File spoon-archives/postanarchism.archive/postanarchism_2003/postanarchism.0307, message 54

Date: Sat, 19 Jul 2003 17:55:52 -0400
Subject: Re: [postanarchism] Always leaving the party early? Part 3

TMB wrote:

> continued...
> Shawn: Nonsense. There are no "neutral operations," and the Derridean
> discourse on inheritance and responsibility is eloquent on this point.
> --- An eloquence on such points typically derives from a certain
> justice...a wrong being righted, according to a first moment in which a
> harm takes place. This harm is the neutrality (presumed but false) in
> question. I am simply pointing to this neutrality. It is no simple
> neutrality, however. It is a metaphysical and conceptual neutrality that
> is so deeply bound up with the very Being of metaphsyics it would take a
> Derrida to break it open...

Hmmm. I really can't parse this. The "neutrality in question" last i looked
was one you attributed to "deconstruction." Now, i would be happy to say that
this attribution is a false presumption on your part, but i don't think
that's what you mean. The rest of the passage doesn't clarify. There is
apparently more or other than a *claim to (false) neutrality* at stake - a
common charge leveled at certain "rationalisms" - since Derrida does not
claim such a neutrality. To locate this exceptionally "deep" neutrality in
"the very Being of metaphysics" apparently is not an appeal to something *in
Being* - something ontological - because it can be "broken open." But, then,
what is the "Being of metaphysics," beyond the facts of the history of
metaphysics, the rules of its language game?

> Or, we might say: no, there are, *indeed*,
> neutral operations, just as there are neutron bombs,

...and neutered pets, and neurotic lovers... We might say a lot of things,
but things go more smoothly when we actually do or don't say them. Are you
saying that the "are, *indeed*, neutral operations," that either can or can't
be "broken open"? And, honestly, what - besides a kind of poetic slide - do
neutron bombs have to do with the question?

> and that is where the
> danger lies.

"The danger"...?

> The move against neutral oprations *in their neutrality* is,
> in a way, typically anarchist.

How so? "Typically anarchist"...? What constitutes or identifies this type?

> The move I make here is not simply
> enarchist. There is nothing in the concept of "enarchy" that is not
> essentially neutral. I am given to a responsibility to a nonviolence I
> bring up.

This "to be given to responsibility" sounds like a sort of response to the
notions of "responsibility" and "the gift"/"is given" in Derrida's more
recent work, but, of course, an important part of what is given, in Derrida's
scheme, is a kind of "violence," a necessity of choice (in the move from
general to limited economy, in inheritance, in that part of reading that is
always already a writing, etc), the poison in the gift. If neutrality was
possible, it would, on this reading, involve "irresponsibility" - an
irresponsibility beyond reproach, perhaps, but still...

You seem to want to make "nonviolence" somehow originary, but why privilege
this concept - already a product of consciousness, of some form of ethical
thinking, and already a strategy of response (to force, interpreted in terms
of our own, and our perception of other's, interests, as "violence") - over
other moments it so clearly does not precede? Other the natural world, we can
say, "there is force, there are forces, and they are only neutral or
indifferent in that nothing more than the play of their differences directs
them." Of the second nature of consciousness, we can say, "these forces, as
they affect me, are felt, at times, as pressures, urgencies, even violences."
It appears that, at these various levels, "there are forces" and "there are

The question of whether or not *there is,* in some analogous sense, "justice"
or "nonviolence" is, as i'm sure you know, one of the subjects of "Violence
and Metaphysics," the piece on Levinas in Derrida's _Writing and Difference_.
The objections to nonviolence as a concept there - the equation of complete
nonviolence to "complete violence" and/or death, for example - are not
trivial. The strongest reading of Levinas probably still only suggests that
"there is a call" inherent in the condition of sociality.  This places us in
a position of respons-ibility, in the sense that we are open to response, and
from more quarters than we can properly account for. If "there is" justice or
nonviolence it is in our experience of that call - which multiplies into
multiple calls, including the "two calls" of whch we have spoken - as
something to be discharged - in a desire to be *responsible to* others. This
desire can manifest itself as a desire to do no violence, or it can manifest
itself as a desire to do necessary violences in some way (with intent, with
grace, as a result of the best calculations, etc) that suits our values. In
this sense, nonviolence is an option among others as to how one is to respond
to that simplest form of responsibility - a fairly high-level operation,
rather some kind of force-of/at-origin.

