Date: Sat, 31 Jan 1998 16:20:11 -0500 (EST)
From: Kelly Timothy Lynch <ktlynch-AT-vex.net>
Subject: Inkonsequenz Spinozas (8 of 11)


(8 of 11)

                              IV

Spinoza repeats his fundamental opposition to
teleology, again in no uncertain terms, in the
foreword to _Ethics_ IV (cf. Part IV, Def. 7).
Although he goes on in the foreword to
characterize "good" in terms of a model of
human nature we set before us, he is careful
to note that the terms "good" and "evil" do not
refer to anything real in themselves, but only
to ways of thinking.  We have already seen
something of what he means by this.

In definition 8 of Part IV Spinoza equates virtue
with power, which is associated with the conatus
and with acting according to one's nature, as we
have seen.  But the wording "conatus in suo esse
perseverare" seems to shift to "conatus sese
conservandi" ("the endeavour of things to preserve
themselves") in Part IV, which seems to bring us
closer to a strict version of the principle of
self-preservation.  The corollary of proposition 22,
for example, identifies conatus sese conservandi
as the foundation of virtue, which is explicitly
associated with the conatus of Part III, proposition
7 in the demonstration of Part IV, proposition 22.

What is at stake here, according to Nietzsche's
remarks in section 13 of _Beyond_Good_and_Evil_,
is not whether things try to preserve themselves,
but whether the drive for self-preservation or sheer
survival is primary, or, as Nietzsche would have it,
a consequence of something still more basic.  In
fairness it must be admitted that Spinoza, having
been acquainted neither with Nietzsche nor with
Darwin and modern, at least late nineteenth-century,
biology, did not quite put the question in this way.
Still, it is, as I hope will become clear in a moment,
a fruitful question to put to Spinoza, or rather, in
Spinoza's absence, to his great book, the _Ethics_.

Proposition 8 of Part IV identifies knowledge of
good and evil with consciousness of pleasure
(laetitia) and pain (tristitia).  Spinoza treats
pleasure and pain, which, along with desire, are
the primary emotions of his psychology, as increase
and decrease of power (see Part III, Prop. 11, Sch.),
and not simply as states of great and little power.
In the demonstration of proposition 8 in Part IV,
Spinoza speaks of that which is an aid or
obstacle to the preservation of our being,
and equates this with what increases or
diminishes our power of action.  Although
Spinoza's wording at times gives a contrary
impression, here the question is not one of bare
survival, but of an increase or decrease in
power.  As he puts it in the scholium to
proposition 18 of Part IV, nature--and hence
reason--demand that man should love himself,
seek his own profit, and desire everything
which leads him to greater perfection.


     Kelly Timothy Lynch     ||    "Dei potentia est
       ktlynch-AT-vex.net       ||  ipsa ipsius essentia."
   Toronto, Ontario, Canada  ||         Spinoza



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