring out what you mean by this. 'Risk averse behavior' is that which yields a daily harvest quantity of lower variance, compared to a behavior which yields a higher variance in daily harvest. That's how it is defined and measured. It matters because variance in daily or weekly, etc. food intake can affect fitness, somewhat independently of average food intake. Also, variance may be associated with mean in various ways, i.e. a high variance strategy might have higher or lower mean return than a low variance strategy. Does that clear it up, or do you still see circularity? or what? TM: [re: tolerated theft] This observation is inconsistent with explaining behaviour where the entire catch is shared out to others and the hunter consumes none of it. Only a custom of reciprocity explains this. Since this is one end of a continuum of sharing behaviour, failure to explain this means failure to explain all other sharing behaviour. LR: Any explanation of anything must explain everything? Hmmm. What about the fact that "reciprocity" fails to explain persistent one-way transfers without return? Also, I?m looking to understand general trends, not to "explain" each and every act with a single hypothesis. I think that several different 'mechanisms' of food-transfer are operating simultaneously, and the minimal point I'd like you to consider is that "reciprocity" alone cannot account for the observations. Also, R is often used in a very fuzzy way, so that it is not clear exactly what the criteria are that something must meet in order to support the hypothesis of "reciprocity". I have done this, detailing the observational differences that must be met in order to distinguish between reciprocity and tolerated theft, for instance, and I find that it is not easy, the observed behavior looks largely similar either way. The vast majority of ethnography does not collect the kind of data that is required to support either hypothesis unequivocally. Besides, if there is sufficient payback in some other way, wouldn't you be willing to go downright hungry? Be aware that we are not content to say 'well, there must be something in it for him', we want to see just what is it that _is_ in it. TM: So the forager is maximizing whether taking defendable (personal nutritional intake) or undefendable prey (allies). All behaviour is explained. Therefor none is explained? LR: Again, "explanation" is not stopping at asserting "maximization", far from it. TM: Is this [re: why men hunt] an argument about the acquisition of status? Since status exists in most primate groupings, this is presumably inherited instinctual behaviour. If so, it is not rational maximizing behaviour. The instinct may be consistent with maximizing reproductive success but that is a different argument. LR: First, it is very important to understanding this work to know that we have done away with traditional ideas of "inherited instincts" and their alleged opposition to "rational maximization". The very concept of "instinct" is misleading and not useful, and evolutionary ecologists have given up the word entirely, in my experience. "Nature vs. nurture" has similarly been reconceptualized and the useless term dropped, the ideas are quite re-cast now, as they should be. But, for the sake of brevity and a direct answer, let me just say yes, to the extent that anything is "inherited" evolutionary theory itself provides the warrant for expecting that any propensities are likely to be fitness-serving. Including the likelihood that one will _not_ seek "status" if it is _not_ related to fitness in one's specific circumstances. Rather, I'd redirect the question to why the specifics of "status" take the various forms that they do. The argument about 'why men hunt' is partly an argument about the _different_ fitness effects that any one behavior [such as gaining many friends and allies] can have, depending on whether it is done by women, men, old or young. It is also an argument about why hunting _of large game_ or of other _high variance_ resources is socially rewarded. TM: Here the grandmother is engaging in altruistic behaviour. It may contribute to reproductive success, but this is not rational behaviour. In terms of conflict of interest between individuals, how are her personal interests served? LR: She gets more grandchildren by assisting her daughters with their reproduction. Thanks for comments, more later, Lisa --- from list marxism2-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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