Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1998 23:44:52 -0330 (NST) Subject: Re: PLC: [H-BLOOM] Western Canon University Deaun -- Welcome back. Lots of interesting stuff in your post.I'm swamped with my interns at the moment. Give me a few days to catch up. Best wishes, Walter ================= On Wed, 11 Nov 1998, c moulton wrote: > More on Truth. > My comments are prefaced by "cdm" > > > >W: Could you give an example of a language game that excluded the > >expression "It is the case that ..."? > > > cdm: I do not know how to define a language game but then I'm not a > rhetorician. On the other hand, it is possible to have things which are > true without having a cosmological sense of the Truth. There are facts. > The earth does turn (or the sun does rise); it is raining > and there is a finite amount of oil and gas. There is no ethical content > in any of these things; there is no Truth only a material reality. The > problem for those of us who are willing to accept this is to structure an > ethics on shifting ground. > > cdm: Now. We create Truths. We develop a God that tells us how to behave. > We create notions of individuality and freedom that tell us how not to > behave. _We_ human beings invest ideas with their grandness. They simply > do not exist beyond us, except insofar as we imagine them to do so. > > > However, in practice we must forget that the meaning of Truth is arbitrary > or it loses its efficacy. Sometimes it loses its efficacy anyway. > Thucydides writes a long book about the effects of words losing their > meaning. Somewhere, perhaps in _Untimely Meditations_, > Nietzsche talks about the movement of history in terms of remembering and > forgetting. There are times when the definitions are working and we can > afford to forget completely. Then there are times when working out of > history cannot be contained within the definitions (Nazi Germany is a > favorite example of contemporaries, but not of Nietzsche, of course) and the > definitions have to be changed. Hence, the nature of the Truth undergoes a > change. The change is codified through the work of philosophers and > linguists as well as in the arena of practical politics and then we can > forget again for awhile. > > >> Your statement is defensible only by saying, that if I wish to talk about > >> truth as relative, or as a concept invented to serve a need, that I am > not > >> talking about the "real" truth. > > cdm: What is the measurement of "real?" I hate to bring it up again, but > once you posit a "real" truth then you have to grant the existence of a > transcendent authority and we're into the question of God again. > > >That DM continues the discussion about truth > >> demonstrates, unarguably, that a language game can be played that does > not > >> contain your presuppositions. > > > >W:I think that what this shows is that an activity can be pursued without > >explicit recognition of the presuppositons, conditions, and rules > >constitutive of that activity. (I speak a few languages that way.) > > > cdm: Yes, well so do I. I would suggest that most everyday life is lived > "without explicit recognition of the presuppositions, conditions and > rules...." On the other hand, list writing is not a thoughtless activity and > I maintain that I have a perspective on the holders of "truth" that they > themselves cannot see. In other words, I allow the possibility that the > Truth which is held dear is not true but conventional. This demotion does > not make that "truth" any less dear; only less majestic. > > cdm: Now. I suspect that anyone who holds to "Truth" will find that I am, > at best, mistaken or unenlightened or perhaps, on a less forgiving day, > thoughtless or stupid. So be it. This is a disagreement on a fundamental > level and I don't see how it can be reconciled. The best one can hope for > is the recognition that this disagreement exists and deal with the > implications of it when a specific instance creates a confrontation. This > is a happy occurence in the academic landscape because it gives us something > to talk about. It is not so happy in the political field where some > agreement is more than likely required. > > cdm: We're back to the problem of constructing ethics in a space where > Truth is devalued. > > >> Can you give me a true statement that a physicist might have that I > cannot > >> call a) what current information supports, or b) a matter of > defininition? > > > >W: Don't you end up epistemologizing truth with that question? Questions > >regarding the nature of truth are different from questions as to how > >(best) to go about procuring the truth. > > > cdm: I'm lost here. What does this mean? > > > > >W: Truth is absolute. It's like being pregnant and not like believing. But > >such absoluteness holds originally in what we could call "the logical > >space of reason". Whether there is a "still point" in the empirical > >univers, I don't know. I'm prepared to believe almost anything from the > >physicists these days. > > > cdm: not believing in what? The material reality of the pregnancy? That > is > a bit like not believing that being hit by a bus won't hurt you. Even the > quantum physicists accept that mechanical physics adequately explains most > of the world as we know it. There is a quantity of certainty in the world; > but there is not complete or absolute certainty. We can posit the form but > it is an imaginary thing, the product of human mind, not of a transcendent > authority. > > cdm: More to the point, it seems to me that the existence of the still > point in the universe is precisely the question. There either IS one or we > decide to define one. If we choose