Date: Wed, 03 Jul 2002 17:00:51 -0500
From: "Kevin Sanchez" <heliogabalus-AT-eudoramail.com>
Subject: nuclear posturing


M2 PRESSWIRE / May 27, 2002

HEADLINE: Australian Peace Committee Campaign for International Cooperation and Disarmament(CICD) Australian anti-bases campaign Friends of the Earth Australia; US-Russia nuclear arms treaty 'the arms reduction treaty you have when you're not having an arms reduction treaty'

Antinuclear groups Friends of the Earth, CICD, Australian Anti- Bases
Campaign and the Australian Peace Committee today characterized the nuclear arms reduction treaty signed in Moscow yesterday as 'The arms reduction treaty you have when you're not having an arms reduction treaty'.

The Bush/Putin agreement signed yesterday is far inferior to the START-II and III arms reduction agreements, which it effectively replaces, and thus a step backwards.

According to spokespeople for the groups, "Even the rhetoric surrounding the recent agreement has made it quite clear that the Bush administration in particular is not really interested in the elimination of nuclear weapons as per the US's treaty requirements under the NPT, and that it is not at all interested in treaties that are in any way binding or that limit what the US (or Russia) can do. The Russians, who wanted a proper successor to the START-I and II treaties, have simply made the best of a bad job by saying that at least the current agreement gives them also the freedom to adopt whatever nuclear posture they like as long as by 2012, they have just 1700-2200 operational warheads."

"The Moscow agreement does little to foster real progress toward the total and unequivocal elimination of nuclear arsenals as required by Article VI of the NPT. It also does nothing to remove the single greatest threat to life, namely the maintenance of large numbers of ICBMs on 'Launch-on-Warning' status."

"Unlike the START agreements, up till 2012, there are no limits at all
placed on warhead numbers. All the treaty says is that by 2012, each side must have 1700-2200 operational warheads. There are no limits on what may be kept in reserve. The treaty itself actually expires in 2012 unless it is extended."

"Statements that no further arms reduction treaties are contemplated between the US and Russia surely contradict the clear obligation of the two countries under the NPT to go all the way to zero."

"In short, the Moscow Agreement does not represent real arms control - Its the arms reduction treaty you have when you're not having an arms reduction treaty, and a step backwards."  

__________________________________

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast / May 21, 2002 

HEADLINE: PRESS CONFERENCE WITH A GROUP OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN EXPERTS ON UPCOMING RUSSIA-US SUMMIT ARMS CONTROL AGENDA

Moderator: Dear colleagues, good day. Welcome to the Press Development
Institute. The topic of our press conference today is as follows: "The Upcoming Summit: Friends Still Threaten Friends With Nuclear Arms?"

I am happy to introduce our guests to you. Vladimir Belous, Major General, Rt., a leading researcher at the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences; Alla Yaroshinskaya, President of the Center of Ecological Education and Enlightenment; Michelle Boyde (sp.?), a researcher at the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, who has come specially from the US; and Anna (inaudible) of the Moscow Endowment Carnegie Center.

   I am turning the floor over to Vladimir Belous.

