File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_2000/nietzsche.0009, message 226


Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2000 14:24:04 +0100
From: Ruth Chandler <R.Chandler-AT-ucc.ac.uk>
Subject: Re: 16 now 21 and moving up!


ok lamdac, now you have offered some interesting questions to to mull over
and ones i find worth extending the time within a more thoughtful plane of
compsotion. i will have to think about some of the issues you raise but for
now,  agreed that Bergson is problematic in as much as he falls back on
Plato's notion of the good cook to make 'natural' lines of articulation,
carving the chicken at its joints, correspond to his 'veritible' series of
distribution. superior durations are precisely the species he represents
and, given his own desire to gallop over the obstacle of death does not seem
overly keen to will his own down going! 

the problem of a pure space is tricky and ( drawing on Deleuze's 1966
reading here) is not to be conflated with temporal/ spatial schema. the pure
space  ( also the beginnings of D's concept of the Aion as empty form for
time) 'is' an imaginary 'space' beyond the extension of all potential
temporal/spatial schema. as such it space seems to end up as an image of
non-image. no difference in kind is asserted between the matter of mind
image and the materiality of world although extended temporal/ schema are
unavoidablye subject to errors of degree to become perceptible within the
relatively slow duration of matter., although Bergson intensives posit also
posit unextended durational registers as the condition of durational
multiplicty ( i'm not sure where imperceptibly extended comes in here).
anyhow, the answer is no duration does not, in itself, account for movement.


yet this is why bergosn is  interesting. the point of a durational account
is precisely not to conflate discernible or imaginable durations with the
movement of time ( or becoming) itself and this is what makes it possible to
describe partial movements. actualised rythyms consist but this is always to
know them in the 'language of solids' and, thereby, reduce flux to the
fictitious idols of grammar. obviously, this coincides with some of N's more
famous remarks on the subject, hence Deleuze's famous synthesis of Bergson
and Nietzsche in Difference and Repeition in order to fracture the kind of
durational repetitions of the self-same identity. i think B's Creative
Evolution is very clear on the non-human components of composite aggregates
but it is D who actually opens these texts to the emergence of superior
composites.

 in the logic of Sense, D re-animates the clinamen ( a kind of curve smaller
than the smallest conceptual unit) to get round the problem of the
non-specifiability of the movement of movement and, as far as i can work it
out, this is made to correspond to the imperceptible realm of simulcra which
replace K's imagined causal supports of the agent and ( i think) sorts out
the problem of Plato's cook. Bergson's account of the being of time as
multiplicity exceeds Riemann's multiplicities which is why D has to posit
difference without a concept as the differenciator instead of the elan
vital. if the proper question about the being of time as multiplcity is yes
but of which kind, then D's ansewer seems to be the kind that is always
bigger or smaller ( by degree Aionically and by dramratic intensity in the
corporeal mix of Chronos) than the kinds of multiplicities available to
describe it. D does not assume whole numbers as the condition of its infinte
differential calculus whereas Bergson's multiplaction by division does seem
to assume this. as i have said, i am not a philsopher and most definitely
not a mathematician, so these are very simplifed accounts of texts which i
continue to work through.

Ruth.C




>>> <lambdac-AT-globalserve.net> 09/28 10:46 pm >>>
>Duration may well require this method to bring about any
>differentiation at all, but does duration suffice to describe movement
>and its indissociable unity (as alteration) - when Bergson poses that
>both experience and duration are natural composites? 

correction:

Duration may well require this method to bring about any
differentiation at all, but does duration suffice to describe movement
and its indissociable unity (as alteration) - when Bergson poses that
both experience and movement are natural composites?


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