Date: Tue, 16 Jul 1996 21:41:06 +0300 (EET DST)
Subject: Re: dialectics, two-valued?


Were these questions for me, Barkley?

> If dialectics is not a "two-valued logic" then what
> is it?  A many valued logic?  A fuzzy valued logic?
> A no value logic?  Not a logic?

I'm a bit slow - now I believe I've got your point. Ergo, basically
dialectics is 'two-value', given argument(ation) is either true or
false.

However, what I originally had in mind, was that dialectics isn't
about singular sentences, propositions, or statements like "house is
red". Dialecticians don't do dissertations on one sentence - "Molly
went into bath and Jack scratched her back" - like people in
linguistic logic do. (That example was obviously 'complex sentence'
and, therefore, unsuitable for dissertation?)

Unfortunately I'm unable to clarify differences between (formal) logic
and dialectics. So one general remark is my 'contribution':

One (non- or anti-marxist) logician once said that Marx's "Capital" is
logical masterpiece - 'convincing, rigorous logic' in use 'if one
accepts his premises' - but he was unable to shed light on dialectical
nature of "Capital". I think that for example Tony Smith does it in
"Logic of Marx's 'Capital'".

If I remember correctly, 'category' and 'dialectic' became nicely
interrelated in Smith, so it could be said that work of dialectic
consists in combining at least (a) heterogenous threads (supposed to
be contradictory ones in this example) and (b) different levels of
abstraction (generality, singularity) into single category, and (c)
combining several categories together into single categorial system.
It's a materialistic one, if its 'logic' is based on 'logic' of
reality, to put it bluntly (that is, it isn't a question of plain
thought abstractions).

Now, if we mean by 'logic' what nowadays is usually meant by it in a
strict sense of linguistic and mathematical logic (strict rules for
'reasoning', or for combinations of terms; formalism; concentration
on individual sentences or propositions - or use they them just as
examples?), then I simply don't see any reason in insistence that
'dialectics' is 'logic'. However, I tend to think that this definion
of logic is too restricted. I like to go back to Greeks in order to
keep in mind different spheres involved in 'logos' ('word', 'reason'
etc). In this broad sense of logic dialectics surely is logic. Logic
of presentation, logic of discourse, logic of argumentation &c.

I have dictionaries at home, so unfortunately I'm unable to look what
Greek dictionary says about 'dia' and 'dialektike'. Yet I'd bet that
Christopher is right in saying that 'dia' means 'through' in
classic Greek. I'm not sure about that 'lektike' - what it actually
means, of what word it's derived etc. 'Lekton', however, comes to mind
easily, meaning 'meaning' or, perhaps, 'conceptual content' or
'sayable' (whatever). In this case dialectics could mean something
like 'meanings-through-each-others', which hints to the fact that
concepts aren't such 'independent' things as 'terms' in formal logic.

However, I'll keep in mind 'dialogue' versus 'monologue' distinction.

But that all is just speculation. I'm not 'professional' in this.

Jukka



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