Date: Thu, 5 Sep 1996 12:50:55 -0600 (MDT)
Subject: *Marx, Hayek, and Utopia*


Now, i am finally in a position to pursue an analysis and discussion of 
Chris Sciabarra's book *Marx, Hayek, and Utopia* SUNY Press: Albany, 1995 
(here after MHU).

My primary interest in MHU is twofold: (a) Sciabarria's interest in 
dialectics (as a method of [social] reasoning); and (b) his attempt to find 
commonalities between these (ontologically) oppossed traditions.

i will go through the book chapter by chapter (for the most part), in 
numerical order.  MHU has an intoduciton, 7 chapters, and an epilogue.

One main thesis of MHU is that the "traditional" interpretations of the 
opposing tradition tend to underestimate, misunderstand, and misrepresent 
one another.  First, the Hayek camp tending to dismiss Marxists as 
utopian; and second Marxians reducing Hayekians to capitalist 
apologists.  Both which  Sciabarra wants to challenge as misled.  Or as 
Sciabarra himself puts it on the frist page of MHU:

	"Each side has expressed the conviction that the other is 
	dismally wrong.  However, it is my belief that each has a great 
	deal to learn from the other: Hayekians, who dismiss Marx as a 	
	utopian, might detect a significant anti-utopian dimension in 
	his thought; Marxists, who dismiss Hayek as an apologist for 
	capitalism, might discover a certain dialectical sensibility in 
	his thought."

One great commonality between Marx and Hayek is their shared commitment 
to anti-utopian thought.  This will turn up again and again throughtout 
the pages of MHU.

Sciabarra adds:  "And yet, despite their common anti-utopianism, Marx and 
Hayek differ with regard to some crucially important epistemic premises" 
(Sciabarra:2).

These "epistemic premises" will be shown to be in latter chapters  
(1) the "unintended consequences" of individual *action* and 
(especially) intentional political or collective policy; and (2) 
unacknowledged conditions of such 'action' and 'policy'.  Together 
constituting the limits of human cognitive reasoning and understanding; 
and hence questioning the ability of human beings to make social change 
for the betterment of the human condition.

This last sentence pushes Sciabarra's own words, but it is a theme that 
the reader (at least this one) is left with throughout the book.  A type 
of (liberal) Skepticism (if you will).  One that must be addressed by 
radical social thinkers.  And if held, a position that must be defended by 
the liberal social thinkers.

It is worth continuing with the last quote in full, which is as follows:

	"For Hayek, Marx's vision of the ideal communist society rests 
	on the mistaken assumption that in the future, people will be 
	capable of mastering their own destiny.  In Hayek's view, this 
	grandiose Marxist illusion served as an ideological legitimation
	for modern attempts to achieve the millennium through the coercive 
	power of the state.  Hayek explains that for important ontological
	and epistemological reasons, such a utopian goal must engender 
	dystopian consequences.  For Marxists, however, any such epistemic 
	constraints are historically specific to capitalism.  Such critics  
	as Hilary Wainwright contend that Hayek embarces a 'dogmatically 
	individualist' view of knowledge that does not recognize the 
	potential for efficacious collective action" (ibid).

i would like to point out a few things that are revealed in this quote.

The main thing being the political tone of reasoning that is embedded in 
Sciabarra's work.  That is to say he has a very political presentation of 
Hayek and Marx.  Sciabarra uses this political presentation especially 
against Marxists, often (i hope to demonstrate) missing the explanatory 
strength of a Marxian understanding of capitalism as a socio-economic system.
But this is not to deny the weaknesses of the dogmatic Marxists committed 
to the "whithering" away of misery and misfortune with the absenting of 
capitalist social realtions.

Or to put in different, more critical, words: a weakness of Sciabarra's 
book is its lack of economic reasoning.  An absence that seems to put his 
interpretation of Marx at a disadvantage of his interpretation of Hayek.

In other words, i do not believe necessarily that Marx's view (and faith & 
hope) of the future social possibilities is directly connected with his 
understanding of the dynamics or social dialectic of the capitalist system.

Whether we can "master" our own "destiny" does not necessarily commit us 
to capitalism or socialism -- if we can disspell Marxists from this 
"grandiose" "illusion" we are not necessarily committing ourselves to the 
"free market". 

This is the theme of Wainwright's book.  

Connceted to these "epistemic differences" is a particular ontological 
commitment to what constitutes human beings themselves and the societies 
they create.  In this respect, i will defend Wainwright against 
Sciabarra's criticism later in the book.

But for now i will quickly finish the Introduction.

Sciabarra offers a history of "dialectic", which is much too brief.  His 
comments and footnote on Aristole are the most interesting.

Sciabarra claims that:  "The best way in which to understand the 
dialectical impulse is to view it as a *method* of social inquiry" 
(Sciabarra:4).  

i am not at all sure about this statement.  i do not necessarily believe 
we should reduce diaelctics to merely to a "method".  

Dialectics is an *implicit* ontological commitment, one which dialectical 
and transcendental reasoning attempts to make *explicit*.  

But in any event Sciabarra maintains dialectic is a method which in part 
determines the content, or there exists a reciprocity of "the 'how' and 
the 'what' -- of one's analysis".  i agree with this, but will attempt to 
push Chris on his meaning of dialectics throughout my reading of MHU.

i did very much like it when Sciabarra says: "The dialectical method 
recognizes that what is separable in thought is not separable in reality" 
(Sciabarra:4).  This is related to my comments about dialectics and 
ontology; and suggests that we must be on guard against (what Bhaskar 
calls) categorical errors.  Or our tendency to apply our categories 
erroneously to reality; consequently mis-understanding reality itself, 
hence our ability to change it.

There is also a nice statement of dialectic in the last paragraph of page 
four and first paragraph of page five (which i  will not reproduce 
here).  This is the best pronoucement of dialectics in the book.  
Although the entire book is developing a notion of dialectic, if only 
implicitly.

i will stop here, but to anticipate, i am very suspicious of what is 
meant by dialectics in this book.   And will attempt to point out the 
when a more economic type of reasoning could benefit.

hans d.






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