> I must remember, remember to remember, nonviolence. The movement
> against the neutrality of metaphysical concepts also constitutes, at the
> same time, an essential violence of anarchy, which is, at the same time,
> its impotence.

Again, it's not at all clear that "the movement against the neutrality of
metaphysical concepts" is in any way "essential" to anarchy. But, then, i'm
not entirely sure what the phrase means anyway. As a diagnosis, "the
impotence of anarchy is its movement against the neutrality of metaphysical
concepts," would require a great deal of elucidation before it could even be
responded to.

> The logics of this essential violence have to be opened up.
> It is urgent.

Then so is some clarity about what is at stake...

> > --- For the warring between the two occurs in this
> dispute in which violence and harm are factors, but this is supposed to
> take a certain back seat. It is to mention this that is to write like a
> woman, well beyond any political strategics.
> Shawn: I wonder how helpful this essentializing reference is - if it does
> not involve its own little(?) violences.
> --- I don't doubt that I am capable of any number of violences, less, I
> claim, than some, owing to the more thematic engagement with nonviolence
> in my work and thought (arrogant as that sounds, I think it's kind of
> true).

I'm not sure what a "thematic engagement" is. I do know that a phrase like
"like a woman, well beyond any political strategics" rings all sorts of
warning bells.

> In any case, I don't understand your comment. The "neutrality" I
> spoke of above was about the "masculinity of the concept", and if you
> like, simply look at the "openness to the worst" in Derrida. Really, what
> could be more masculine? And in this context, what could be more womanly
> than to question this....

This particular deployment of gender simply confuses me, as it's obviously an
appeal to some groups of "essences," but not to any of the critical
essentialisms (strategic or otherwise) with which i'm familiar. Couldn't we
just as easily say, particularly in a conversation that started with
reference to psychoanalysis, that it was precisely "feminine" to be "open"?
Isn't the critique of phallogocentrism built in part on just this sort of

But the question about violence was about the potentially colonizing nature
of wanting to be "dark and womanly." Where does such an essentializing desire
take us?

> But have I? Or have I played along in that regard
> too much? Should I have perhaps said, earlier os that what Derrida means
> by the worst? Well if tha't it, I'll *disrupt the work of Derrida
> itself*". Now, nothing is less "manly" in a certain way. To allow such an
> intrustion! A moment of weakness!

You run the risk of simply not engaging the work of Derrida at this point.

I assume there is also some criticism inherent in this sudden deployment of
gender stereotypes, but without clarification it's just muddying the waters

> Socrates surely would have sent the
> women out of the room!

OK. And this relates to the discussion in what way...?

> When is an introduction of nonviolence not, in a
> certain way, precisely a certrain problem for the procession of things
> long these lines?
> --- And it is to become this woman of nonviolence (as explicit, thematic,
> substantive) that is to disrupt the protocols of structuralism *and*
> anarchism. To move into a post anarchism that has given the *postal
> moment* to thought, perhaps according to what one might call a
> Heideggerian gesture: that the in order to, the for the sake of which, a
> certain because *of the moveof the negation, of a gg past, is given to
> thought and allowed to reveal itself out of concealedness: nonviolence.
> This nonviolence, it should be noted, is a BIG player on the political
> side of anarchism. While there is a mild violence aspect to political
> actions regarding things like the IMF and anti-war protests, which is
> where virtually all anarchists were located ideologically (can a true
> anarchism have an ideology?), the actional modes were essential in the
> direction of nonviolent civil disobedience as tatic, albeit in an
> affirmation of a diversity of tactics.
> Shawn: Anarchism is a position-taking. If i say "i am an anarchist" in a
> way that parallels a statement like "i am just," i can't imagine looking
> anything other than hypocritical and foolish. If i mean, instead,
> something like "i would like to work towards a society where action could
> be better addressed to justice" - well, that seems both a saner approach
> and one more representative of what it has meant historically to be an
> anarchist.
> --- Well, clearly if Derrida does anything, it is to demonstrate and
> disseminate (I guess) the way not to take a position,

