Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 23:41:37 -0600 (MDT)
Subject: Re: *Marx, Hayek, and Utopia


Below is a review of chapter one of Sciabarra's *Marx, Hayek, and 
Utopia* (1995).  i will continue to develop this chapter to chapter, but 
there needs to be a overall assetment to discuss the major issues.

Chapter one of MHU is titled "Hayekian Dialectics".

The first section of this chapter attempts to define Hayek's political 
and social positions or views.  Sciabarra claims Hayek is not 
(necessarily) conserative, nor reactionary, and certainly not an 
apologist for the capitalist system.  In brief Sciabarra argues Hayek 
is: (1) a classical liberal toward the ("free") market; (2) conservative 
toward evolutionism (as opposed to violent revolution); and (3) 
"profoundly radical" in his commitment to a dialectical method of social 
theory (Sciabarra:12).

There is not much textual support offered for these claims (there are 
references); but i would tend to agree this interpretation is easily 
supported by Hayek himself.  The main trouble being (3), namely the title 
of the chapter itself -- in what way can we say Hayek is dialectical?

This will be especially important in that Sciabarra's argument throughout 
MHU is there exists two main inflection points in the work of Marx and 
Hayek, which offers a certain common ground for communicability between 
the two camps.  These inflection points are (a) dialectical method; and 
(b) anti-utopian commitments. Where (a) is usually (or dogmatically) 
understood to be strictly Marxian; and (b) is held to be strictly 
characteristic of evolutionalism.  Sciabarra attempts to demonstrate (a) 
and (b) charactrize both camps, and hence offers a unique and important 
possiblity for a commonality that exists between the Hayekian and 
Marxian traditions where there is most often understood to be none. 

Sciabarra's case is well made for (a) and (b) charactrizing both Hayek 
and Marx (it is interesting how cherished utopianism is on this list as 
a Marxian commitment). However, personally i have reservations with the 
case made for (a) and will attempt to critique this aspect of MHU in 
posts to come.

In any event, Sciabarra's purpose in the first section of chapter one 
seems to be to argue for the strenghs of the Hayekian commitments (1-3 
above). For example, one argument is that a commitment to evolution is not 
necessarily a commitment to the status quo.  Rather the importance of 
history, the timing, and rate of change are of the utmost importance for 
being effective and successful in social transformation.

BTW i take this to be the central (implicit) theme in Karl Polanyi's *The 
Great Transformation*.  K. Polanyi's is usually understood as a radical 
(though not usually Marxian).

The next section is a defense against the strict methodological 
individualist interpretations of Hayek.  Admittly, i am not familiar 
enough with Hayek to agree or critique the accuracy of such an 
interpretation.  However, i have developed enough "faith" in the author 
to accept this is an imporvished reading of Hayek (in whole).  

However, Sciabarra's wants to critique Hilary Wainwright for 
mis-(or under-)interpreting Hayek as a "dogmatic individualist". He 
insists that the "framework" of Hayek "relects a deep appreciation for 
organic social interrelationships and their dynamic development over 
time" (Sciabarra:15); and not a dogmatic individualist.

There may be truth to this, but i will (passively) suggest there is not 
necessarily anything mistaken with saying there is a general tendency in 
some (or much) of Hayek's work to interpret him as a dogmatic 
individualist.  Moreover, Wainwright's own interest is in understanding 
the appeal of the free-market right.  i have read Wainwright's book, but 
my interest did not have these issues in mind at the time, hence, this is 
all i am able to say.  But i am curious if her comments on Hayek as a 
"dogmatic individualist" are political or methodological.  i would 
suggest that politically a defender of the "free-market" would tend to be 
an individualist; while the Austrians in general are methodologically 
individualists.

But according to Sciabarra Hayek does not necessarily commitment himself 
to a reductionist, atomistic methodology of social analysis:  "while 
Hayek recognizes the ontological priority of concrete particulars, of 
real, existing individuals, he views the whole as a relationally evolving 
totality that is beyond the capacity of any single individual to fully 
comprehend" (Sciabarra:17-8).  And in the next section Hayek is quoted 
as saying: "social theory must start 'from men whose nature and 
character is detemined by their existence in society'" (Sciabarra 
quoting Hayek:25). Hayek is in agreement with M. Polanyi 
(Karl Polanyi's bother) when the latter "argues that 'all particulars 
become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly 
constitute'" (19).

In all Sciabarra is quite convincing in making a case for Hayek being 
methodologically *relational* but does this make him necessarily 
*dialectical*.  i would like to come back to this issue further along in 
the book itself, but will state dialectics is a commitment to a particular 
ontological view.  Dialectics is not merely a "method" (Sciabarra:4) or "a 
way of thinking" (Sciabarra:24).  It is uncovering, or making explicit 
this ontology that in part makes a thinker dialectic, and it is here that 
we must question the commonality between Marx and Hayek (and Hegel for 
that matter).  

The next section of the chapter does begin to develop a more specific and 
explicit ontology by discussing "internal relations". In short, this 
section of the book is very well done.  But i may suggest that it belongs 
in the introduction as part of the defination of dialectics itself.

With an apology i will not develop or attempt to reproduce Sciabarra's 
presentation of "internal relations".  Rather (unfairly?!) i will focus 
on a disagreement.  Sciabarra (page 25) says: "For Hayek, there is a limit 
beyond which we are unable to articulate the rules, customs, and habits that 
govern our lives.  We are *internal* to these rules and cannot take an 
external, transcendental role.  Even our consciousness operates according 
to rules of which we are not conscious, since these rules are *internal* 
to the operation itself."

The first sentence suggests there is an ontological limit for human 
beings, but is this really the case?  There are certainly difficulties, 
and epistemological problems, but i am not at all sure this should 
commitment to a general limit for all human beings, and to the production 
of knowledge a priori.  Second it is the transcendental role (at least in 
the Kantian usage of the term) that offers us hope in re-constructing 
reality in thought.  That is we can always ask the transcendental 
type of question -- what must (social) reality itself be like for 
our experience to be as it is?   Once we understand social reality, we can 
change it in an attempt to absence particular unwanted manifestations.  
We do not necessarily need to know all of reality to change part of it 
for the better.  Moreover, this should not in itself commitment to any 
particular social system.

This is a theme of Wainwright's book which i think is very important.  
Namely there is hope in transforming reality for the betterment of the 
human condition.

i will end here.

hans despain



     --- from list marxism2-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---