Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2000 14:24:04 +0100 From: Ruth Chandler <R.Chandler-AT-ucc.ac.uk> Subject: Re: 16 now 21 and moving up! ok lamdac, now you have offered some interesting questions to to mull over and ones i find worth extending the time within a more thoughtful plane of compsotion. i will have to think about some of the issues you raise but for now, agreed that Bergson is problematic in as much as he falls back on Plato's notion of the good cook to make 'natural' lines of articulation, carving the chicken at its joints, correspond to his 'veritible' series of distribution. superior durations are precisely the species he represents and, given his own desire to gallop over the obstacle of death does not seem overly keen to will his own down going! the problem of a pure space is tricky and ( drawing on Deleuze's 1966 reading here) is not to be conflated with temporal/ spatial schema. the pure space ( also the beginnings of D's concept of the Aion as empty form for time) 'is' an imaginary 'space' beyond the extension of all potential temporal/spatial schema. as such it space seems to end up as an image of non-image. no difference in kind is asserted between the matter of mind image and the materiality of world although extended temporal/ schema are unavoidablye subject to errors of degree to become perceptible within the relatively slow duration of matter., although Bergson intensives posit also posit unextended durational registers as the condition of durational multiplicty ( i'm not sure where imperceptibly extended comes in here). anyhow, the answer is no duration does not, in itself, account for movement. yet this is why bergosn is interesting. the point of a durational account is precisely not to conflate discernible or imaginable durations with the movement of time ( or becoming) itself and this is what makes it possible to describe partial movements. actualised rythyms consist but this is always to know them in the 'language of solids' and, thereby, reduce flux to the fictitious idols of grammar. obviously, this coincides with some of N's more famous remarks on the subject, hence Deleuze's famous synthesis of Bergson and Nietzsche in Difference and Repeition in order to fracture the kind of durational repetitions of the self-same identity. i think B's Creative Evolution is very clear on the non-human components of composite aggregates but it is D who actually opens these texts to the emergence of superior composites. in the logic of Sense, D re-animates the clinamen ( a kind of curve smaller than the smallest conceptual unit) to get round the problem of the non-specifiability of the movement of movement and, as far as i can work it out, this is made to correspond to the imperceptible realm of simulcra which replace K's imagined causal supports of the agent and ( i think) sorts out the problem of Plato's cook. Bergson's account of the being of time as multiplicity exceeds Riemann's multiplicities which is why D has to posit difference without a concept as the differenciator instead of the elan vital. if the proper question about the being of time as multiplcity is yes but of which kind, then D's ansewer seems to be the kind that is always bigger or smaller ( by degree Aionically and by dramratic intensity in the corporeal mix of Chronos) than the kinds of multiplicities available to describe it. D does not assume whole numbers as the condition of its infinte differential calculus whereas Bergson's multiplaction by division does seem to assume this. as i have said, i am not a philsopher and most definitely not a mathematician, so these are very simplifed accounts of texts which i continue to work through. Ruth.C >>> <lambdac-AT-globalserve.net> 09/28 10:46 pm >>> >Duration may well require this method to bring about any >differentiation at all, but does duration suffice to describe movement >and its indissociable unity (as alteration) - when Bergson poses that >both experience and duration are natural composites? correction: Duration may well require this method to bring about any differentiation at all, but does duration suffice to describe movement and its indissociable unity (as alteration) - when Bergson poses that both experience and movement are natural composites? --- from list nietzsche-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- --- from list nietzsche-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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