Really? "Clearly?" How does this clear demonstration relate, for instance, to
the ongoing discussion of position-taking in Derrida's work, of which the
1971 interviews in _Positions_ might be taken as an important moment?

> and that doing so is
> far from what it is ordinarly taken to be (wimping out), yet, in the end,
> doesn't it lead again to the necessity of "taking a position". I claim
> that there is *more to look at here* and that the *dominance* of the
> Derridean thing keeps the other things closed,

What is the, um, "Derridean thing" keeping closed, exactly, and how?

> and they arehat anarchism
> tends to do the same. New categories need to be opened up and they can not
> be found in these rubrics.
> Shawn: "Nonviolent civil disobedience" is a tradition and a set of
> practices that are "nonviolent" within the terms of its own metaphysics.
> As i mentioned, the movement has attempted to stretch concepts of violence
> and nonviolence in ways that suggest real problems either with that
> metaphysics or our willingness to treat its implications seriously.
> --- I got *no* problems with casting suspisions on nonviolence/violence,
> traditions, etc. However, the casting of the suspision operates out of a
> nonviolence itself, which is just another condition of inescapability.

Nonsense. Seriously. You are stopping (if you're not blazing on through) just
short of attributing all of philosophy to "a nonviolence." If by some stretch
of logic and definitions you could show this to be true, what would it gain

> *This* nonviolence is about as hard to see as Heidegger's Being. No,
> harder. It might be something one might call "ur-nonviolence" or
> Nonviolence (capital N), etc. To be clear: your move to situate and
> relativize nonviolence is not a neutral operation: it's nonneutrality is
> nonviolence (to truth, to other things).

OK. I'm now completely confused about what you imagine the relationship
between neutrality and nonviolence is. At some points, nonneutrality seems to
be a great sin, and at others a great virtue. WTF?

And, again, to attribute the fact that i value truth and logic to some
"nonviolence" simply renders the term almost meaningless. Your ur-nonviolence
will then become the means of justifying every necessary violence. This makes
the "property destruction is nonviolent because it doesn't target people
*directly*" dodge seem both philosophically astute and politically fortunate
(neither of which i believe it to be.)

> --- Yet, at the same time, for those who see it at least the way I am
> seeing it here, there is a terrible limping of action

Honestly, where do you get off talking about a "limping of action," let alone
attributing it to a particular "philosophical error." There's a combination
of self-deprecation and self-righteousness in all of this that is extremely

> in that it remains
> ensconced in a philosophical accomplishment that is too deeply within the
> contours of the traditional western figure and polemos

One of these days, i want to meet "the traditional western figure"...

