File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_1998/nietzsche.9802, message 64


Date: Mon, 16 Feb 1998 19:44:49 -0500 (EST)
From: Kelly Timothy Lynch <ktlynch-AT-vex.net>
Subject: S&N paper clarification attempt



All right, let me take a stab at
clarifying, in a way perhaps
demanding less thought from the
reader, the basic line of my little
paper which seems to have
bewildered John.

We begin with BGE #13, with
particular interest in Spinoza's
"Inkonsequenz".  Instead of sailing
off into the side blue yonder, perhaps
looking for some grand inconsistency
in Spinoza rooted in a conflict of
cultures (Magian & Faustian?), we
pay careful attention to the actual
specific context of the remark "(man
dankt ihn der Inkonsequenz Spinozas--)".

The basic point of BGE #13 is against
the physiologists' idea of "self-preservation"
as the cardinal drive of organic beings,
in favor of "Wille zur Macht".  An important
reason given for this is that
"self-preservation" (as the basic organic
drive) is a superfluous teleological principle,
and _this_ is where our Spinoza remark
comes in.  At this point I presuppose, as
my opening notes indicated, at least
some knowledge of Spinoza.

Given some knowledge of Spinoza,
we realize immediately that S. was
clearly, fundamentally, radically
opposed to teleology.  In this fundamental
respect S. is in agreement with Nietzsche.
To this degree we might say, at risk of
confusing John, that S. was, from N.'s
perspective, on the right track.  But N.
then seems to suggest that S. did
not follow this through to its final
consequences, that he let a superfluous
teleological principle slip in, one
somehow related to "self-preservation".
Which leads us to a consideration of
S.'s "conatus".

I think this more or less takes us
through the point that John needed
clarification of.  And my little paper
does, from this point on, gradually
become more subtle, more difficult,
perhaps more questionable, in a
sense more speculative.  (An aside:
ending with a question-mark was
quite deliberate in this paper.)  Still,
it might be useful to push on just
a bit further, for now, adding a few
words on the interpretation of S.
my paper hints at.  If more clarification
is needed, I suspect John will let
me know.

As I noted, the S. quotation in my
sig. is _Ethics_I prop.34, "God's
power is his essence itself".  One
way (by no means the only way)
to approach the S. interpretation my
paper hints at is to start at this
point.  In my paper I make two
points about this prop., that it is
the leading prop. of the short 
concluding group of prop.s in
Part I, and that we can view this as
a kind of infinite analogy with the
essence of individual things.  There
is no question of God (for S.) acting
for an end (even if that is only
"self-preservation").  But act He does.
His essence is, so to speak, pure
action, pure power, pure necessity
(prop.35) and pure productivity (prop.36).
Perhaps my drift is becoming more
clear--you might say, I suggest a
dynamic interpretation of Spinoza.

Take care for now,

     Kelly Timothy Lynch     ||    "Dei potentia est
       ktlynch-AT-vex.net       ||  ipsa ipsius essentia."
   Toronto, Ontario, Canada  ||         Spinoza



	--- from list nietzsche-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---


   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005