File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_2000/nietzsche.0004, message 86


Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2000 23:27:25 -0700
From: George Sherwood <search-research-AT-worldnet.att.net>
Subject: Re: Nietzsche and Love


yinyang 100 wrote:
> 
> if there was any love that nietzsche preached, it's that of self love
> (similar to ayn rands virtue of selfishness). NEVER for humanity, nor for
> anything for the greater good (if the greater good means helping mankind).
> If its any good, it's one that would benefit the self. not anything for pity
> nor compassion.
> the game of mankind is highly competitive, its all about who gets what, the
> survival of the fittest, a game of willpower and strength.
> fuck all the others crawling behind you, if they can't figure out a way,
> their doomed to the herd forever.
> as far as im concerned, theres nothing wrong with hitler.
> 

Darwin on the Evolution of Morality
Soshichi Uchii, Kyoto University
http://www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~suchii/D.onM.html

Paper presented for the session on the 19th century biology,
Internatioal Fellows Conference (Center for Philosophy of Science,
Univ. of Pittsburgh),

May 20-24, Castiglioncello, Italy


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
1. The Continuity of Man and Animals

Today, I wish to talk about Darwin's biological considerations on
morality. There are other people who treated the same or the related
problems in the 19th century, e.g. Spencer or Huxley; but it seems to
me Darwin is by far the most important. When I began to study the
Darwininan evolutionary theory some twenty years ago, I was very much
impressed by Darwin's persistence with his thesis of the continuity
of man and animals. In The Descent of Man, published in 1871 (2nd
ed., 1874), this thesis is put forward as follows [Q1]:

It has, I think, now been shewn that man and the higher
animals, especially the Primates, have some few instincts
in common. All have the same senses, intuitions, and
sensations,----similar passions, affections, and emotions,
even the more complex ones, such as jealousy, suspicion,
emulation, gratitude, and magnanimity; they practise deceit
and are revengeful; they are sometimes susceptible to
ridicule, and even have a sense of humour; they feel wonder
and curiosity; they possess the same faculties of
imitation, attention, deliberation, choice, memory,
imagination, the association of ideas, and reason, though
in very different degrees. The individuals of the same
species graduate in intellect from absolute imbecility to
high excellence. They are also liable to insanity, though
far less often than in the case of man. (Descent of Man,
ch. 3)

However, traditionally, there have been various sorts of arguments
for regarding man as qualitatively distinct from any other animals;
among these arguments, it seems that the most persuasive was that
only man has the moral sense or conscience. For instance, Rev.
Leonard Jenyns, commenting on the Origin of Species in a letter to
Dawin, argues as follows [Q2]:

One great difficulty to my mind in the way of your theory
is the fact of the existence of Man. I was beginning to
think you had entirely passed over this question, till
almost in the last page I find you saying that "light will
be thrown on the origin of man and his history." By this I
suppose is meant that he is to be considered a modified and
no doubt greatly improved orang! . . . .
Neither can I easily bring myself to the idea that man's
reasoning faculties and above all his moral sense could
ever have been obtained from irrational progenitors, by
mere natural selection ----acting however gradually and for
whatever length of time that may be required. This seems to
me doing away altogether with the Divine Image that forms
the insurmountable distinction between man and brutes.
(Letter to Darwin, Jan.4, 1860. Wilson, 1970, 351.)

Thus Darwin had to face with the problem of how we can handle the
moral sense within evolutionary processes, in other words, how we can
give a biological explanation for man's moral faculties. This subject
is tackled in chapters 4 and 5 of his book.

2. Social Instincts

Darwin's explanation of the origin of the moral sense is very
interesting, but as is customary with his exposition, it is very
complicated and hard to follow. But I think the main line of his
argument may be reconstructed as follows: First, he puts forward the
following conjecture or hypothesis [Q3]:

(H) "any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social
instincts, the parental and filial affections being here
included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or
conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become
as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man." (op.
cit., ch. 4)

"Oh, come on, this is a sheer counterfactual statement, and how
should we justify such a statement?"-----no doubt many people may
feel this way. But let's see what he means. Darwin means that this
statement can be justified or made probable by what we know about man
and social animals in general, if we supply evolutionary
considerations.