> : one of neutral or
> free accumulation, tracing into the very structure of metaphysical
> concepts themselves, and of a rebellion ction of negation (archeanarche),
> without the dark-skinned, other- worldly figure of nonviolence being able
> to articulate and develop itself with the same kind of rich development we
> witness for things like anarchism, deconstruction, textual readings,
> psychoanalysis, etc.
> Shawn: You've lost me here. Grand abstract statements pitting "the west"
> against "the dark-skinned, other-worldly figure of nonviolence" seem to me
> fraught with so many theoretical and rhetorical violences...
> --- Violences or abbreviation? Would depend on how good my paper would be,
> could I write it. I don't think they go so far as violences yet. Truly,
> and this is a case for *mis en scene* and opening of *context*: the *truth
> of violence* here...I am sketching out horizons, orienting frameworks (I
> guess you may find them bad or violent, but I'm only pointing, semi-
> poetically, to an idea of "white" and a dominance in western metaphics and
> history by which the "dark" has a certain marginality; I see Gandhi as
> "dark" perhaps in this way, and "left out", not recognized, not "a player"
> in, say, philosophy, when you will find plenty treatments of Hitler, as
> violent of course). A violence as such at this point, I don't think will
> open up very much at least, until I absolutely refuse to see another other
> direction, any mitigation of this particular story. The story, again, is
> simply of an exclusion of both Gandhi and of nonviolence in western
> thought.  Not only that! You see what follows is this strange apology for
> what is "dirty" in my response, *precisely because I see the "violence" of
> the gesture. I think it is an acceptabl: this is an email dialogue, not
> some final pronouncement, a place where impressions can be thrown forward
> even if the must later be mitigated. My own apology and admission simply
> says too much about this, mitigates it too much, to be the violence you
> suggest it is. I will hold that you yourself would allow for som kind of
> text that puts together a "case against western thought vis a vis a
> certain whiteness according to a marginalized darkness, etc." Whethery you
> buy *nonviolence* as a marginalized thing, that is another matter.

It's funny to hear Gandhi spoken of as "not a player" at a time when other
elements in the activist community have taken up arms against "pacifism as a
pathology" because they believe the tradition of nonviolent direct action is
too dominant. Nonviolence is one of the dominant dogmas of anarcho-punk.
Nonviolence is not "marginalized" in Derrida's work - it was, quite early,
rejected as an adequate response to the question of violence. Similarly, i am
personally unconvinced that it is an philosophically adequate response,
despite much useful study of Ghandi, the Quakers, several generations of
nonresistants, etc. On the other hand, as a result of my researches on the
history of anarchism, i'll always grant the importance of organized
nonviolence in the movement. In fact, i'm rather impatiently awaiting a work
on the Universal Peace Union which i expect to provide some key bits of

> The
> "Derridean urgency" (which is presumably his take on "our"/anyone's
> urgency) arises from a nonviolence, no question. We can see (I will
> presume for you as well here) clearly and quickly that the discourse of
> nonviolence can fall prey to a violence itself, and a certain polemos, in
> which the charge of "you yourself are being violent!" may be invoked. This
> is quite interesting. I refer at least to, for example, a Heideggerian
> discipline against such a falling. In one resepct, your charge of my
> rhetorical and theoretical violence is well taken, in another respect, it
> is not. I would claim that a best assessment of the matter would have to
> be a question of the "truth" of the circumstances, with considerations of
> context, setting, the whole *mis en scene*, etc. Aean here, in this odd
> "dirty" way I claim I'm doing.
> --- A certain Gandhian gesture inhabits this perhaps unbidden intrusion,
> if I anticipate accurately: unbidden in that my reaction, taken in a
> decent substantive reading,
> --- Here, the "decent substantive reading": That could mean, from you,
> something like "oh, so you are saying, um, somthing like 'Gandhi as
> hidden, marginalized, you say it's because he's left out of philosphy,
> etc.', I get the idea, I don't know if I buy it but I can see how that can
> be sketched out". Well it's a suggestion. In any case, let me give one
> example of that overall circumstance I pointed to in my articulation: I
> said:
> "philosophical accomplishment that is too deeply within the contours of
> the traditional western figure and polemos: one of neutral or free
> accumulation, tracing intf metaphysical concepts themselves, and of a
> rebellion that plays by the same rules, only in the direction of negation
> (archeanarche), without the dark-skinned, other- worldly figure of
> nonviolence being able to articulate and develop itself with the same kind
> of rich development we witness for things like anarchism, deconstruction,
> textual readings, psychoanalysis, etc."
> --- I'm sorry. But I mean, look at Marx. Was it not a reversal of Hegel?
> Wasn't Hegel a certain procession of positivity in some way, a thought
> perpetually accomulative, albet with the negational moment ofthe
> dialectic? Can't I point to this if Arendt can be cited for noting that "a
> reversal of Hegel is still hegel", isn't "reversal" a kins? Doesn't
> Hegel's program occur out of a definite nonviolence (violence to the
> workers as unacceptable;  workers of the world, unite), don't we see a
> real failure to thematize nonviolence as such in Marxism? Isn't there a
> serious problem of violence associated with Marx in some difficult ways,
> even if we know that Marx was not fully put into practice adequately?
> Doesn't the formof protest in Marxian terms increasinly *take on*
> nonviolence, but wasn't it emergence a bit limping, later, like something
> marginalized? Is it going to far to suggest that the nonviolence of Gandhi
> (historically better developed that most) gets referenced in some
> important ways? Doesn't a certain "neutral or free accumlation"
> (capitalism) trace in some ways right into metaphysical concepts
> themselves? Doesn't Marxist reversal put that conceptuality in a material
> sense, without simply giving up that conceptuality?

