File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_1998/nietzsche.9801, message 93


Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 13:46:28 -0500 (EST)
From: Kelly Timothy Lynch <ktlynch-AT-vex.net>
Subject: Inkonsequenz Spinozas (4 of 11)


(4 of 11)

                             II

Spinoza's fundamental opposition to teleology, that is,
explanation in terms of final causes, is perhaps most clearly
and loudly expressed in the Appendix to Part I of the _Ethics_.
Here it is treated, along with the idea of "free will", as a
prejudice, albeit a natural prejudice following from the fact
that while we are conscious of our desire, we are ignorant
of the true causes of things, in particular of our desires.
Nietzsche seems to contend that Spinoza failed to draw
the full consequences of this basic thought and that this
failure leads to the physiologists' principle of self-preservation.
The obvious point at which to begin investigating this
theme in Spinoza is in _Ethics_ III:

          Each thing, to the degree that it is in itself,
          endeavours to persevere in its being (in suo
          esse perseverare).  (Proposition 6)

          The effort (conatus) by which each thing endeavours
          to persevere in its own being is nothing but the
          actual essence of the thing itself.  (Proposition 7)

The third and central part of the _Ethics_, "On the Origin and Nature
of the Affects (or Emotions)", is the most psychological part,
leading into the thick of human things.  Here the conatus is identified
with will, appetite, and desire (Prop. 9, Sch.).  Desire, however, is
part of the reason for which the prejudice of teleology is believed.
For desire is desire of something, and the actions in which desire
results are for that which is desired, that is, for an end.  The 
formulation of the propositions just quoted also seems to point
in the direction of a final cause, in suo esse perseverare 
apparently being the end of every thing.

But Spinoza's fundamental opposition to teleology must be
remembered.  The most profound expression of this
opposition is not the polemical Appendix to Part I, but
the denial that God acts for an end (Part I, Prop. 33, Sch. 2).
Outside of God, the absolutely infinite being (Part I, Def. 6),
there is and can be nothing, and therefore nothing at
which God aims in His actions.  It seems that only finite
creatures such as ourselves might in some sense act
for an end.  But Spinoza's point is that our ends are
imagined, and that the true causes of our desires have
nothing final about them.  That is, final causes are
imaginary causes.

Admittedly Spinoza's use of the term "imagination" is
broader in reference than is now customary, including,
for example, sense perception.  But this is more than
just a trivial verbal difference.  Sense perception, unless
it is ordered by reason, belongs to the first kind of 
knowledge (see _Ethics_ II, Prop. 40, Sch. 2), which is
the source of falsity (ibid., Prop. 41 and 42).  Spinoza
does not deny that the world our senses perceive is
real; in themselves the senses do not lie (see eg.,
ibid., Prop. 49, Sch.).  The source of falsity is finally our
finitude.  We are but a finite part of the infinite whole, or
Deus sive Natura, and as such we are part of the infinitely
complex chains of causes among things, and we are,
therefore, necessarily conditioned by things, as in sense
perception.  Sense perception reflects the infinite whole,
although necessarily in a fragmentary, finite, and
conditioned way; in the final analysis psychological
considerations must be taken into account.  Our external
perception depends as much on our nature, body, and
brain as it does on bodies outside of us, and it tends,
as such, to be necessarily confused.


     Kelly Timothy Lynch     ||    "Dei potentia est
       ktlynch-AT-vex.net       ||  ipsa ipsius essentia."
   Toronto, Ontario, Canada  ||         Spinoza



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