First, he reminds us of a fact that man is a social animal: human
beings live in a family, in a group, and in a society; and this is a
biologicalfact like that bees and ants live in a colony. And any
social animal has social instincts which support their social life.
By "social instincts" he means innate or genetic propensities "to
take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount
of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them"
(ibid.). Since social instincts are part of the "essence" of a social
animal, so to speak, these instincts persist and work continually in
the whole life of any individual. But these instincts may work quite
differently depending on what species that animal belongs to: in the
case of bees and ants, social instincts may determine particular jobs
and roles an individual is to perform; but in a higher animal, social
instincts may work as a mere tendency to prefer social life and to
aid fellow members.

Of course, it may be asked why these animals have such instincts.
Darwin has a ready answer to this: such instincts are useful for
these animals, and therefore they have acquired these by natural
selection. But we have to notice here that the moral sense is not
included in social instincts at this stage of the argument. Darwin's
purpose is to depict the process by which the complex faculty of
moral sense may be developed from the combinations of simpler
faculties of social instincts and intelligence, hopefully by means of
natural selection. Moreover, even if we admit his assumption that the
social instincts are useful for the animals, there is still a crucial
problem: useful exactly to whom?----to a group of animals or to
individual animals? We will come back to this problem later (Section
5).

3. Conflicts of Social Instincts with Other Instincts

Now, granted that man is a social animal, how has man acquired the
moral sense?The second stage of Darwin's argument is concerned with
an imaginary psychological process which may give rise to something
like moral sense or moral feeling. Suppose some social animal has
acquired high intelligence so that it can remember past actions and
motives. This will intensify the ability of sympathy which is
included in the social instincts. Sympathy is an ability to
re-present others' feelings, as well as one's own, within oneself; so
that if this animal acquires better knowledge about others, by means
of its improved intelligence, it is natural to suppose that the
extent of sympathy will also be somehow widened.

But Darwin is not arguing that, since intelligence strengthens the
operation of sympathy, the social instincts together with
intelligence give rise to the moral sense. The matter is not that
simple. We have to notice that the social instincts are not
necessarily the strongest in each occasion when this animal makes
decisions or actions, and they may give in to some other
temporarilystronger motives, such as appetites or sexual drive. As we
all know, we humans have anti-social or selfish motives as well as
social motives; we often follow the former, and with higher
intelligence we may even become cleverer for satisfying our selfish
motives rather than social motives. Darwin is well aware of this.
Then what would give rise to the moral sense?

The key is the enduring nature of the social instincts. The social
instincts
may give in to other stronger motives; but nevertheless, the social
instincts are ever persistent. Then what would happen when these
social instincts conflicted with other desires and were frustrated by
satisfying the latter? As we know, when a certain instinct or desire
failed to be satisfied, some sort of disagreeable feeling remains.
And since the social instincts are enduring, each time this animal
recall this conflict, this disagreeable feeling also recurs and it
may be even intensified. Thus in memory, those feelings which are
associated with social instincts would become dominant. Similar
things would happen with agreeable feelings of satisfaction and
enjoyment; if this animal followed the social instincts rather than
other desires, its satisfaction would be recalled with enjoyment,
because that is quite in conformity with its enduring social nature.
And this is the beginning of the formation of moral feelings; and the
ability to experience these feelings is an essential part of what we
call the "moral sense".

------------------------------------------------------------
[Note added in October 1998: This argument was already
criticized in the 19th century as trying to replace an
evolutionary explanation of the origin of morality by a
mere "imaginary psychology" (Shurman 1887, ch.5); and this
crriticism seems to have some point. However, we can
reconstruct Darwin's argument in two stages, (1) the
evolution of a behavioral strategy, and (2) the evolution
of psychological properties accompanying such a behavioral
strategy.

