File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_1995/nietzsche_Aug.95, message 151


Date: Fri, 25 Aug 1995 13:02:30 -0700
From: callihan-AT-callihan.seanet.com (Steven E. Callihan)
Subject: Re: Hegel and the Nietzschean Dialectic


'm not sure I agree with myself, per se, as of yet, but am finding it
an interesting track to pursue.  Yes, the rules define the piece, not
the piece the rules, or the laws determine the categories, we might
say.  The negative relation of force would be a state of being ruled
in some kind of categorial fashion, that is, being this _or_ that, so
to speak.  A bishop, a knight, a pawn, etc.  Of course, in the chess
game the pieces/categories are apparently arbitrary, or, shall we say,
focused on the end-object of determining the make-up of a good game--
the game may be said to have evolved toward that end (the latest step
having been the two-square opening move of the pawn in conjuction with
capturing _en passant_).  The veracity of the categories of
consciousness may, themselves, be something of the same order, having,
in other words, evolved toward the end of a "good game," not simply
between the white and black pieces, but between Self and Other in the
game of life.  An interesting speculation.  This would, I think, point
to Nietzsche's criticism of the categories of reason as being in any
sense self-determinative--rather they are a kind of evolutionary
armature, so to speak, with which the human, a particular sort of
being, has become equipped as necessary for itself (if either Self or
Other should ever win in the game of life, the game would be over).
If any "truth of the categories" is to be deduced from the categories,
then at most it can only be _our_ truth, the expression of a species
perspective.  (The categories cannot be grounded in "being" because
"being" is one of the categories.)  Needless to say, how the
categories are defined (the specific rules which compose them) make
all the difference (between chess and checkers, for instance).  Of
course, evolution is not entirely unbounded--it is difficult to see
how the game of bridge could ever evolve into the game of chess, or
vice versa, for instance (although, perhaps, given enough time--a
_lot_ of time, in other words)--it could, although anything which
takes an infinite amount of time would be, to put it simply, a waste
of time).

>Anyway, what Hegel does, then, is reverse
>everything -- it is the relationships that establish things-in-themselves.
>This is a tricky idea to get, but that is why Hegel does away with essence
>and switches to force.   Any sort of 'essence' that remains will now be an
>effect of relational forces -- the way, say, the hardness of a table is not
>actually due to it being constructed of 'hard' atoms -- since the table is
>99.999999999% 'empty void' -- but rather to fields of force.  This is why I
>would disagree with you about the reification of forces as actual forces.
>I would go along with Deleuze in reputing that to Nietzsche, and I think
Hegel
>says as much as well.

That is, the differential element within "force," which renders force
as something necessarily multiple ("inessential"?).  Is the
differential element the multiplicity of force, as such?  The atoms
are governed by the laws which govern atoms, shall we say (not one
law, but a multiplicity of laws).  The field of force would thus
simply be a product of the laws governing the atom.  But can "cause
and effect" remain untouched here in the distinction between force
simply as a set of rules and force as being composed of actual,
reified "forces"?  If there is no force _in_ "force," but only the
governance of a law...?  Or, to put it another way, if "force," even
in the sense that a scientist might use the word, is still a metaphor
which may be said to conceal as much as it reveals of the character or
nature of the "linkage" which has occurred (that one thing has
reliably, as if by law, followed after another--of course "law" is
also a metaphor, as is "rule," etc.)...  Is there something within the
cause which commands (a cause within the cause), within the effect
which obeys (an obeyance within the obeyance), or does each simply
subsist as the command and obeyance of itself?  At bottom, nothing
_but_ metaphors, in other words.

The Will to Power quote that was discussed earlier begins, "The
_victorious_ concept of 'force'..." as if to indicate that the victory
is itself problematic exactly to the degree that the concept remains
questionable.

>What Nietzsche, however, is opposing -- along with Derrida and Deleuze -- is
>the idea of the game as a 'whole' to begin with.

Or as "closed."  That is the notion of the ideal game may be a
complete figment, for instance.  There is no such thing.  Or there may=7F
be any number of games (even an infinite number) which might or might
not satisfy the requirements for ideality, shall we say--the
difficulty is deciding which, the problem being that the issue may, in
fact, be undecideable, as such.  If we follow the analogy, the case
would be the same for the dialectic--it is ulimately open and
undecideable in its results.  But no game in which either white or
black "won" could be perfect--the game begins from an equilibrium of
forces.  The chess problem, on the other hand, does not start from an
equilibrium, but a disequilibrium, of forces.  (Of course, in chess
white makes the first move--which is one of the "rules"--giving white
a slight advantage, what is called a "tempo," so the table is slightly
tipped in white's advantage, without which, I suppose, no game could
ever begin.)

>For what Hegel basically
>does is get rid of the idea of a self-enclosed identity on one level (there
>is no such identity on this level, because each piece is defined only by its
>relationships to the other pieces) in order to affirm a self-enclosed
identity
>at the level of the totality.  And that is ultimately what the Hegelian
>dialectic seeks to do.  In Hegel's theory of the state, for example, the
>dialectic traces the progression of the state towards something that is
>self-contained, whole and closed.

Yes, I would agree.  The dialectic cannot escape its own
undecideability, if you will.  But that is exactly its "openness."
Although, I think there is some ambiguity in Hegel's postulation, in
that one could infer that it is the self-actualization of the "state"
as an on-going process that is aimed at, but not necessarily its
closure.  The "state" subsists as the dialectic of itself, in other
words.  In that sense, the state is both determined and determinable.
However, not in any absolute fashion--the determinability of any one
dialectic is only as good as the base terms of the dialectic are
"solid," something which they never are in any kind of complete or
final fashion.  Here, again, I think the game of chess is revealing,
for it shows how this difficulty is overcome to some degree within the
dialectic.  That is, simply understanding the rules is not sufficient
to be able to play the game.  The rules themselves cannot tell you
what the right moves are, only the allowable ones.  The right moves
are determined, or at least indicated, by "guiding principles" which
can only be learned and understood from the playing of the game
itself, that, for instance, it is better to develop knights before
bishops, apply force in the center of the board, double your rooks on
an open file, occupy the seventh rank, etc.  However, this is
"wisdom," not certain knowledge--the principle may be said to only
roughly match the case (be true most of the time, but not all of the
time), and must be checked against each case (each position) in turn.
So, at best, the dialectic may be said to advance and be advanced in
exactly that fashion.  It is what makes the game worth playing.
Ultimately, only a "reality check" can tell us the value, or non-
value, of our results.  (Of course, "reality" itself subsists as the
dialectic of itself, as well!)

Steve

===============================================================================
            Steven E. Callihan -- callihan-AT-callihan.seanet.com
 
            "Most of the expressions we use are metaphorical:
             they contain the philosophy of our ancestors..."

               --Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, _Aphorisms_,
                    "Notebook D 1773-1775," No. 87
===============================================================================



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