one, then we choose to believe in the > transcendent authority. If we choose the other, then we are stuck with the > human mind as the author of its own ethical controls. > > >difficult to act for the intentionality of belief. What would the content > >of a belief be? > > cdm: a definition of the still point in the universe? God, Natural Law, > etc. > > >W: Evidence is an indicator of truth. Any statement that is true is > >established via "current evidence." But it could also be established via > >"past, currently-deemed-to-be-mistaken" evidence. Consensus has no > >necessary relationship to the truth. > > > cdm: Here we seem to be touching the relationship of truth to knowledge. > Mechanical physics ruled the boundaries of scientific knowledge for > centuries. The political world operated on those rules too insofar as it > believed that science was the method for achieving true knowledge and > political ideas were generated using applications of science. The > evidence of the truth of mechanical science was manufactured in a way > through this application of what was believed to be true. If evidence is > the indication, but the evidence is a product of the truth, then aren't we > running around in circles? quantum physics has not destroyed the truth of > mechanics but expanded it. The political world is now trying to figure out > the implications of uncertainty in that field that was supposed to provide > knowledge - certain knowledge. > > >> WO, have you seen _Pi_? Rent it and come back to the discussion. It is > >> philosophically stunning. > > > > >W: Who's in it and who directed it? Blockbusters around here are stafffed > >by former librarians. > > > cdm: It won the director's award at the [run by Robert Redford, in Utah] > film festival. As George says, it is stunning. It is also painful to > watch. > > >> If there _is_ order in the universe, there must needs be a pattern in Pi, > >> worked our far enough. Banks of computers have not found it, having > worked > >> it out to powers for which we have to invent words they are so large. > >> > >W: I don't know if that conditional is true. But if there were a pattern, > >wouldn't it exist independently of needs and definitions? > > > cdm: It is the premise of the film. It is interesting not necessarily > because it is true but because mathmaticians believe it and math is the > language of science and science is our means to the truth. The film is > interesting because it foregrounds the assumption about patterns in the > universe and deals with some of the implications of such an assumption. > > > who wrote the following paragraph(s)? > > >> I've had a great deal of trouble with the concept of respecting ideas > that > >> are wrong. For instance, I cannot say, "Wow, I know you are a white > >> supremacist, and I respect that, but......" And the idea that truth is > >> absolute and eternal is wrong. Indeed, regardless of the Pope, it is > >> self-contradictory. Like elephants all the way down. I can still like a > >> person who so thinks, but I cannot " respect" their opinions on the > >> matter. I can even understand such a person. But so also can I > understand > >> a Klanswoman, the Pope, and Mother Theresa. > > > >I agree with you on that one. But I would use the term "tolerate" and > >this, under certain conditions. It is patronizing, as Taylor rightly > >suggests, to accept a-priori that all cultures and tribes deserve equal > >respect from us. > > > cdm: Hmm, interesting. When I say "respect" I don't mean tolerate. I mean > that > I will undertake to determine the terms and conditions upon which human > beings base their decisions. That is, I respect the possibility that they > think at least as well as I do and even use this capacity as often and as > effectively as I do. In other words, I approach an "other" from a position > of humility rather than arrogance. This does not mean that I grant the > rightness of "white supremacy" or of any other heinous act that humans can > manage to inflict on themselves and the world around them. It is unlikely > that an argument which deteriorates into "you're wrong!" "Am not!" "Are > so!" doesn't get very far. It is far more persuasive to use the opponents > terms against him and you can't do that if you don't know how he uses them. > In order to understand, you have to be willing to forego judgement long > enough to understand. That however, does not mean that you forego judgement > all together. > > I do not understand why it is patronizing to assume that other people have > worked out a system of ideas and practices as we have. It seems, rather, > that the patronization comes from the assumption that our favor is something > worthy to be desired by them, and critically bestowed by us. > > I've just moved to a foreign country. I went to see the doctor - a > south-Asian Indian educated in Britain. He's a garrulous type and wanted a > chat about "being American." Ok. I can do that. What he really wanted was > to front his opinion on the matter. He thinks that Americans are energetic, > ambitous, good-hearted and naive. This last stems from the inability of the > average american to understand why the rest of the world doesn't want to be > like the U.S. I have to agree with him. > > geez this is long. enough > > > deaun. > > > > > > > > > >All best wishes, > > > >Walter > >================> > > > > > > > --- from list phillitcrit-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > > > > > --- from list phillitcrit-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu --- > --- from list phillitcrit-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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