As regards (1), the contemporary reader is already familiar
with the conditions under which an "altruistic" (or
"conditionally altruistic") strategy can evolve and become
dominant within a group. For instance, for reciprocal
altruism, two conditions are necessary: (i) the same
individuals must interact frequently, and (ii) they must
have memory in order to respond to an opponent's previous
response. We should notice that Darwin's conditions can
cover these two; i.e., social instincts imply frequent
interactions, and intelligence provides the memory needed
for a wise strategy. I have shown, by a simple example, how
a social and intelligent animal may acquire an altruistic
strategy by natural selection (Uchii 1998).

As regards (2), it is quite natural to suppose that such a
behavioral strategy needs some psychological makeup which
supports it; in an animal with social instinct and
intelligence, feelings, preferences, or propensities will
accompany a behavior or a response to an opponent's action.
And it is not difficult to imagine what sort of feelings
are necessary for a reciprocal altruism, and this can be
confirmed, to a considerable extent, by observing
primates's behavior (see de Waal 1996). Thus, we can
perfectly make sense of Darwin's original argument.]

4. Social Norms, Sympathy, and Habits

Darwin's emphasis on the persistent nature of the social instincts is
illuminating. But his story is not over. Darwin next points out that
high intelligence would be accompanied by the ability to use some
sort of language, which would enable our animal to express their
wishes or desires as a member of their community. Thus it is very
likely that they come to form their social norms, or "public
opinions" as to how they should do for the common benefit of the
community. These norms or opinions are of course in an important
sense "artificial" or "conventional"; and therefore these cannot be
regarded as genetically determined. Darwin admits all this. But he
emphasizes that "however great weight we may attribute to public
opinion, our regard for the approbation and disapprobation of our
fellows depends on sympathy, which . . . forms an essential part of
the social instinct, and is indeed its foundation stone" (op. cit.,
ch. 4). His point seems clear: although the contents of norms and
public opinions are determined largely by artificial factors, their
binding force essentialy depends on a biological factor, i.e.
sympathetic ability, and this is instinctive or genetically
determined.

The importance of sympathy has been emphasized by many philosophers
such as Adam Smith or Hume. But Darwin criticizes these philosophical
views as follows: we have to understand sympathy not merely as a
psychological ability to reproduce former states of pain or pleasure,
but also as a biological instinct, which is a product of evolution.
Only the latter characterization can explain the fact that "sympathy
is excited, in an immeasurably stronger degree, by a beloved, than by
an indifferent person" (ibid.). This point is of course frequently
mentioned by recent sociobiologists; but I wish to emphasize that
Darwin was well aware of this, and he clearly saw its significance
for ethics, although he was not clear about the biological mechanism
which produces such tendencies.

By now, the major part of Darwin's view on the genesis of the moral
sense or conscience has been outlined. Let me summarize his view with
his own words [Q4]:

At the moment of action, man will no doubt be apt to follow
the strongest impulse; and though this may occasionally
prompt him to the noblest deeds, it will more commonly lead
him to gratify his own dsires at the expense of other men.
But after their gratification when past and weaker
impressions are judged by the ever-enduring social
instinct, and by his deep regard for the good opinion of
his fellows, retribution will surely come. He will then
feel remorse, repentance, regret, or shame; . . . . . He
will consequently resolve more or less firmly to act
differently for the future; and this is conscience; for
conscience looks backwards, and serves as a guide for the
future. (op. cit., ch. 4)

In short, his explanation of the genesis of conscience has the
following features: (1) it analyzes conscience into a bundle of
psychological dispositions and feelings; (2) these dispositions and
feelings are products of evolution and therefore are instinctive,
i.e. they have a genetic basis; and (3) because of this, the wrokings
of conscience have some conspicuous limitations that the conscience
regulates mainly actions toward closer people.

