File spoon-archives/nietzsche.archive/nietzsche_2002/nietzsche.0202, message 11

Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2002 21:14:04 -0500
Subject: Re: Of the Three Metamorphoses

Years, decades, centuries pass and the same petty, low-life idiot arguments are
made - in this case by the SAME stupid subjects - as if they once held water.
Always the feminist, or the leftist, or the little fascist - Nietzsche's
typology could not be right because of his resentment of...the Chandala in all
its forms, and above all as self-professed semi-literate analphabetism.  If one
is distracted one might even come to believe in Freud's penis envy.  Hey, thanks
to post-modernity prostheses of all sorts are now available.  Can't you girlies
go play 'exhibit me and my reconciliations' on some more deserving anus mundi?
If you can confuse resentment with rejection of all base values, you should not
open thy archenterons, oh infamous bitches.  Become anorexic by barfing food not


PS - Fuck all masses, classes, races, majorities, parties, churches and little
communities.  Thought and desire are for the few and small.

Rebecca Stringer wrote:

> >> My view is that N gets it wrong by locating a discrete typology of types,
> >ressentiment versus nobility. I think he gets it wrong because he never
> >finishes overcoming his own ressentiments. However,  I think there is a case
> >for modes of emphasis in each an every body, some of which are more full of
> >ressentiment than others, some of which may be more noble as N discusses it.
> >N can't pose nobility  for the few (or the one_ without the conditions of
> >ressentiment for the majority-one of the few places where he explicitly
> >discusses the material conditions for the overman are as surplus
> >countermovement to the conditions of mass enslavement. the majority thus
> >stand as a dance floor, a dance floor machined into specialised utilities,
> >for a noble culture above and beyond their all-too-human concerns. You might
> >want to dispute this point, but I cannot reconcile my uptake of Nietzsche
> >with my politics without posing a way out of this dilemma. This does not
> >mean a return to 'everything is equal!' however.
> >>
> >This is one aspect of his thought that i just do not understnad. In HAH he
> >clearly indicates tha the overall health of each is essential to the well
> >being of the free spirits. He discusses using psychological methods to help
> >each create a solid center.  He then posits the necessity of master/slave
> >type relationships, and even goes so far as to proclaim the need of a
> >religion to control and manipulate the masses (the ER, as hinted at in BGE
> >61)
> Your comments chime with something I've been trying to figure out - n.'s
> first mention of the thesis on master & slave moralities in BGE (260) is
> immediately qualified with the idea that there is a third phenomena of
> mediation between these moralities & that they may coexist within cultures
> and within "a single soul". But then in GOM this complexity seems to be
> dropped out as it gives way to the stark typology you both mention.
> This seems to create a situation in which N. struggles to keep the nobles
> clean of ressentiment (ie. the noble is capable of immediate reaction - oh
> yeah?; the strong invent legalism to quell the resentful populace - but are
> they not therefore party to the doer/deed distinction?).
> The complexity resurfaces to some extent in EH (wise, 6) when N. discusses
> his relationship with ressentiment & seems to link knowledge of it to
> freedom from it, indicating something of the single soul's process of
> overcoming/mediating (but also positing the uninspiring posture of russian
> fatalism - a third model of reactivity?).
> For me the problem with N.'s stark typology is that it sets up the concept
> of ress. for literal useage - it's overused to diagnose politics of the
> 'powerless' and underused to diagnose the politics of dominant groups (ie.
> ress. used to diagnose feminism/certain feminisms & not at all to my
> knowledge to diagnose, say, misogyny [even as the N. makes way for the
> latter in D, IV, 346]).
> On the whole, I would say there are a number of underexamined conundrums in
> the concept of ressentiment, not the least being Nietzsche's own
> ressentiment which Ruth mentions: what kind of critical posture is steeped
> in what it denounces? and what happens when ressentiment is not up against
> a contrasting morality but rather an opposing ressentiment? These questions
> rarely enter into analyses which employ ress. diagnostically.
> R
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