Date: 	Wed, 26 Nov 1997 19:59:37 -0500
From: "kenneth.mackendrick" <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Origins, Generalities, and Universals


Hey folks,

I just got back from the San Francisco where I attended the 
annual AAR and NAASR meetings.  One of the sessions of 
NAASR (The North American Association for the Study of 
Religion) discussed the relevance of origins, generalities, and 
universals in the study of religion.

So these are just a few thoughts:

Jonathan Z. Smith argued that there are several problems with 
origins, generalities and universals.

First of all he contended that it might be better to examine 
beginnings rather than origins.  Whereas origins rely upon 
a spacially fixed, absolute, and self-referencial 
conceptualizations - Smith posited that it might be more 
intelligible to examine beginnings.  A beginning, in contrast to 
an origin, is a temporal category based upon a discourse of 
difference.  It relies upon a fluid understanding of the myriad 
of processes that flow into the examination of a given object 
(hermeneutic of otherwise).

For the study of religion - a beginning marks a temporal 
location regarding a specific and particular religious 
generality.  Studying the origins of religion would involve a 
reductionistic and self-referencial spacial analysis which 
inevitably reduced the concept of religion to a discourse of 
sameness - implying a universal and absolute core - which 
generates internal problems of the category of religion to 
begin with.

Furthermore - Smith argues that the idea of a generality might 
be more coherent that the search for universals in the study of 
religion.  Universals rely upon a search for origins - again - a 
fixed point - whereas generalities pinpoint a demacation of 
intellectual space that admits exceptions and signifies itself 
as incomplete.  By way of contrast - a universal claim points 
to a systematic claim without exceptions and supports a 
(scientifically) problematic model of completeness.

Now Smith does not argue against universals - he is open to 
the possibility that they exist.  But in terms of studying 
religion - he notes that they are not particularly helpful.

Armin Geertz then notes, in agreement with much of what 
Smith has to say, that the study of religion must proceed with 
a unrepresentative realism which abandons the 
correspondence theory of truth.  Unrepresentative realism 
(drawn from Putnam) indicates the employment of metaphors 
in scientific research - arguing that the idea of theory is simply 
a framework for conceptualization.

Jeppe Jensen expands on these idea by supplementing the 
discussion with a paper about the links between semantic 
systems and their objects.  He notes that things are 
recognizable only insofar as they have appeared semantically 
in language.  In this way it is not possible to discuss the 
"radical other" since this category itself would not be 
recognizeable to any language game.  His idea draws on the 
notion that any kind of conceptual transcendence is based 
inexplicably upon a teleological self-referenciality.

All in all - the conference ended with a couple of papers (by 
Gary Lease, Russell McCutcheon, and Tim Fitzgerald)  
arguing that religion, as a category, doesn't make much 
sense in light of its internal inconsistencies and 
incoherencies (Don Wiebe's objections not withstanding).  
Provocatively - McCutcheon contends that cultural practices 
are better identified when analyzed according to their social 
formations - which simultaneously provides an analysis of 
power while remaining embedded within the history of 
category formation.

thoughts?

ken