The rest of his arguments is an elaboration of the preceding view.
Darwin was a good observer, and it seems that this ability is well
displayed in his remarks on the interplay between sympathy, public
norms, and individual habits in morals. He argues that the preceding
view is quite in accord with what we know about undeveloped people.
Among them, only strictly social virtues are esteemed, and
self-regarding virtues such as temperance or prudence are rather
neglected. Darwin seems to attribute the development of
self-regarding virtues mainly to the improvement of intelligence and
knowledge; but he is also aware of the importance of habits of
individuals. As many moral philosophers have emphasized, virtues must
be acquired as a habit; and a substantial part of habits may
originate from individuals and spread within their groups, and
sometimes beyond their groups, by imitation. This is one of the
essential features of what we call "culture". And such habits often
strengthen and complement the workings of social instincts. Here,
biological process merges into cultural process. This is a very
intriguing question, but we shall not get into this.

5. Darwin on Group Selection and Kin Selection

Now, what has Darwin accomplished by his argument so far? For the
sake of argument, let us suppose that his explanation of the genesis
of conscience is on the right track. But where does the principle of
natural selection play its role? This still is not quite clear. Since
Darwin attributed the genesis of conscience mainly to two factors,
(1) intelligence and (2) the social instinct,we will examine the two
in this order.

First, it seems quite clear that intelligence is developed by means
of natural selection; because intelligence is no doubt useful to its
possessor, an individual animal. So we can agree with Darwin's
assertion, at least with respect to this factor.

But what about the social instinct? The social instinct included
sympathy, in particular, and sympathy played a crucial role in
generating the moral sense or conscience. By means of sympathy,
individual animals care for others and restrict their own selfish
desires; in other words, altruistic or moral tendencies originate
from sympathy. Then naturally we have to ask: Is the social instinct
including sympathy also developed by natural selection? Darwin's
attitude to this question is ambivalent; sometimes he seems to think
that the answer is obviously 'yes', but at other times he seems to be
aware of a grave difficulty. But what exactly is this difficulty? Let
me explain.

Let us recall how natural selection works. There are many individual
variations which are hereditary among animals of the same species.
And if some of these variations are more advantageous than others in
the struggle for existence, individuals with these variations
gradually increase within the species, and they eventually become
dominant in number. Thus natural selection works in terms of the
herediatry characteristics of individuals; and these characteristics
must be useful primarily to their possessors, i.e. to individuals.
But Darwin frequently speaks of moral faculties useful to a tribe or
group of individuals, and he says that these faculties have been
developed by the competition among such tribes or groups in their
struggle for existence. For instance, he argues this way [Q5]: "When
two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into
competition, if . . . the one tribe included a great number of
courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always ready
to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this
tribe would succeed better and conquer the other" (ch. 5). Granted;
but is this natural selection working on individuals? Darwin doesn't
seem to think it is; for he is well aware of the difficulty as
follows [Q6]:

But it may be asked, how within the limits of the same
tribe did a large number of members first become endowed
with these social and moral qualities, and how was the
standard of excellence raised? It is extremely doubtful
whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and
benevolent parents, or of those who were the most faithful
to their comrades, would be reared in greater numbers than
the children of selfish and treacherous parents belonging
to the same tribe.. . . Therefore it hardly seems probable,
that the number of men gifted with such virtues, or that
the standard of their excellence, could be increased through
natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest;
for we are not here speaking of one tribe being victorious
over another. (ibid.)

Thus Darwin's program for explaining the genesis and development of
morality by means of natural selection seems to have failed at a
crucial point. That is to say, he tried to appeal to what we now call
'group selection' (i.e. an advantageous group survives and
individuals of that group indirectly change), but he admitted that
this group selection is not likely to be supported by natural
selection working on individuals.

However, it must be pointed out, to be fair to Darwin, that he was
aware of at least one key for solving this difficulty. It is what we
now call 'kin selection.' Just before discussing the development of
moral faculties, Darwin argues for the development of intelligence by
natural selection, and he briefly touches on this key, as follows
[Q7]:

If such men [i.e. intelligent men] left children to inherit
their mental superiority, the chance of the birth of still
more ingeneous members would be somewhat better, . . . Even
if they left no children, the tribe would still include
their blood relations; and it has been ascetained by
agriculturarists that by preserving and breeding from the
family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be
valuable, the desired character has been obtained. (ibid.)

