Date: Wed, 1 Mar 1995 00:33:36 -0600
From: Jim Elson <jlelson-AT-utdallas.edu>
Subject: Re: _verwindung_ and Gianni Vattimo


On Tue, 28 Feb 1995 I.P.Wright-AT-computer-science.birmingham.ac.uk wrote:

> > [Jim Elson had written:}
> > _Verwindend_, a Heideggerian term, is related to _uberwindend_,
> > overcoming.  "Overcoming" is central to the project of modernity
> > which "progressively" "overcomes" the "errors" of the past, thereby
> > getting closer and closer to apprehending the "Truth".  It seems
> > that a number of postmodern thinkers fail to fully appreciate this
> > when they criticize others for being "metaphysical" since this
> > implies that the "errors" of metaphysics can be "overcome"/left behind.
> > However, any such attempt at "overcoming" can only resusitate
> > modernity in a "new" form.
> 
> The whole issue pivots around the notion of the possibility of
> progress and of obtaining more causally efficacious knowledge
> (better `truths') about the natural and social world through
> human work. This -- for very good reasons -- is a central
> problematic of our time. The original modernist belief in this
> possibility has been, largely, lost.

Yes.  There is a subtle, but significant difference between the
modernist notion of "progress" and 'progress'.  The notion of
"progress" could be glossed as a secularization of theistic
teleology since it entails a belief that "Man" is steadily
and inexorably getting closer and closer to apprehending
the "Truth".  (The glamour that surrounds the idea of a Theory
of Everything or Unified Field Theory is a symptom of this belief.)
'Progress' is another matter.  To say that "progress" is delusional
or impossible is simply an inversion of modernism: black becomes
white, but such thought still remains within the same horizon.
I would echo what you have suggested by saying that 'progress'
involves obtaining/'discovering'/creating efficacious 'myths'/
'truths'/'fictions'/'narratives' that enhance 'power' without
that they are "writ large" or are "true" for all forms of life,
much less for all time.

> 
> I often think that the generic postmodernism is the grimacing
> and posturing of the atheists who still wish for transcendental
> sources of value (be it God, Objective Truth, History or
> a moral obligation to the working class), know it to be an
> unsatisfiable wish, yet cannot ground their action within
> the world through a conscious egoism of the Nietzschean/Stirnerian
> kind. I know I'm being provocative here, and, to a certain
> extent, caricaturing postmodernism, but I can't help having
> my fun.

I doubt Nietzsche would provide as generous a description as
you have. :)  I concur, but as I have averred, this is only a
stage: having been habituated to metaphysical comforts/guarentees
the encounter with the _Abgrund_ is frigthening/disorienting/
threathening.  One looks around in desparation to find something,
anything to prevent the dissolution of the "real" world.  It's
the hesistation involved as one first places one foot on that
rope which strecthes across the abyss to the _Ubermenschen_.
Later, when one has abolished the "appearant" world along with
the "real" one, the realization comes that tightrope-walking
entails the ascetic ideal since it remains focused upon carefully
maintaining contact with ground and the concomitant terror
of falling in the _Abgrund_.  Instead, we recognize that the
rope must be danced across, cheerfully, without fear.

> 
> The point you make is a very good and important one. How is
> it resolved? -- My feeling is that modernism remains. History
> doesn't end.

Yes, modernism and metaphysics still remain, but as traces/scars.
Although 'history' does not end, "History" does.  

> > 
> The prevelance of the ascetic ideal would indeed be a stage
> of human development. As we can't `wait around' until our
> biological design changes through evolution, the ascetic
> ideal will need to be overcome by human culture,
> i.e. training, `breeding' (which I think Nietzsche nearly
> always considers as the inheritance of acquired characteristics)
> and scientific-philosophical work (both thought and practical
> activity). A good theory of the individual, including a
> theory of the ascetic individual, would be a way of overcoming
> the ascetic ideal by understanding how it arises. Isn't
> this what Nietzsche first made steps towards?