This business of reducing philosophies and ideologies to something like
vectors (which end up being the same, apparently, no matter their direction)
just doesn't seem adequate to any of the language games (history, philosophy,
etc) that seem to be in progress here - and as poetry, i can't say that it
speaks to me. The relationships between Hegel's thought and that of Marx, or
between the ideologies and dynamics of capitalism and marxism, are only
matters of "standing things on their heads," "righting" them, or otherwise
reversing them, in the most general terms, and then only in given regards.

> While we see a rich
> developmentde of things", which I allow here a rough and ready (but I hope
> not excessively violent) characterization as a kind of *collection of
> various, kindred movements* (look at web pages, there is nothing wrong
> with such a grouping here), further, an "anarchist trend", likewise
> againsat archical structures reaching far beyond simply government but
> also into conceptuality, philosophy, etc, do we see such a treatment of/in
> nonviolence? And might not nonviolence in a way petition and find a way of
> stepping into more freely opened up theoretical
> inclusion/ontology/metaphysicality, or far better and provisional: might
> it not enjoy a topicality and thematicity that these other themse enjoy?
> And, I am sorry but yes, there is a sequence: an-+ arche, where arche is a
> positivity, an-a negativity.

"There is a sequence: an-+ arche, where arche is a positivity, an-a
negativity." Is the sequence in the word? Is the word, appropriated by
Proudhon (among others), to then encompass the movement? Anarchists have been
talking about the problems inherent in the word and the ideals - plural - for
which it has been made to stand, for over 150 years now (and other prefixes
have certainly been suggested). What makes you imagine this etymological play
matters at all? Why are we talking in the vaguest terms about the history of
nonviolence within anarchism - a subject which has a history more or less
easily researched?

> --- I resect your charge, as hereby so treated in response. I believe it
> is adequate, in this setting, toacterization, even rhetoric, was not
> excessively violent.

This seems like kettle logic. When asked about the "small violence" of
deploying essentialist ethnic and gender types as philosophical tropes, the
retreat is from nonviolence to "no excessive" violence, to the origin of this
violence in nonviolence at any rate.

> Shawn: There is much that might be said about "requirements" presented in
> the name of a spirit. Derrida said some of them in _Specters of Marx_. I
> would only add that your gesture of "requirement" is perhaps in another
> spirit. Think of the piece on "the invitation" that i posted recently
> under another heading.
> --- Here I am too ignorant.

The post is in the archives:, with the header "on
more practical terms" and includes a (badly "chainsawed," thanks to a
formatting change) quote from Derrida on the nature of "invitation."

> Shawn: I write, and calculate, and am not extricated. More than that, i'm
> very conscious of the dilemma and attempt to approach important questions
> with a bit of grace - which doesn't rule out the possibility of siding
> with the more "rapid" of the speeds at times, and being insistent, even a
> pushy bastard at times. As long as i remember i don't have a mandate or
> permission slip i can live with the state of affairs with some sense of
> "accomplishment."
> --- I am pointing to another condition: one of *entrication*. It is not
> "implicated or calclated or nothing".

