Date: Wed, 4 Mar 1998 23:57:24 -0500 Subject: Re: Objectivity and Ideology >Forget M. Heidegger - he isn't talking about subjectivity - he is >talking about Being - a certain kind of privileging of >nonidentity - an attempt to think without concepts and then >privilege the results. Bad stuff that. Both metaphysical, as >Adorno successfully demonstrates, and authoritarian (as >Derrida demonstrates I do think this is q bad characterization -- in that it seems to neither reflect upon its own terms He's not talking about subjectivity, he's talking about being. Seemingly he counters them for very specific reasons. My understanding of H.is premised on the view that he propose that being and identity are not equivalent and can never be ( a Platonist/ Kantian logic dominates his thinking on this point -- which is probably re-enforced by his understanding of Husserl's phenomenology) -- The arguement goes something like this -- Identity (which is our perception of ourself as an object into the world)) is a construct of language. Language is a technology by which we put things into the world. The non-identity of being is existence within its totality, it lies outside of conscious though it must also be conscious of the fact that the world outside of its symbollic ordering is not for us, It is fear and the drive for control -- egoticism that makes us believe it is being held in reserve for us rather than being aware that we are part of it. Adorno's humanism rooted in the Enlightenment tradition (German Idealism) of course would have to find H. metaphysical given the only materialism he knows are those of Marx and Weber are themselves rooted in a romantic metaphysics of fulfilment, as for Derrida the idea of an non metaphorical being that can not be open to interpretation because it consciously acknowledges the limits of the representation of being and claims that there is something beyond that representation in which it is grounded and that thing is not metaphysics but being itself ( consciousness)-- must seem authoritarian because here is a claim for a fixed meaning not rooted in language but in the notion of an authentic experience of the self. I would propose that at worst H. is a romantic given he would find our completion in the restoration of nature and the primacy of origins, and that it was probably this that mde Nazism seem so attractive to him given its own anti-bourgeois rhetoric and bias against technology. More to morrow. This lengthy precis does not mean I buy H. view but they do come in handy in that they do necessitate that we view any statement in terms of its interriority, exterriority, anterriority and posterriortiy which means atlest to me that when I have the patience and time there is no possibility of jumping to conclusions-- no matter whose authority is called into play. More tomorrow, I've had a long day trying to construct Jasper Johns and thisis all I can muster at this hour. . ).... Has anyone seen any good feminist >critique's of Heidegger? I don't know if Irigaray talks about >him at all....
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