This idea could have been more developed and applied to the
explanation of moral faculties; but Darwin left that job to the
biologists in the 20th century, such as W. D. Hamilton (kin
selection) or Robert Trivers (reciprocal altruism). What Darwin
actually did instead was to appeal to the principle of heredity of
acquired characters.

6. The Significance of Darwin's Considerations on Morality

In this talk I have outlined what I take as the essence of Darwin's
theory of morality. He was mainly concerned with the biological and
psychological task of explaining the genesis of moral faculties of
man. But it seems to me that he was also interested in moral
philosophy based on the evolutionary theory. The major advocate of
what is called 'evolutionary ethics' in the 19th century was of
course Herbert Spencer; and Darwin was far more cautious than
Spencer, trying to avoid any definite statements about what we ought
to do. But now and then he criticizes former and contemporary moral
philosophers, such as Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill, and sometimes
even gets into issues of eugenics, in The Descent of Man. This
indicates Darwin's strong interest in moral philosophy. Moreover, we
have good evidence that this interest originates in his youth. For
instance, I was surprised by finding the following remarks (written
in October, 1838) in his Notebooks [Q8]:

Two classes of moralists: one says our rule of life is what
will produce the greatest happiness.---The other says we
have a moral sense.---But my view unites both & shows them
to be almost identical. What has produced the greatest good
or rather what was necessary for good at all is the
instinctive moral senses: (& this alone explains why our
moral sense points to revenge). In judging of the rule of
happiness we must look far forward & to the general
action---certainly because it is the result of what has
generally been best for our good far back.---(much further
than we can look forward: hence our rule may sometimes be
hard to tell). Society could not go on except for the moral
sense, any more than a hive of Bees without their
instincts. (Old & Useless Notes 30, Barret et al., 1987,
609.) [Darwin in 1840, drawing by the author]

We may recall that the moral philosophers who emphasize the moral
sense are called 'Intuitionists' and those who emphasize the greatest
happiness are called 'Utilitarians'. Thus the young Darwin here is
claiming that he can synthesize these two major schools of moral
philosophy! I will add, for your curiosity, that Henry Sidgwick, a
great utilitarian and who claimed that Intuitionism and
Utilitarianism can coincide, was born in the same year, 1838. And we
have to notice also that Darwin's idea of the genesis of morality is
already sketched in rough outline in the last sentence.

But these historical interests aside, are there any significant
suggestions for ethics or normative moral philosophy that can be
exploited from Darwin's theory of the moral sense? I think there are.
Since I do not have much time left, let me briefly touch on this
without arguments. First of all, (1) we have to know well about human
morality in order to make any normative assertions. And in this
respect, the Darwininan view of morality is certainly useful. We have
to construct feasible ethics for humans as a social animal, not for
an angel or an isolated beast. For this purpose, we certainly have to
know our biological capacity, limitations as well as potentialities.

Secondly, (2) if the Darwinian view is on the right track, we should
take the continuity of man and animals more seriously. Darwin argued
more or less persuasively that we humans and other animals share many
properties, including intelligence, feelings and preferences. Hence,
if we find some of these valuable and think that they should be
protected by our morals, the same consideration should support
similar treatments of animals, with the difference of various
degrees, of course. For instance, persons like Jane Goodall, knowing
very well about primates, assert that our treatment for them should
be improved; and this assertion may well be justified.

Thirdly and finally, (3) the Darwinian view suggests a certain
approach to ethics, say the Reductionist approach (I borrow this word
from Parfit, who uses it in the context of the problem of personal
identity; and Daniel Dennett also defends this approach, with respect
to cognitive science, in his Darwin's Dangerous Idea, 1995). This is
the view that all ethical concepts can be analyzed into more basic
concepts which are not themselves ethical. In other words, it is the
view that concepts such as 'conscience' or 'moral goodness' will be
well understood only in terms of concrete workings of human faculties
and feelings, without postulating any peculiar realm of moral value.
This is exactly what Darwin has done in his theory of the moral
sense; conscience or moral sense is so called because of its workings
in a certain way, not because it is related to some irreducible moral
value. Since this position is very likely to be misunderstood, I will
hasten to add a few explanatory remarks.

