Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 13:46:28 -0500 (EST) From: Kelly Timothy Lynch <ktlynch-AT-vex.net> Subject: Inkonsequenz Spinozas (4 of 11) (4 of 11) II Spinoza's fundamental opposition to teleology, that is, explanation in terms of final causes, is perhaps most clearly and loudly expressed in the Appendix to Part I of the _Ethics_. Here it is treated, along with the idea of "free will", as a prejudice, albeit a natural prejudice following from the fact that while we are conscious of our desire, we are ignorant of the true causes of things, in particular of our desires. Nietzsche seems to contend that Spinoza failed to draw the full consequences of this basic thought and that this failure leads to the physiologists' principle of self-preservation. The obvious point at which to begin investigating this theme in Spinoza is in _Ethics_ III: Each thing, to the degree that it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its being (in suo esse perseverare). (Proposition 6) The effort (conatus) by which each thing endeavours to persevere in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. (Proposition 7) The third and central part of the _Ethics_, "On the Origin and Nature of the Affects (or Emotions)", is the most psychological part, leading into the thick of human things. Here the conatus is identified with will, appetite, and desire (Prop. 9, Sch.). Desire, however, is part of the reason for which the prejudice of teleology is believed. For desire is desire of something, and the actions in which desire results are for that which is desired, that is, for an end. The formulation of the propositions just quoted also seems to point in the direction of a final cause, in suo esse perseverare apparently being the end of every thing. But Spinoza's fundamental opposition to teleology must be remembered. The most profound expression of this opposition is not the polemical Appendix to Part I, but the denial that God acts for an end (Part I, Prop. 33, Sch. 2). Outside of God, the absolutely infinite being (Part I, Def. 6), there is and can be nothing, and therefore nothing at which God aims in His actions. It seems that only finite creatures such as ourselves might in some sense act for an end. But Spinoza's point is that our ends are imagined, and that the true causes of our desires have nothing final about them. That is, final causes are imaginary causes. Admittedly Spinoza's use of the term "imagination" is broader in reference than is now customary, including, for example, sense perception. But this is more than just a trivial verbal difference. Sense perception, unless it is ordered by reason, belongs to the first kind of knowledge (see _Ethics_ II, Prop. 40, Sch. 2), which is the source of falsity (ibid., Prop. 41 and 42). Spinoza does not deny that the world our senses perceive is real; in themselves the senses do not lie (see eg., ibid., Prop. 49, Sch.). The source of falsity is finally our finitude. We are but a finite part of the infinite whole, or Deus sive Natura, and as such we are part of the infinitely complex chains of causes among things, and we are, therefore, necessarily conditioned by things, as in sense perception. Sense perception reflects the infinite whole, although necessarily in a fragmentary, finite, and conditioned way; in the final analysis psychological considerations must be taken into account. Our external perception depends as much on our nature, body, and brain as it does on bodies outside of us, and it tends, as such, to be necessarily confused. Kelly Timothy Lynch || "Dei potentia est ktlynch-AT-vex.net || ipsa ipsius essentia." Toronto, Ontario, Canada || Spinoza --- from list nietzsche-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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