   Belous: Dear members of the press, we are very grateful to you for coming to this meeting, and we will try to answer your questions.
   First of all, I would like to say that the attention of the world public is on the upcoming meeting of the leaders of the two countries that, no matter, how controversial the assessments may be, is a milestone event that will largely determine the development of the strategic situation in the world.
   I must say the problem of security, international security will undoubtedly be at the center of the meeting. And of course, we all understand very well that relations between Russia and the US is critical to international security. 
   A very complex stage Russia and the US will have to begin is new strategic conditions. While before, the reduction of strategic offensive weapons was the only and the main condition for the maintenance of strategic stability, now the problem of missile defense, which the US plans to create, seriously interferes
with this issue.     
   The establishment of strategic stability in the totally new conditions will leave a serious mark on the course of negotiations in Moscow. First of all, I would like to note that although the end of the Cold War has been proclaimed many times, it is too early to say that its vestiges have been fully liquidated. The reason for this is, first of all, that the sides have not rejected the concept of mutual guaranteed destruction, and unfortunately, the sides are conducting negotiations in different weight categories.
   For the US, this meeting will solve first of all military-strategic and military-political problems. For Russia, priority has been given to economic factors that determine the behavior of the Russian delegation and the Russian leadership at these talks.
   It's an achievement of Russian diplomacy that it has succeeded in getting the US consent to sign a legally binding treaty that will have to be ratified, by two thirds of votes in the US Senate, and this gives <us> hope that the treaty will be implemented better than START-2 would have been implemented.
   Basically the sides have stepped over or are ready to step over START-2 and accept the terms of START-3 that reflects present-day strategic realities better. Until recently the US leadership refused to consider the upcoming talks with Russia on a binding treaty and thought that the US could ensure security unilaterally without assuming any obligations.
   The reduction of the number of warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 is, of course, an important step toward the reduction of nuclear weapons. But, as you probably know, here comes a thing that worries us very much. I am talking about the fact that the US prefers not to scrap the nuclear warheads to be removed from missiles, but to put them aside as a reserve.
   What is the reason for this? First of all, it's the asymmetrical structure of the nuclear forces in the two countries and hence asymmetrical disarmament. The US will not destroy their carriers and will not destroy warheads to be removed from these carriers but will store them.
   Therefore, they plan to leave about 4,000 warheads in reserve in addition to 2,200 nuclear warheads to remain deployed. One may ask why they need these reserve warheads? It's very hard to answer this question. For example, they justify the missile defense system to be deployed by the existence of pariah states that may threaten the US. At least, there is some subtlety in meaning that these pariah states may indeed use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes. But when we are talking about 4,000 warheads in reserve, one can't help asking how they can be used.
   I can't but draw an analogy with the US actions when they dropped atomic bombs on Japan. Just two tactical bombs of 15 kilotons degraded Japan's war potential. So, tell me, why do they need 4,000 if about 200-300 warheads deployed on MX missiles or Russian SS-18 missiles are enough to plunge the world into a nuclear winter? And this is a matter of serious concern to the world public.
   I must say that the question of destruction of nuclear warheads also remains open because the complexity of mutual control over their destruction has long been part of all such negotiations. If we take START-1, START-2 and even the INF Treaty, we will see that the dismantlement of nuclear warheads was not provided for before.
   Essentially, talking in the classical terms of understanding the word, the nuclear disarmament steps in this directions were quite modest. Take this example. Even in the INF Treaty the provision was not to liquidate the warheads themselves but only the body of the warheads, while the military loads could be adjusted for other charges.ong other things, the warhead dismantled from the medium-range Pershing-2 missile was used by the Pentagon to develop a new munition -- the B-61 aviation bomb, modification 10.
   In this way the reuse of warheads is of course causing a certain amount of concern. The more so that the useful life of nuclear warheads of the US is somewhat longer than the useful life of nuclear warheads in Russia.
   Yet another very serious problem remains, which has been raised over the past years: it is a question of preventing an accidental nuclear conflict resulting from a technical fault in the missile complexes themselves or in the combat management systems; it is an inadequate assessment of the situation by leaders of nuclear powers; it is finally the human factor which is always present in such cases.
   One can say that until both sides maintain a high level of combat readiness of the nuclear missile forces of the two sides, as well as of other nuclear powers, the likelihood of accidental nuclear war remains. Here it is necessary for the leaders of the US and Russia and of other nuclear countries to concentrate on preventing this phenomenon, a historical phenomenon in the development of world civilization.  
  It is with the appearance of nuclear weapons that for the first time mankind became threatened with the loss of its future, loss of its perspective, because mankind can be destroyed as a result of a world nuclear crisis.
   I must say that in March 1997, when the leaders of two nuclear super powers met in Helsinki, the statement drafted by the leaders there said that they would instruct their experts to examine the issue of lowering the combat readiness of missile-nuclear forces through removal of warheads from the carriers or through other mutually agreed methods. This is to say that already at that time the
question of lowering the combat readiness was raised in practical terms as a means of preventing an accidental nuclear conflict.
   One must say that the problem of course is not simple. It has political, military, strategic and economic aspects to it. To fully answer all these questions, that situation was analyzed and, among other things, the conclusion was drawn that lowering the combat readiness of nuclear forces of the two countries required "inputting" three main criteria making it possible to assess the situation and adopt a correct decision.
   What are these criteria? Above all, they are -- the time of restoring the combat readiness. This is an extremely important factor, because one can take a warhead out of combat readiness. For instance, in 1994 the decision was taken on non-targeting missiles at each other -- first by Russia and the US, which was later joined by other nuclear powers. But the restoration of missile targeting takes around one minute. So, it was more of a political step but at the same time an important and necessary step.
   The second criterion is the ability to control. It is the ability to control the process of lowering the combat readiness when both sides are convinced that they are carrying out the commitment assumed.
   And finally the third criterion is financial expenditure. One must bear in mind that the work with nuclear arms is an extremely expensive activity. That is why it is also necessary to take into account the economic factors which, without a doubt, impact on the process of cuts and lowering of nuclear forces.
   Lowering the combat readiness. It is of course a consistent process, not a single step. It is a complex process that must correspond to the indicators under the above three criteria but steps should be made. So, I think that the declaration on the new framework for strategic relations between Russia and the United States, to be signed in Moscow, will probably provide an impetus to resolving the problem of preventing an accidental nuclear conflict through lowering the combat readiness of the strategic nuclear forces.
   I would stop here. Thank you.