By reductionism I do not mean that ethical or evaluative concepts can
be reduced to factual or descriptive concepts; this is what Moore
called 'naturalism' and I do not support it. In order to be a
reductionist in my sense, one need not be a naturalist. All one has
to admit as an ethical reductionist is that morality can be related
to a bunch of natural or conventional elements and their workings.
Morality needs intelligence, but this intelligence does not come from
any peculiar realm, devine or angelic. Morality needs some
instinctive factors, but one can find similar factors in other
animals. And, again, moral feelings and preferences have an origin in
a non-moral animal world, and you don't have to suppose any peculiar
'respect for the divine moral law'. All the factors necessary for
full understanding of morality can be found in this world and the
workings of its constituent parts. This is what I mean by
reductionism.

And I understand that Darwin is one of the most powerful advocates of
this position, although very few people would regard him as a moral
philosopher. So, by emphasizing his contribution to ethics as a
reductionist, I should like to end my talk.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
Bibliography

Barret, P.H. et al., eds. (1987) Charles Darwin's Notebooks,
1836-1844, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Darwin, C. (1871) The Descent of Man, 1st ed., London: Murray, 1871.

Darwin, C. (1874) The Descent of Man, 2nd ed., London: Murray, 1874.
(1922 reprint is used.)

Dennett, D.C. (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Simon and Shuster, 1995.

de Waal, Frans (1996) Good Natured, Harvard University Press, 1996.

Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984.

Shurman, J.G. (1887) The Ethical Import of Darwinism, Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1887; 3rd. ed., 1903.

Uchii, S. (1996) Evolutionary Theory and Ethics [in Japanese], Kyoto:
Sekaishiso-sha, 1996.

Uchii, S. (1997) "The Origin of Morality" [in Japanese], Kagaku
(Science Journal) 67-4, 1997.

Uchii, S. (1998) "From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary
Ethics, part I" [in Japanese], Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Journal of
Philosophical Studies) 566, October 1998. English abstract

Uchii, S. (1999) "From the Origin of Morality to the Evolutionary
Ethics, part II" [in Japanese], Tetsugaku Kenkyu (Journal of
Philosophical Studies) 567, (forthcoming)1999. English abstract

Wilson, L.G., ed. (1970) Sir Charles Lyell's Scientific Journals on
the Species Question, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

Postscript

This is a paper read for a session on 19th Century Biology,
International Fellows Conference (Center for Philosophy of Science,
Univ. of Pittsburgh), May 20-24, 1996, Castiglioncello, Italy.

Robert Butts was the commentator; his comments and questions from the
floor mostly centered on what I didn't say in the paper, i.e. on the
point how scientific knowledge of evolution and normative ethics are
related. I have worked out my ideas in my book (1996, see the
preceding Bibliography, and click here for English abstract); the
essential idea is that (1) evolutionarty biology can teach us what
sort of sentiments or preferences we have as part of our human
nature, and (2) moral sentiments and preferences are among them.
Since, as I see it, the justification of moral judgements can be made
essentially in terms of our rational choice for satisfying our
preferences (not all, but those that can survive criticisms by facts
and logic)----including moral preferences----, evolutionary
knowledge, unlike knowlege of general relativity or quantum
mechanics, does contribute to our normative ethics. For a brief
discussion of the justification of "ought" statements (prudential,
moral, etc.), see my paper "Comments on Prof. Ruse's View" in
Newslet. 19.

Finally, I wish to thank Jerry Massey for teaching me de Waal's
recent book (1996) on the origin of morality; I have supported my
view by de Waal's observations in my 1997 and 1998 papers.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
(c) Soshichi Uchii, November 20, 1997; revised, June 17, 1998; last
modified
March 10, 2000.

DZD01557-AT-nifty.ne.jp
suchii-AT-bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp


	--- from list nietzsche-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---


   

Driftline Main Page

 

Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005