Date: 	Mon, 10 Nov 1997 21:35:55 -0500
From: "kenneth.mackendrick" <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: The Problems of Method and Theory


I'm just not going to let this one go....

Nicholas Smith (U of Sydney) recently wrote a book entitled 
"Strong Hermeneutics."  His basic thesis defends a case for 
strong hermeneutics vs. weak hermeneutics (Rorty) and depth 
hermeneutics (Habermas).

The irony of Smith's position is that neither Rorty nor 
Habermas could possibly accept his thesis based upon their 
own respective premises.  Smith develops his position based 
on the work of Charles Taylor, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul 
Ricoeur.

Rorty is an anti-representationalist of the Nietzschean variety. 
 He argues that foundationalist accounts of reason, democracy 
etc. are not possible.  For him what matters is the effect of 
discourse, narrative, or argument...  His only principle is "do 
not harm others."

Habermas's account is truth oriented.  He argues, against 
hermeneutics, that only a proceduralism can "remember" what 
hermeneutics forgets - that a conversation governed my 
domination is not a conversation at all.  His principle is based 
upon a formalized concept of discourse.

For Smith, Habermas overestimates the liberative potential of 
scientific procedures - attempting to formalize something that 
cannot be formalized.  Conversely, Smith also argues that 
Rorty neglects the possibility of understanding that language 
games afford.  Smith argues for an ongoing narrative 
exchange appropriately understood as an open ended 
process (the hermeneutic circle monitored by a hermeneutics 
of suspicion).

The oddity of this book resides in the tautological conclusion 
that Smith reaches.  He does not do justice to Rorty's poetics 
of irony nor does he do justice to Habermas's claim that only 
of formal concept of reason levels the playing field to permit 
everyone a voice in the conversation.  The problem is, in my 
opinion, not that Smith has missed his mark in the book - but 
rather it resides in the incommensurate nature of the debate 
itself.  Smith defends the idea that truth and reason can be 
measured comparatively (via narrative).  In this sense 
statements or narratives can be contrasted only against other 
positions.  It is not merely a synthesis of the two positions but 
an overarching attempt to move beyond them by "outmoding" 
them.  However he is only able to reconcile this idea within 
the idea of hermeneutics itself and must reject the irony of 
Rorty and the formalism of Habermas.  In other words his 
premises, which he sees validating his theory prevent him 
from truly engaging the other perspectives which are 
surveyed.  Likewise the premises of weak and depth 
hermeneutics also prevent them from fully engaging each 
other adequately or appropriately.

My suspicion is that Smith has outlined coherently three 
models of language that have the advantage of each being 
fairly coherent (postmodernism, hermeneutics, and critical 
theory).  My interest is in determining what one can do with 
this for the field of ethics.

Can ethical reflection only take place retrospectively - with the 
acknowledgment of an unlimited responsibility to otherness 
(postmodernism)?  Or is ethical reflection caught up in the 
principles of an open dialogue - with understanding as a 
guiding light?  Or is moral theory bound by the harmonization 
of the sciences - the formalization of discourse through a 
theory of argumentation based upon good reasons....

Each perspective shares several things in common.  The idea 
of a conversation - however each of these perspectives 
understands this in a radically different way with divergent 
implications in each case.  Is happiness, the good, the right, 
the just etc. to be determined procedurally?  processually? or 
through the malaise of a rainbow of otherness coloured 
brightly by an idea of alterity.

Quite honestly I have no idea.  I like the idea of formal 
procedures that level out power interests and inequity but i 
recognize this is not really a characteristic of concrete human 
affairs.  I like the idea of open processes but get worried that 
the idea of understanding levels out difference and preserves 
the private interests.  I'm interested in the idea of a poetics of 
living but am concerned about how this translates into the 
realm of political economy.

Of course this problem is similar when trying to determine 
what methodology is appropriate to examine a particular 
object.  Is "truth" or even the "results" of a study determined 
poetically (emphatically? ironically?  metaphorically), 
interpretively (comparatively? pluralistically?), or scientifically 
(procedurally?  formally?).

just a couple of thoughts,
ken