   Moderator: Now Alla Alexandrovna, please.
   Yaroshinskaya: Thank you. I would like, within the framework of this press conference, draw your attention to the problem of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, because the upcoming Bush-Putin summit is closely connected with this problem. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty has been in existence for over 30 years. 
   But today there are more nuclear weapons in the world than was the case before the signing of that treaty. It seems to me to be an eloquent fact. This is to say that despite the existence of this treaty and of other treaties in the nuclear sphere, regrettably they do not "perform" in practical terms. Nuclear weapons get increasingly piled up. 
   And according to experts' data, experts Russian and Western, today there are already 40 states who could, if they wished, to quickly develop a nuclear bomb -- 40 states. Twenty states already actually have a primitive atomic bomb. 
   Today the problem of mankind is related to how quickly those states can develop delivery vehicles. As they say, it is a matter of time. 
   It is an open secret that Israel, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, hostile states have nuclear weapons and proclaim themselves to be nuclear states.
   I also wish to draw your attention to the fact that despite the ban placed by the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear states to deploy their nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear states, up till now the territories of seven states of Western Europe, NATO members, house, according to military experts, 120 nuclear bombs which cease to be tactical weapons and become quite strategic, considering the rapid expansion of NATO toward the borders of Russia.
   I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that, following the collapse of the USSR, the nuclear treaties of the only remaining super power -- the United States are being rapidly curtailed, which is a matter of regret. I have in mind, above all, the <US> withdrawal, on June 14 this year, from the ABM Treaty, and the deployment of a national ABM system. I also have in mind the US non-ratification of the START-2 treaty which is now being sort of
transformed into a new START-3 treaty which will of course also require ratification. We also know that the US has so far not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Russia, the Russian Duma ratified this treaty immediately after Putin became President. Let alone the new NATO doctrine and the so-called US Nuclear Posture Review, the concept of which has been leaked to the press and then admitted by US officials. We know that it puts Russia among the countries
at which US nuclear missiles are aimed.
   All this taken together, seriously undermines years of international efforts aimed at eliminating the nuclear threat by completely banning or destroying nuclear weapons of mass destruction. There is a convention, like the chemical and biological ones, which, these two conventions, work for peace although there are still many questions there, too.
   Now I would like to connect non-proliferation problems to the future treaty that may be signed. I think it will be signed on May 23-26 during the Bush-Putin summit in Moscow. How important is this treaty for the world and global peace, and how have Russia and the US moved toward it? I think it will be interesting for the journalists to hear some concrete figures describing the state of nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia.    
   According to Arms Control Association experts, the US has about 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on ground-based missiles, submarines and bombers as counted by START-1 counting rules. According to preliminary estimates, the US has more than 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and more than 5,000 nuclear weapons in reserve. So, all in all, 12,000.
   Arms Control Association experts say that Russia has about 5,500 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on missiles, submarines and bombers, 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons and 13,000 strategic and tactical warheads in reserve. So, now you can calculate the difference between the overall nuclear stocks in Russia and the US.
   It now has been proposed to lower this level to 1,700-2,200 warheads. We know that the Russian president, while being the guest of Bush in the US some time ago, proposed to reduce it to 1,500-2,200. In other words, the Russian side made a step forward. But the US disagreed, and at first there was no any agreement, they did not even agree to sign a treaty.
   As Bush said, we are friends, we trust each other, and let's just talk and cut, which is of course not serious talk.
   Now, as we think, a full-fledged treaty will be signed. It is known that during the negotiations on the new treaty Russia called for the dismantlement of warheads. Russia still insists on this but unfortunately the US disagrees, and as the general just said, the US will store its warheads. This is what I call double morals. It's a political step. We proclaim the reduction of nuclear weapons, and the world applauds. But in reality it's not quite so, in reality we
have what is called double morals.
   The US objected to Russia's proposal and now plans to store rather than dismantle the warheads removed from the means of delivery. So, what is the purpose of this? The Bush administration has said that it wants to have flexibility allowing it to redeploy its warheads quickly in the future in order to respond to new threats or prevent changes in strategic relations. For example, more hostile relations with Russia, if it may happen in the future, or a threat from China.
   In order to ensure such flexibility, the Bush administration plans to keep at least 2,400 warheads to be removed under the future agreement as the so-called retaliation force, which means that the warheads will be kept in conditions that will make it possible to mobilize them within several weeks, months or years. And this would allow the US to deploy a total of 4,600 strategic warheads in three years after the expiration of the arms reduction agreement to be in effect until the year 2012, if such a decision is made, that is.
   In addition, the US plans to keep an additional several thousand warheads at a lower level of combat readiness, and they will take more time to be made combat capable. Clearly, if the US keeps a considerable number of nuclear warheads in reserve, so will Russia. It has already made this clear.
   At the same time, the removal of 4,000 strategic warheads from the launch sites in the next 10 years is, of course, a welcomed step. The US and Russia will each have about 2,000 strategic warheads. This will be more than enough to destroy not only each other but everything else. This will be compounded by the fact that both sides will most certainly keep several thousand warheads that may be deployed and aimed at each other.
   I am sure you remember Bush's statement that the US should no longer commensurate its nuclear arsenal with the Russian one, and the intention of the Bush administration to preserve thousands of nuclear warheads. This intention shows the opposite because no other explanation but a desire to match the Russian armed forces can justify the preservation of thousands of nuclear warheads. 
   In the latest Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush administration said, I am quoting, that should there be a considerable deterioration in the Russia-US relations, the US may need to revise the level of status of its nuclear weapons in the future. IN other words, the right hand signs an arms reduction treaty, while the left hand does something else. This is the kind of situation we have no. Of course, it's a step forward for peace, but for specialists who understand what is going on it's a political step by America and an economic step by Russia because Russia cannot afford to keep so may nuclear warheads and actually doesn't need so many of them.
   While START-1 and START 2 did not require the warheads removed from the weapons to be disassembled, although they require the launching systems, that is missiles, submarines and bombers, now, if this provision were included in the treaty, requiring nuclear warheads to be disassembled and destroyed, then this treaty would be vital for Russia and America but first of all for peace. Then this treaty would be priceless because it would be irreversible, these warheads could not be restored. As it is, they can be restored to the original condition very quickly.
   I think I will stop here.        

