Date: Sun, 15 Apr 2001 18:20:22 -0400 (EDT)
From: Michal Klincewicz <michal-AT-priest.com>
Subject: Re: prisoner's dilemma defined


Thank you so much for your response. Nonetheless, there is more that I think
we could get at in analysis. Maybe I could start by replying to your
insightful comments in the problem itself and that way focus more on what I
think is interesting in the puzzle.

You wrote:

Just off the fly, without reference to specific texts, it seems to me
that the conception of rationality underlying games theory in general
is suspect from a Nietzschean perspective:

it assumes knowledge of discrete "units" of benefit (three problems
there: what is the good, how can we be confident in our knowledge of
it, and why is a utilitarian conception of self-interest the best
means to construct a "joyful" life?).

I write:

We do not have to analyze the prisoner's dilemma purely from the perspective
of Game Theory or using the utilitarian calculus. I am more interested in
the account of a prisoner.  Consider what sort of decision he would make
referencing Nietzschean principles/ethics. It is not necessary to use the
calculus of utility to make a decision in this case but some reasoning has
to take place. My interest is in following the resononing of a Nietzschean
prisoner.  The example was cited from Singer, so perhaps that is why it came
out this way.

You write:

Specifically, in reference to
the prisoner's dilemma:

1)  why is the amount of time spent incarcerated the only constituent
of self-interest?  What of the "cost" of betrayal, and the danger
that we wouldn't be able to think back on our betrayal and will that
act over again?  None of these count as factors in computing
self-interest according to this abstract model.

I write:

Yes. I realize this. This is where I was hoping to get some insight from
someone that knows more about N. than me. What is the cost of betrayal? Is
it a symptom of slave-morality to betray the other? Is it a betrayal of the
self to betray the other? What would determine self-interest?

You write:

2)  how can the prisoners be sure that they are not being tested by
their secret society?  They might be killed if they betray their
comrade.  This reflects a troublesome reification of truth and
knowledge, which Nietzsche indirectly addresses.

I write:

I am not sure what you mean by this. I did not know that the problem in the
example was epistemological.

3)  The framing of the problem or question itself is irksome.

Jason


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