From: open1-AT-execpc.com
Date: Mon, 01 Sep 1997 09:49:07 -0700
Subject: Re: PLC: *Fuehrer Prinzip* (was More on Authority) 


Howard Hastings wrote:
>
> On Sun, 31 Aug 1997 open1-AT-execpc.com wrote:
>
> > I made a point of saying there is an analogy of proportionality between
> > authority and assent.  Dominion secures not free, but compelled assent, the
> > difference being that compelled assent will cease when the treat of force is
> > removed.
> >
> > Perhaps a better response is that dominion is not true authority, as the assent
> > secured is not true assent.  There is much to recommend this view.  It serves
> > to distinguish legitimate authority from its counterfeits.  The compulsion of
> > real criminals is certainly a legitmate exercize of authority, but in all
> > compulsion, the real term of authority (if any) is in those who assent to
> > compel rather than in those who, rejecting the authority, are compelled.
> >
> The last point seems to me a good one, since I do not want to say that
> someone compelled to do something is responding to "authority."
> "Dominion" is perhaps one subset of "power", "authority" another.  At
> least there seem to be contexts in which I would want to distinguish the
> two.
>
> I am, however, curious about the phrase "true authority."  I can't
> tell from it whether Dennis is asserting that the distinction between
> "dominion" and "authority" allows us to legitimately define authority
> analytical purposes, or whether he is asserting that the distinction
> allows us to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate authority in the
> so-called real world. His realism inclines me to think he actually
> means the latter.

As I was writing the post, I was aware of a tension between the analytic 
and
ethical uses of "true authority."  My intention was initally analytic, 
but as I
wrote I saw the moral imlications come to the fore.  Still, the analysis 
was
analytic in primary intent, and my mention of the *Fuehrer Prinzip* came 
out of
the analysis.  Once mentioned, however, it changed the tone of the post 
so much
that I felt an introduction was required.  The first draft was sent 
without my
being aware of it at a time when my computer said that I was not 
connected to
the net.

> Everyone grants that the compulsion of "real" criminals is ok. But I've
> noticed that people quarrel over the definition of "criminal," and
> sometimes those labeled criminal are so labeled precisely for choosing one
> form of authority over another (remember Antigone?). This raises the
> question of how confidently one can use Dennis's definition of
> authority to separate legitimate from illegitimate authority in the
> real world. Authority, in that world, is always allied with the power to
> define what is authoritative, to ground itself authoritatively, so to
> speak, and perhaps even to hide that grounding so that authority appears,
> not a matter of definition or social construction maintained by one
> group's control of material circumstances, but a natural outcome of the
> way things "really" are.

The analytic projection can help to distinguish what it legitimate from 
what is
illegitimate, because good analysis is a requirement for good ethics, but
ethics has a teleological projection that analysis does not.  The 
question of
legitimacy in authority is the question of whether the assent secured 
promotes
human self-realization in general, and in the case of political 
authority, the
common good specifically.

My analysis was inadequate to these ethical issues, and hence to the 
question
of legitmacy.  Still, I think it contributes to the ethical discussion by
showing that authority is a creature arising out of individual assents, 
and is
not an intrinsic property of the individual in authority.  Unless this
distributive and relational nature of authority is perceived, moral
responsibility cannot be properly distributed.  The result would 
certainly be
bad ethics.

> At such a point the distinction between "true" authority, as Dennis
> defines it, and "dominion" as Saicho defines it, collapses.  Many women
> assent to male authority because in schools and their own families they
> have been defined as less authoritative. Material control or "dominion"
> over the instruments of socialization produces subjects who assent to
> authority, thus making it "true."

Yes.  The point is that being real, "true" authority is not an adequate
condition for being legitimate, moral authority.  We have become 
conscious of
the illegitimacy of the systematic subjection of women to male authority. 
In
what does this consciousness consist?  In the awareness that women cannot
become fully self-realized under such conditions.  This is a 
means-to-ends or
teleological ethics.  What is moral is what is conducive to the good.  
What is
immoral is what impedes our progress to the good.  Underpining this is 
the
recognition that we have some capacity to recognize a potential, but not 
yet
actual, state as good.  This last is the "synderesis principle."

> From within the position Dennis has so
> far articulated, I see no means of legitimately contesting this
> sort of "legitimate" authority.  Though, of course, I do not doubt that,
> from within any given tradition of authority, it is possible to define
> other kinds of authority and the actions which flow from them as
> illegitimate.