Then what the sam hell is it? Seriously, it gets frustrating to try to
respond when everytime i use a word with a prefix you add another unexplained
en-word. You don't appear to care nearly as much about the sense of what i'm
writing as whether i'm using on of your prohibited prefixes. You "required"
an answer to your question about the "two calls" and writing - an impertinent
gesture at best, probably. So i answer, and the response is enalphabet soup.

> That nothing, the opening of it,
> that starts off as a "back", a turned back of what is simply not opening,
> is the opening of the "en", the envestment of the self, not into
> calculation, but into the enporiaic, enprimordial, urarchiac, radical and
> proto-radical space, of, *so interestingly*: "Thought" (for heidegger, who
> had to TURN THIS WAY in order to do what he had to do, only to fail to
> grasp what that turns possibility meant ontologically).
> Shawn: This is taken up *all the time* in forums like this, if often in
> terms of the most trivial sort of "anti-elitism." And the issue of
> "reference" is another near-constant, generally in terms of rescuing "real
> activism" from the clutchinad guys and their academic lackeys. Then again,
> the difficulties of reading - perhaps its "impossibility" in a certain
> sense - is one of the key themes of poststructuralism, and informs this
> dynamic of the "two calls."
> --- Ok...perhaps you have some idea where I am, what I am distributed
> into, entricated into vis a vis this dynamic, the envolution I am pointing
> to, opening up.

When you put it that way, i'm pretty sure i don't...

> Shawn: Accumulation of knowledge hardly works in the same way as the
> capital accumulation on which capitalism is based. And what you call
> "reportage" on texts like Newman's (which is damned expensive) work
> against the possibility of "hoarding" or the like. There is also the very
> complicated question of "value" to deal with here. If you reproach me for
> having read, say, Stephen Pearl Andrews' "universological" works in any
> attempt to "accumulate capital," i'm likely to laugh.
> --- In any case I'm not trying to reproach you. It just sounds like it,
> may even be at times identical with it.

I am, but i'm not. But of course you are. And, "in any case," you're not
responding to the objection - simply repeating the initial assertion

> But why I am harping....I am not
> sure. Perhaps if any thing it might be clarified (well I am in fact
> recently developing some threads into what is involved here, I think they
> are good) by the sentence I wrote previous to this one.
> Shawn : If one wants to talk about "anarchism" and "poststructuralism" in
> something other than generalities, with some sort of understanding, there
> are, for better or worse, "canons" to read, and, as always, critical texts
> excluded from them. And contexts to be explored. Etc. You can't do the
> work until you've assembled the tools and learned to use them, gathered
> the raw materials, decided what form you're working toward. Certainly,
> there are instances here where citation is related to something like
> "dependency," but it is also just part of the language games - and very
> useful ones they are - of history, analysis, theory building, critique.
> --- Yeah, I know. There is a level of very broad characterization in what
> i'm doing. I defend that level and how I do it here.  I am sure you are
> right. This level, whatever it is, has a problem and a lot of issues
> associated with it.

>From where i'm sitting, the level looks like it combines a very sloppy
approach to complicated thought with an almost complete lack of attention to
history, combined with a slight fixation on the prefix "en." That's harsh, i
realize, but probably no more than tit for tat for the admitted "arrogance"
of your rhetorical play.

> Everything, indeed, you want to mention about
> generalities, for example, and yet, other stories about how one might
> characterize a certain "lay of the land", "the directions things tend to
> take", the overall character of the toolkits involved, their tendency to
> determin and limit worlds and *set anchors*, set the scene, etc. In these
> various regards, according to my particular history and proclivities,
> tentencies, understanding and journeys, I think I am in fact making a
> good, albeit very difficult move in such a characterization (don't we
> always...) and, further, simply claim mayself to be operating at the very
> pitch of the Derridean urgency. I apologize in prostration for every bit
> of arrogance in this nearly absurd claim, but claim at the same time a
> necessity of making, at times, such a claim. Very difficult, and
> interesting, business.
> --- Oh, look what I said next: "Now. In this urgency that fills every
> second of my mind as I write". I didn't read ahead here. I'm up to
> something that is, at least, consistent and authentic in a certain way...
> --- Perhaps...
> Shawn: As for the "post-postal," it seems premature for us, here in this
> forum, to "move on" when it was largely the question of what the "postal"
> entails that remains in question, motivating my original posts under this
> heading.
> --- I am suggesting something coming from the side, in way, to the
> discourse, the question you propose.  A question to/for postality,
> something that, in my case at least, limps a great deal when it comes to
> an adequate textual basis.

