Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 11:37:06 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: *Marx, Hayek, and Utopia*



I appreciate the dialogue that Hans is beginning here, and will show a
little restraint in engaging the dialogue until Hans gets into the
"nitty-gritty" of the issues he's raised.  Just a few quick observations,
however...

On Thu, 5 Sep 1996, hans despain wrote:
> Sciabarra offers a history of "dialectic", which is much too brief.  His 
> comments and footnote on Aristole are the most interesting.
	I agree, Hans!  My next book, TOTAL FREEDOM, will spend quite a
bit of time tracing the history of the concept of dialectic -- I suspect
at least 2 chapters worth, and I also suspect, given the direction of my
research, that Aristotle will figure prominently in the discussion.  Alas!
We cannot reinvent the wheel in one book, two books... not even three! :)
But at least I'm trying to reorient the discussion, and I'm delighted that
we can chat about that here.

> Sciabarra claims that:  "The best way in which to understand the 
> dialectical impulse is to view it as a *method* of social inquiry" 
> (Sciabarra:4).  
> 
> i am not at all sure about this statement.  i do not necessarily believe 
> we should reduce diaelctics to merely to a "method".  
> 
> Dialectics is an *implicit* ontological commitment, one which dialectical 
> and transcendental reasoning attempts to make *explicit*.  
> 
> But in any event Sciabarra maintains dialectic is a method which in part 
> determines the content, or there exists a reciprocity of "the 'how' and 
> the 'what' -- of one's analysis".  i agree with this, but will attempt to 
> push Chris on his meaning of dialectics throughout my reading of MHU.
	I have since called it a "methodological orientation" rather than
strictly a "method" along the lines of say, logic, statistical inference,
induction.  As a genus, a "methodological orientation" is a formal
designation for a basic, broad, underlying approach to social research.
Strict atomism, dualism, reductionist monism, strict
organicity, and dialectics are different methodological
orientations.  Each orientation offers a different mixture of
key positions in philosophy and social theory, foremost among
these being the issue of internalism vs. externalism.  Brand
Blanshard tells us of internalism:
    "A given term is internally related to another if in the
    absence of the relation it could not be what it is."

And he tells us of externalism:
    "A term is externally related to another if the relation
    could equally be present or absent while the term was
    precisely the same."

     I discuss the full implications of internalism and
externalism throughout MARX, HAYEK, AND UTOPIA, and in
Chapters 1, 2, 5, 6, and Part 3 of AYN RAND:  THE RUSSIAN
RADICAL.

     The methodological orientations that I discuss below
exist on a continuum from strict atomism to dualism to
reductionist monism to dialectics to strict organicity,
though I often place dialectics in a three-dimensional
relationship to the continuum -- since, in my view, it
seeks to avoid the pitfalls of the other orientations.  By
way of example, here is what each orientation entails in the
realm of social theory:

1.  Strict atomism:  The strict atomist looks at 
    the social world as if each aspect of it
    is strictly separable and in an external relationship to
    every other aspect.  Each part is an "atom," and there is
    a mutual exclusivity between the atoms.  The strict atomist analysis
    is often static, and entirely acontextual.

     While in philosophy, atomism has been expressed by both
Democriteans and some Bertrand Russell types, in social
theory, one can find strict atomism at work in neoclassical
economics, with its caricature of homo economicus, Economic
Man, a utility maximizing atom, external to culture, history,
and context.  One can also find such atomism at work in the
pronouncements of any Democratic or Republican politician,
who simply takes each social problem as it comes, to be dealt
with in a piecemeal fashion, by legislation that has no
connection with any other legislation.  This is fragmented,
fractured thinking at its worst, completely oblivious to the
system within which such social problems are manifested.

2.  Dualism:  The dualist identifies two mutually exclusive,
    entirely separate, co-equal, externally related spheres
    in the social world.  These spheres are expressions of
    two distinct principles, which the dualist often sees as
    logically irreducible and at odds.  

     While in philosophy, dualism has been expressed by
Cartesians who would dichotomize mind and body, in social
theory, there are two fundamentally different versions of
dualism at work:  the statist (socialist or fascist) dualists
and the anarchist dualists.  All dualists, in essence, view
the social world as divided strictly between two co-equal
spheres:  the state and the market.  The statist dualist sees
the state and the market as expressions of political and
civil society, public vs. private sectors.  The anarchist
dualist sees the state and the market as expressions of power
and freedom, violence vs. liberty, directed vs. spontaneous
order.  Each sees the battle between these spheres as an
apocalyptic struggle.  Each proposes a different resolution,
which leads us to --

3.  Reductionist monism:  An orientation that embraces the
    dichotomies defined by dualists, while advocating a
    resolution in which one of the spheres ABSORBS the other.
    The reductionist monist often places priority on ONE
    sphere to the detriment of the other, seeing in one
    sphere a kind of metaphysical primacy which explains the
    other sphere.  The secondary sphere is often described as
    an "epiphenomenon," of the primary sphere.