Yes, but allow me to be nit-picky for a moment.  The ascetic ideal
is not "overcome".  Such a notion would be analogous to a speaker
"overcoming" her/his native tongue by replacing it with a "new,
improved" one.  Even though he/she may never speak that orginial
language again, it still exerts its influence, it insidiously remains.
Having dispensed with that, I would say you're quite right.  It seems
becoming aware of the genealogy and functions of the ascetic ideal
is the first step in 'overcoming' it/releasing oneself from its
debilitating enchanments.

> With regard to the spectacle of commodities that promise
> the satisfaction of desires but deliver nothing of the kind,
> do you here mean that although there are `new and improved'
> things to consume, the basic premise of society -- the
> capitalist organisation of production and the limits on
> individuality it imposes -- remains the same, i.e. nothing
> really has changed, and novelty, or the pretense of novelty,
> is a commodity like everything else. Is this what you
> are implying? Perhaps you could elaborate.

That is part of it.  However, it has a broader applicability.  It
goes back to modernism's secular teleology.  Each "new" "truth"
is supposed to make us "freer"/bring us closer "The Truth". 
Consider it from an ethical perspective that encompasses our
species.  Someone might object that we have made great progress
in how we treat others: physical slavery has been abolished and
sexism/racism is rapidly becoming unacceptable as is the demonization
of "otherness".  All of these represent "new and improved" ethical
standards.  But from another perspective, nothing has changed.  It's
only a difference of degree, not of kind: the same all too human
drives/motivations behind the "elimanated" symptoms are simply
expressed in 'sublimated' fashions.  It is not enough to act like 
"a kinder and gentler" form of life since it assumes that we can
"overcome"/"leave behind" the "beast within us".  These demonized
drives will still remain.  They cannot be "overcome", although
they can be 'overcome'/accepted/understood/harnessed/integrated.
This type of 'overcoming' is what I see as one of the tasks
that must be accomplished to become an _Ubermensch_.
 
> > That is why I spoke of post-modernity as an era/age/epoch.  Most
> > post-modernisms have not advanced beyond stage 5 which I see
> > as basically therapeutic.  The main focus appears to be placed
> > on weening ourselves away from the comforts/guarentees offered
> > by metaphysical/foundational thought/belief.  The rarely addressed
> > question concerns how we as thinkers should proceed once we have
> > lost our nostalgia for metaphysics.  This is stage 6 where the
> > "apparent" world has been abolished along with the "real".  It is
> > only at this stage that post-modern thought begins to bear fruit.
> > Given the degree to which metaphysics/foundationalism permeates
> > our culture, it is not surprising that it has taken a 100 years
> > for a sizable number of thinkers to reach this stage although
> > we are greater outnumbered by stage 5 thinkers.
> 
> I am undecided at the moment between discovering a new `ground',
> i.e. a replacement of metaphysics, in the indexical knowledge
> I have of my own consciousness (some kind of embedded solipsism),
> which I think, ultimately, was Nietzsche's position; or
> understand the knowledge science provides on a new footing,
> i.e. all its knowledge is revisable but it makes sense to talk
> of truths about an external world; or some combination of the
> two. As I am not widely read in postmodernism I wonder how
> these views might fit in to the general scheme of things. Or
> perhaps I am totally missing the point and am also at stage 5.
> I hope not.

Frankly, I don't see a significant difference between your two
choices depsite the 'fact' that the former seems to valorize
the 'internal'/'self' and the latter the 'external'/'not-self'.
I don't see any choice between since the 'internal' entails
the 'external' and vice versa.  Either term is meaningless 
without the other.  This leads to a number  of linguistic
difficulties; I really don't know how to talk about the
'resoultion' of this dichotomy.  Perhaps, only poetic
prose, a la Zaranthustra, or poetry is adequate to the task.  
As for your ending comment, all I can say is you don't seem
to be a stage 5.