The tradition that I am writing in here is the Thomistic-Jeffersonian.  
In the
Thomistic view, a well-formed conscience is seen as able to recognize the 
good
in a particular situation, and that that good may not have been 
anticipated by
even the most legitimate of authorities.  Aquinas gives the example of a 
just
law requiring that the city gates be kept shut in time of siege.  He then 
asks
"What if the defenders are outside of the gates?"  This places the
responsibiliy clearly on the gate keepers, who must dissent from 
authority for
the common good.  Locke and Jefferson reflect this tradition. We are well 
aware
that, for Jefferson, "governments derive their just powers from the 
consent of
the governed," and that there are circumstances that justify "desolving 
the
political bounds."

For Aquinas, the dissent contemplated is limited.  It is attempting to 
see what
the authority would have said if cognizant of the existential situation. 
 For
Jefferson, dissent can justify the use of deadly force in replacing an
authority no longer conducive to the common good.  For Gandi, dissent 
must use
peaceful and self-sacrificeing means.  For Martin Luther King, it needs 
to
single out particular exercizes of authority as illegitimate while 
accepting
that others by the same authority are legitimate.

In each case (Aquinas, Jefferson, Gandi, King) the justification is that 
the
rejected exercize of athority is not conducive to the good of the people. 
 Each
views rights as being those conditions required for human development, 
and sees
authority as illegimate insofar as it is not so conducive.

Saicho-AT-aol.com wrote:
>
> In some recent post Dennis Polis says: “Not to put too fine a point on it .
>  .  .  .” and then, in my opinion, does just that.  By distinguishing between
> “true authority” and “counterfeit authority”  a very fine point is placed.
>  The agent of authority may be a democratic election or an Uzi, but authority
> is established -- period.  Whether or not the authority is true or
> counterfeit is usually one of perspective, opinion, even “projection.”

Due to my not being explicit, two issues are confused here.  One is the 
nature
of authority (the target of my analysis) the other is its legitimacy.  
Power
can come from an Uzi, and compelled assent, but not free asent.  In most 
cases,
the one holding the Uzi has given free assent to his leader.  Those at 
the
other end of the barrel have not.  Which is in the right is a matter of
circumstances.  In many cases, the side most conducive to human 
fulfillment is
clear, in some it is more obscure.  Clearly genicide is not conducive to 
human
fulfillment.  This is not a matter of perspective or opinion, but one's 
ability
to see clearly what is conducive to human fulfillment does depend on the 
scope
projections one considers.  I am sure that many of our forebears 
earnestly
believed that the extermination of Native Americans was conducive to 
human
fulfillment.  That opinion did not make it so, but may have mitigated 
their
guilt.

> Dennis insists that authority is based on relationship and assent.  Consider
> those incarcerated -- in jail or concentration camps.  The person who has
> authority (dominion) over the inmates does not require their assent; his/her
> authority stems from the established agent of power.  (This agent is in
> effect even if the jail is empty.)

Yes, "authority over" is used in that way, and those under this authority
rarely give their assent.  Still, the authority of a warden derives from 
the
assent of others.  This assent is two fold.  First, it is the assent of 
those
granting his or her authority.  Second, it is the assent of those 
implementing
the authority.

> I cannot see why Dennis introduced “Fuehrer Prinzip.”  I am not claiming that
> personal responsibility is not important, or a moral imperative, but often
> (usually?) one is helpless to resist authority -- “good” or “bad.”

No, usually one is not helpless.  On the contrary, it is usually only by 
our
assent that authority is maintained.  We each have authority, i.e. the 
capacity
to secure assent.  Most of us make only limited use of this capacity and 
are,
consequently, inadept at securing assent.  But, our capacity to 
communicate, to
re-create our vision in another, is the antidote to this supposed 
helplessness.
That is why the First Amendment is our most precious safeguard.

> I liked what Howard Hastings said: "Authority (in the real world) is always
> allied with the power to define what is authoritative, to ground itself
> authoritatively.  .  ."  This suggests that, as Howard points out, that the
> distinction (if there really is one) between dominion and "true" authority
> becomes quite blurred.

The reason for this alliance is easy to see.  Having given assent, we 
become,
*ipso facto* commited to an end, i.e. the support of that to which we 
have
assented.  Hence, dominion derives from assent in those that impose it.

As for "true" authority, I have discussed the relationship of good 
analysis and
ethics above.

GJLEONARD-AT-aol.com wrote:
>
>  In Dennis's terms, the email I forwarded might have said, "The assent of the
> tenured professors to the oppression of the lecturers" speaks more loudly
> about their true beliefs--fidelity to their own class interests --than their
> putative philosophic positions. I like our discussion of "assent." Assent
> helps us suggest the way power can be exercised by doing precisely nothing!

Bravo!

Dennis Polis