Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 03:12:36 -0700 (PDT)
From: "J.M. Adams" <ringfingers-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: [postanarchism] Amster: "Anarchism as Moral Theory"


Anarchism as Moral Theory :
Praxis, Property, and the Postmodern
   
by Randall Amster

Abstract

This essay explores the prospect of attaining a
non-coercive morality that could enable the
simultaneous realisation of maximal individual freedom
and stable community, through the exposition of an
anarchist theory premised on a subjective
'conscience-ethic', an inherent tendency toward
sociality and 'mutual aid', and normative 'usufruct'
in property. Part of the project entails the
development of a reflexive synthesis between the two
seemingly contradictory ends of 'individual' and
'community', concluding that only an anarchist 'social
order' integrating self, society, and nature can
resolve this apparent tension. In this regard, an
argument is advanced here for a commonly-held
materiality (deriving from the 'state of nature') that
sets the framework for a normative view of property
and possession. The essay concludes with an assessment
of the efficacy of an accord between anarchist moral
theory and poststructuralism.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Introduction:  The Persistence of Moral Inquiry

Human history and moral reasoning are inextricably
linked to such an extent that it is nearly impossible
to discuss the former -- either in assessing the past
or speculating about the future -- without reference
to the latter.  Even prominent theories often
characterized as a-moral, such as Nietzsche's forecast
of the "advent of nihilism," his pronouncement that
"God is dead," and his claim that we have finally
witnessed the "end of the moral interpretation of the
world" (Kaufmann, ed., 1956), nonetheless require
reference to a moral framework even if only as a means
of adducing a critique of religion, authoritarianism,
or formal ethics.[*fn1]  Try as he might, Nietzsche
cannot escape the primacy of morality since humans
have been and always will be imbedded in a network of
moral processes; indeed, as Peter Kropotkin, the
gentle prince, has shown through his extensive
biological and zoological research on Ethics (1992),
the moral impulse in nature precedes the existence of
human life.  Early humans, according to Kropotkin,
developed the moral urge by observing the processes of
nature, "and as soon as they began to bring some order
into their observations of nature, and to transmit
them to posterity, the animals and their life supplied
them with the chief materials for their unwritten
encyclopedia of knowledge, as well as for their
wisdom, which they expressed in proverbs and sayings"
(1992:50).  Human nature, then, as part of the great
web of natural life and its complex processes, has
been and will always be imbued with the moral impulse.


For Kropotkin, the moral lessons that humans have
derived from nature include:  sociality; a prohibition
against killing one's own kind; the clan, kinship, or
tribal structure; the advantages of common endeavor;
play; and a notion of reciprocity in retributing
wrongful acts (1992:51-9).  In this view, the
overarching tendency in nature toward "mutual aid" --
and not competition, as the social Darwinists have
argued -- has principally enabled the survival of
species in the animal kingdom, including of course the
species Homo.  Thus, while the precise character of
ethical queries changes over time, with each
development in science, technology, and social control
bringing with it new and more difficult moral
challenges, the omnipresent nature of moral inquiry
itself is constant.  In our postmodern world, changing
by the minute as nanotechnology and instantaneous
global communications continually re-make the social
and material landscapes, we face an unprecedented
urgency in the sphere of moral reasoning, often
manifested in a pervasive sense of individual
dislocation and collective anxiety.  Nietzsche's
exhortation to "Live Dangerously" captures some of the
angst of our own era, and in this notion we begin to
grasp the essence of praxis as both a means of coping
with an ever-changing world and as the very essence of
the belief that "philosophy has to be lived"
(Kaufmann, ed., 1956:51).  "Praxis," then, is simply
the conscious deployment of an inherent moral impulse
in nature that predates even our own human existence. 

It must be noted, however, that for all of his insight
into natural morality and the processes of biological
communities, Kropotkin never formulated an ethic that
would include the earth itself in its calculus, but
instead often expressed, as George Woodcock notes, "a
kind of uncritical optimism that the earth's resources
are unlimited" (in Kropotkin 1993:125).  Today we
possess a deeper understanding of the interdependence
of all life processes on the planet and the tenuous
nature of our own survival as a function of flouting
this natural interconnection, and accordingly our
current moral inquiries must reflect this ecological
knowledge (see Rogers 1994).  Thus, amidst our moral
speculations on the nature of government, law,
society, and property, there exists a ubiquitous
grounding that presupposes humankind's imbeddedness in
the processes of "nature," manifested in the primacy
of sociality and mutual aid among humans, as well as
in the recognition that these same priorities apply
equally to our relationships with non-human nature. 
And this, I think, is the chief value of anarchism to
moral reasoning:  In challenging established
conceptions of authority and illuminating the
persistence of inequality in civil society, anarchism
simultaneously enables a deeper inquiry into how these
same "human" hierarchical processes impact the balance
of life on the planet.  In this light, human morality
and natural morality are taken to be coeval, deriving
from the same beginning place -- and with that
understanding we can undertake a meaningful analysis
of the contours of politics, praxis, and property in
the postmodern era. 

(for the rest please visit:
http://www.geocities.com/bororissa/ana.html )

===="The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule...power no longer has today any form of legitimization other than emergency."  

- Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, 1996

For cutting-edge analysis of contemporary war visit http://www.infopeace.org

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