File spoon-archives/method-and-theory.archive/method-and-theory_1997/method-and-theory.9711, message 36


Date: 	Mon, 17 Nov 1997 02:53:17 -0500
From: "kenneth.mackendrick" <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: Individuals and communication (fwd)



> But I want to understand: which are the consequences of the 
antihumanism radical of Luhmann?
> His theory conduct to a critical theory of the society or to a 
theory of  the dominion of the System on the individuals? Is 
my worry moral or  politics, then not sociological? Tanks.

I think Luhmann follows the same kind of analysis that Dieter 
Henrich has - regarding the individual.  Henrich defends the 
thesis that what is constitutive for the position of modern 
consciousness is not an intransitive self-preservation that is 
posited absolutely but an interconnection of subjectivity and 
self-preservation.... Henrich focuses upon the internal limits of 
subjectivity itself.  This runs parallel to Luhmann's account.

Tugendhat describes the circle this runs into as follows - 
"Self-consciousness is supposed to be consciousness of an 
"I."  But something is an I only when it has the structure of the 
identity of knowing and what is known.  Now if, according to 
the theory of reflection, self-consciousness is achieved in a 
turning back on itself, then the identity of knowing with what is 
known is first established in this turning back.  On the other 
hand, the subject upon which the act turns back is already 
supposed to be an I.  Thus, on the one hand, in turning back 
the act is supposed to rperesent the I; on the other hand, 
according to the concept of the I, it is first constituted in this 
act."

Henrich attempts to get out of this difficulty by basing his 
understanding of self-consciousness on an ego-less 
consciousness which is marked by akind of original intimacy 
or familiarity with itself as with something impersonal.  In fact 
- it sounds fairly zen - do I detect Karen Horney? or Mark 
Epstein?

Luhmann replaces "subject" with "system" and "object" with 
"environment."  But he gets caught in the same circle.  In 
other words - but theorists, Henrich and Luhmann theorize a 
kind of instrumental reason "run wild."  A critique of 
instrumental reason is necessary in order to make ones' way 
out of the circle (communicative action, deconstruction, 
hermeneutics, philosophy of language, social psychology, 
and/or something akin to deXology, Gilliganism, Tomistics, 
Patristics, Ludvigonian, Saulinskish, Adamite, Ismoa, or 
Ianic... and perhaps I've missed a few who have only posted 
once or twice).
emphatically yours,
ken

PS.  This critique has been brought to you by pages 390-399 
of Jurgen Habermas's "Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 
1" - trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.  
Funny that he should mention the method-and-theory list and 
all the usual suspects on it eh?

oh yeah, the consequences of radical antihumanLuhmannism.

A one person suite in the Grand Hotel Aporia.

Kudos to those who caught ALL the references.





   

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