Date: Sat, 14 Apr 2001 18:03:15 -0700
From: Jason Ingram <jingram-AT-usc.edu>
Subject: Re: prisoner's dilemma defined


Just off the fly, without reference to specific texts, it seems to me 
that the conception of rationality underlying games theory in general 
is suspect from a Nietzschean perspective:

it assumes knowledge of discrete "units" of benefit (three problems 
there: what is the good, how can we be confident in our knowledge of 
it, and why is a utilitarian conception of self-interest the best 
means to construct a "joyful" life?).  Specifically, in reference to 
the prisoner's dilemma:

1)  why is the amount of time spent incarcerated the only constituent 
of self-interest?  What of the "cost" of betrayal, and the danger 
that we wouldn't be able to think back on our betrayal and will that 
act over again?  None of these count as factors in computing 
self-interest according to this abstract model.

2)  how can the prisoners be sure that they are not being tested by 
their secret society?  They might be killed if they betray their 
comrade.  This reflects a troublesome reification of truth and 
knowledge, which Nietzsche indirectly addresses.

3)  The framing of the problem or question itself is irksome.

Jason


>here is an example of the famous problem often called 'the prisoner's
>dilemma':
>
>In the cells of the Ruritanian secret police are two politcal prisoners. The
>police are trying to persuade them to confess to membership in the an
>illegal opposition party.  The prisoners know that if neither of them
>confesses, the police will not be able to make the charge stick, but they
>will be interrogated in the cells for another three months before the police
>give up and let them go.  If one of them confesses, implicating the other,
>the one who confesses will be released immediately but the other will be
>sentanced to eight years in jail. If both of them confess, their
>helpfullness will be taken into account and they will get five years in
>jail.  Since the prisoners are interrogated separately, neither can know if
>the other has confessed or not.
>
>The dilemma is, of course, whether to confess. The point of the story is
>that circumstances have been so arranged that if either prisoner reasons
>from the point of view od self-interestr, she will find it to her advantage
>to confess; whereastaking the interests of the two prisoners togetehr, it is
>obviously in their interests if neither confesses. Thus the first prisoner's
>self-interested calculations go like this: "If the other prisoner confesses,
>it will be better for me if i have also confessed, for then I will get five
>years instead of eight; and if the other prisoner does not confess, it will
>still be better for me if I confess, for then I will be released
>immediately, instead of being interrogated for another three months. Since
>we are interrogated seperately, whether the other prisoner confesses has
>nothing to do with whether I confess--our choices are entirely independent
>of each other. SO whatever happens, it will be better for me if I confess."
>The second prisoner's self-intereseted reasoning will, of course, follow
>exactly the same route as the first prisoner's, and will come to the same
>conclusion. As a result, both prisoners. if self-interested, will confess,
>and bothwill sped the next five years in prison. There was a way for them
>both to be out in three moneths, but because they were locked into purely
>seld-interested calculations, they could not take that route.
>
>Now, my question is about a prisoner that is acting on Nietzschean ethical
>principles (and what exacltly would they be). What would he/she do, and what
>would be the rationale behind it?
>
>----
>Michal
>
>
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