> > As I mentioned previously, _uberwindung_ is "overcoming".  As V.
> > points out we cannot simply "overcome"/leave behind metaphysics
> > since this would entail that found a "truth" free of the "errors"
> > of modernity.  With what are we to replace metaphysics? How is it
> > even possible to "overcome" the metaphysics intrinsic to grammar?
> > Like Vattimo, I submit that we cannot.  However, I don't find
> > a move which simply resusitates metaphysics tenable.
> 
> Have you considered the possibility of a new philosophy _for_
> science? -- Or is that out of the bounds of good taste?

Yes, I have.  Also, I don't think it would be in bad taste.  In fact,
I would suggest that it is vital since the division between the
"human" and "natural" worlds is artifical.  This follows from seeing
philosophy as a thorough, careful, intellectual manner of organizing
our experiences.  Some day, I hope to have the time to work out some
of the details necessary for a type of post-modern empiricism that
addresses the needs/interests of the "natural" sciences.

> 
> > Even though we can't "overcome" it, there is another possibility:
> > _verwindung_ which conotates a distortion, a resignation, a
> > convalescence from a injury/chronic dis-ease which leaves permanent
> > traces in/on us.  It indicates a perspective towards modernity and
> > metaphysics that "is neither an acceptance of its errors nor a
> > critique that tries to overcome them but merely ends up by prolonging
> > them instead." (171)   Thus, to speak of 'truth' or 'objectivity'
> > is to speak of metaphysical notions in a distorted/convalescence
> > sense since we are aware that 'truth' is only a necessary 'error'
> > for a particular set/superset of forms of life.
> 
> This sounds like giving up to me, and has a forlorn ring to it
> reminiscent of the nihilist. `Truth as a necessary error' is,
> I think, a sentiment Nietzsche rejcted or de-emphasised in later
> work. Error _compared to what_? If it is knowledge for beings
> such as us, is causally efficacious, increases our power in
> the world, then it _is_ true. And there is no need to search
> further.
> 
> _verwindung_ doesn't inspire me much. But perhaps you would
> like to expand.

There is merit to your objection.  But the forlonness soon passes.
"Truth" is a necessary 'error', but not an "error".  As you point
out, for it to be an "error" requires the metaphysical presence of
"Truth".  The difference between "truth"/"error"/"fact" and 'truth'/
'error'/'fact' is the latter are _verwindend_ forms of the former
which are thoroughly metaphysical.  The concept of a _verwindend_
philosophy entails a recognition of the impossibility of "overcoming"/
leaving behind modernity and metaphysics.  The forlonness you detect,
like metaphysics, remains as a trace in the consciousness of a
cheeful accomplished nihilist.  It's very much like those moments
when one remembers the simplicity and naviete of childhood, smiles
and proceeds with the business of the day.

> > Vattimo connects this with N.'s "philosophy of morning" and
> > "accomplished nihilism".  Unlike reactive ones who yearn for
> > guarentees/comfort and attempt to solidify the groundless upon
> > they stand by valorizing other "truer"values, e.g., other cultures,
> > alternative cannons, or even language itself, which thereby take
> > the metaphysical grandeur of the _ontos on_, accomplished nihilists
> > cheerfully accept the futility of such nostalgic moves.
> 
> This sounds much better, and more alike to the underlying passion
> and sentiment of a Nietzsche. .... The building of _Ubermenschen_
> through the creation of societies that could train them to
> be such. (I should back this up from Zarathustra, but it's
> not with me).

I haven't thought about the role society will play in this enough.
Clearly, it is necessary for me to do so.  I'd be very interesting
in listening to your thoughts on the subject.

===========================================================================James L Elson:              |<o  When you stare into the abyss too long  o>|
School of Arts & Humanities |<o       the abyss stares back into you.    o>|
University of Texas-Dallas  |                  --Nietzsche--               |

P.S., As soon as I finish the essay, I'll send you a copy.  I'll look
forward to your comments/criticisms.



	--- from list nietzsche-AT-jefferson.village.virginia.edu ---

     ------------------