  Moderator: Thank you very much. I am giving the floor now to Michelle Boyde of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
  Boyde: I am sorry for speaking English. I will speak Russian next time. I am here today as a board member of the Back from the Brink campaign, which is a campaign to remove nuclear weapons from high alert status and also as the global coordinator for the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, a non-governmental organization based in the United States.
   The Back from the Brink campaign is comprised of over 40 national arms control and disarmament organizations and hundreds of local and regional groups in the United States whose goal is to remove all nuclear weapons from high alert status.
   The institute for energy and environmental research has provided technical advice and international outreach ... (inaudible)... for many years and is a founding member of the "Back from the Brink" campaign in two days presidents Putin and Bush are meeting in Moscow to sign an agreement on reducing their nuclear arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next ten years. 
 President Bush has said that the treaty will "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." But the agreement falls far short of this claim. The treaty would in some years temporarily reduce the numbers of the <US> and Russian nuclear weapons on high alert but vast numbers -- enough to destroy the world -- would still be ready for launch in minutes. The treaty requires that 3,800 US warheads be removed from operational status at the end of ten years. However, these warheads can be removed from missiles and stored separately much faster, within only three years. Further, this agreement will not require that a single US or Russian missile launcher or warhead is actually destroyed. Each side can carry out the reductions at its own pace or even reverse them and temporarily build up forces.
   At the end of 2013 all of the surplus weapons can be kept in storage leaving open the possibility of future deployment of these weapons. The agreement also allows either side to withdraw on three months notice. The treaty has additional problems. It explicitly allows multiple warhead missiles within the context of the proposed US deployment of a ballistic missile defense as well as large numbers of weapons on hair trigger alert. This has long been considered a destabilizing arrangement that would increase the risk of nuclear war by miscalculation.     
 It sets aside the commitments to irreversible cuts in nuclear arsenals that are part of the strategic arms reduction treaty the START-2 which has often been held up before the world community as an example of progress in nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia.
   The START-3 framework agreement on irreversible cuts made in Helsinki in 1997 has also been abandoned. Finally, the treaty will expire in 2012, leaving both sides free to expand their nuclear arsenals and increase the number of warheads that are operationally deployed in a high alert. We do not agree with the characterization that this treaty will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War. The following steps would be much more helpful. The US and Russian nuclear weapons slated for elimination should be taken off high alert immediately, warheads should be removed from missiles and stored, secured and verified as quickly as possible.
   Nuclear weapons slated for elimination should be dismantled so that
reductions in nuclear arsenals are irreversible.
   The US and Russia should commit to removing all their nuclear weapons from high alert status and to ending the policy of launch on warning. This will help set a global zero alert standard -- no nuclear weapons poised for quick launch.
   They should move to reduce the alert status of all their warheads as soon as technically possible and move progressively to complete de-alerted status by verified removal of all nuclear warheads from their delivery systems.
   We urge presidents Bush and Putin to commit to further negotiations and actions that will truly help <us> to leave Cold War behind. We also urge them to remove the destabilizing elements in this treaty.


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