It seems to me that you're treating "postality" here precisely as if there
was no discourse, had been no discourse about it.

> Yet, in the main, I am still quite inclined to
> say that the directions concerning "postality" are fruitful and have some
> relevance here. The whole business, look it's quite interesting, the
> logics, the implicatins, etc., of what "prematurity" can mean here
> regarding any sense of "postal", is very important, and should lead (here
> is the Derridean thinking I am looking for) not just to a story to tell
> about, within and beyond (if appropriate) the text with which you and
> "anarchists" of certain bents are familiar; it must also happen in,
> indeed, a certain Derridean spirit of meditation, in a "this is happening"
> (and not just an "it happens") of, on, within and about the *post*, the
> beyond, the meta, the pronouncement and the difference between it and
> accomplishment, the structure (if you like, for a moment) if the "beyond",
> after, "aftericity", etc. So much to say, and in any case, the moves I
> have indicated, I claim, are *precisely and most appropriately postal* in
> an authentic sense, but, to be clear, one that is at the same time quite
> savvy to the whole businss of what postal means. The step is, if this
> helps clarity, not "revolutionary", in the sense of "the postal", the
> "after" of a revolution, but *envolutionary*, precisely and fully
> (well...) responsive to the whole situation the "essence"  of "progress"
> is about in these general concepts.
> Shawn: This, then, is yet another "postanarchy" that can be situated among
> those already present in the discussion...
> --- I don't know. Must urgently go and do somthing about the patriot
> act...

An opportunistic appeal to "action," as opposed to talk...? If you're too
busy to actually talk about this stuff, then i'll bail out here.


> But if there is a post-postmodernism (as I claim), how would it
> relate to post-anarchy? If anarchy was already postmodernism all along,
> just not inhabiting the right spaces, then post-anarchy could be in the
> position of post-postmodernism. I suggest that post-pomo is: a certain
> opening and realization of nonviolence. Is that the case for post-anarchy?
> I am too ignorant here, but: is there a post-anarchism that emerges out of
> a nonviolence? Why nonviolence? And if there is a "getting postal on
> anarchy" in the form of "enarchy", what does this mean? Look: here is
> something: the *post postal* emerges as a turn on (and some bit of
> against) a *negative operation of beyond*: It is the turn on the an- of
> anarchy, the de- of deconstruction, the meta- of metaphysics, as
> essentially negative operations positing, eSTABLishing, anchoring a thing
> and setting off its closure in some way or other. Post-anarchy would be: a
> turn on postality itself. Anarchy = postarchy, with a hardon.
> Post-anarchy finds itself, "happens" when postality is given to thought
> and nonviolence both as justice. There is no evolution to post-anarchy
> that is not one whose theoretical moment has not crossed the border into a
> becoming-substantive (no DG reference intended), just as a Kuhnian
> metaparadigmaticity eventually becomes *part of the scene, part of
> science*, a situation of formidable complexity and urgent necessities (if
> for no other reason than that complexity allows "the worst" certain ground
> to seize with reduction, regression, etc.). Yet the logics of
> *intercession* as constitutive confronts a history of "revolution" and
> "progress". The pause given, a great shudder thoughout theories,
> movements, worlds, has first articulated itself in neutral terms
> (post-anything), and slowly finds itself as "ur-nonviolence", that is to
> say, in an *inextricable* condition of *nonviolence* that is envolutionary
> and becoming substantive as primordial as being and time. There is no
> ground for this nonviolence.
> best regards,
> Tom


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