     In philosophy, the reductionists come in two broad
categories, materialists or idealists (those who view the
body, or the mind, respectively, as primary, and who describe
the secondary substance as an expression of the primary one).
In social theory, such reductionism is manifested by both
statists and anarchists.  The statists resolve the
irreconcilable dualism of state and market by adopting a
political monism, in which the state completely absorbs the
market.  The anarchists resolve the irreconcilable dualism of
state and market by adopting an economic monism, in which the
market completely absorbs the state.  Vulgar economic
determinism is another monistic expression in social theory.

4.  Strict organicity (or what some have described as
    "neutral monism"):  An orientation which views all
    relationships as internal to or constitutive of a single
    basic principle.  This is organic collectivism and
    determinism at its most complete -- it stresses a kind of
    formalism or functionalism, in which all parts are fully
    determined by the whole.  This orientation relies upon a
    "synoptic" vantage point, or omniscient identification of
    the whole.  It entails the belief that one cannot analyze
    any part of the whole without understanding EVERY part of
    the whole -- which usually takes place appropriately, at
    the "end of history."

     In philosophy, Hegel's Spirit comes to mind, while in
social theory, all forms of historicism are expressions of
strict organicity.  They entail defining laws of development
as if one possesses a hidden knowledge of the central telos
in human history.

     In MARX, HAYEK, AND UTOPIA, I argue that utopianism
involves a constellation of dualism and strict organicity:
A la strict organicists, Utopians often recognize that the
social world is composed of infinite, complex, internal
relationships, but their central plans suggest that they
would need to possess perfect knowledge of every internal
relationship and organic link within the social world.  This
strict organicity depends upon an extreme rationalism, as
Hayek makes so clear.  It is moreover, a
"constructivist" rationalism, because it implies, quite
literally, constructing a bridge between the real world and
the Utopians' conception of the ideal world.  This
construction is almost always, statist in its implications.
Yet, a la dualists, utopians who try to maintain a synoptic
vantage point on the social world necessarily exempt
themselves from that world.  They act as if THEY are
completely EXTERNAL to the world; hence, they refuse to
recognize their own contextuality.  Perhaps this is why the
very word "utopian," strictly translated, means "no-place."

5.  Dialectics:  This orientation lies at the base of radical
    social theory, and in my view, it transcends the pitfalls
    of strict atomism, reductionist monism, dualism, and
    strict organicity.  It views relations as internal, but
    internal WITHIN A SPECIFIC CONTEXT.  We simply CAN'T know
    every internal link in the universe; we simply can't
    know whether or not the blinking of my eye is internally
    related to a volcanic eruption on a distant planet in
    some distant galaxy.  CONTEXT, CONTEXT, CONTEXT is the
    leitmotif of a dialectical analysis.  Moreover,
    dialectics stresses not statics, but internal relations
    understood synchronically or systemically (within a
    defined system) and diachronically or dynamically (over
    time, inclusive of the past, the present, and the
    possible future).  Like atomism, it recognizes the
    ontological priority of particulars, but like organicity,
    it views these particulars within the organic unity of a
    systemic context.  (In contrast to atomistic pluralism
    and organic collectivism, one might say that dialectics
    offers a kind of organic pluralism.)  Like dualism and
    monism, it recognizes different spheres, but in placing
    emphasis on any one sphere, it never drops the relational
    context between spheres (which is why you'll often see my
    phrase "asymmetric internality").  Since dialectics
    centers on relations between spheres, factors, and parts,
    it stresses mutual implication and reciprocal causation.
    Since it rejects dualism and monism, chief among these
    being the mind-body dichotomy, and its materialist-
    idealist offspring, it also rejects any dichotomy between
    theory and practice.  It views social change as immanent
    to, that is, internal to, or a potentiality of, social
    critique, since every critique of the status quo carries
    within it, the seeds of transformation.

     I'm sure this posting will generate additional
questions, but it should also answer a few.  

	In any event, while some of this is stated explicitly in MHU, some
of it is only implicit... which is why I view TOTAL FREEDOM, my
forthcoming book, as the completion of the trilogy begun with MHU,
continued with AYN RAND:  THE RUSSIAN RADICAL, and culminating in the
coming work.  

	I look forward to chatting about these issues and many others
raised by MHU, and I think I can benefit enormously from the criticism, as
can we all.

					- Chris
P.S. - MARX, HAYEK, AND UTOPIA has been mentioned and/or reviewed by THE
NEW REPUBLIC, CHOICE, and most recently, CANADIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWS.

=================================================Chris Matthew Sciabarra, Ph.D
Visiting Scholar, NYU Department of Politics
INTERNET:  sciabrrc-AT-is2.nyu.edu
http://pages.nyu.edu/~sciabrrc
=================================================


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