File spoon-archives/postanarchism.archive/postanarchism_2003/postanarchism.0307, message 55

Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2003 01:38:11 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: [postanarchism] Always leaving the party early? Part 3 (fwd)

Shawn: Hmmm. I really can't parse this. The "neutrality in question" last
i looked was one you attributed to "deconstruction." Now, i would be happy
to say that this attribution is a false presumption on your part, but i
don't think that's what you mean. The rest of the passage doesn't clarify.
There is apparently more or other than a *claim to (false) neutrality* at
stake - a common charge leveled at certain "rationalisms" - since Derrida
does not claim such a neutrality. To locate this exceptionally "deep"
neutrality in "the very Being of metaphysics" apparently is not an appeal
to something *in Being* - something ontological - because it can be
"broken open." But, then, what is the "Being of metaphysics," beyond the
facts of the history of metaphysics, the rules of its language game?

TMB: The being of metaphysics is being post-physics. While it's langauge
games may have rules, they are in no way reducible either to rule sets or

> Or, we might say: no, there are, *indeed*, neutral operations, just as
> there are neutron bombs,

Shawn: ...and neutered pets, and neurotic lovers... We might say a lot of
things, but things go more smoothly when we actually do or don't say them.
Are you saying that the "are, *indeed*, neutral operations," that either
can or can't be "broken open"? And, honestly, what - besides a kind of
poetic slide - do neutron bombs have to do with the question?

TMB:  "neutral" (or what I call "neutral good") progress in physics can
lead to neutron bombs. Yeah, poetic but it hits off something concerning

> and that is where the danger lies.

Shawn: "The danger"...?

TMB:  A danger of metaphysical concepts: it lies in their essential

> The move against neutral oprations *in their neutrality* is, in a way,
> typically anarchist.

Shawn: How so? "Typically anarchist"...? What constitutes or identifies
this type?

TMB:  Isn't it, though? Is this really going too far? Doesn't anarchism
tend to rebel against views of neutrality in rationality/occidental
rationalism, etc.? Maybe it's a bit general on my part, but is it so
terribly inadmissible? Hasn't there been a a multiple series of rebellions
against rationality, against a sense that rationality proceeds in some
kind of objective (remaining neutral) fashion? I think you're not reading
me quite generously enough. Feyerabend...would that be a kind of anarchist

> The move I make here is not simply enarchist. There is nothing in the
> concept of "enarchy" that is not essentially neutral. I am given to a
> responsibility to a nonviolence I bring up.

Shawn: This "to be given to responsibility" sounds like a sort of response
to the notions of "responsibility" and "the gift"/"is given" in Derrida's
more recent work, but, of course, an important part of what is given, in
Derrida's scheme, is a kind of "violence," a necessity of choice (in the
move from general to limited economy, in inheritance, in that part of
reading that is always already a writing, etc), the poison in the gift. If
neutrality was possible, it would, on this reading, involve
"irresponsibility" - an irresponsibility beyond reproach, perhaps, but

You seem to want to make "nonviolence" somehow originary, but why privilege
this concept - already a product of consciousness, of some form of ethical
thinking, and already a strategy of response (to force, interpreted in terms
of our own, and our perception of other's, interests, as "violence") - over
other moments it so clearly does not precede? Other the natural world, we can
say, "there is force, there are forces, and they are only neutral or
indifferent in that nothing more than the play of their differences directs
them." Of the second nature of consciousness, we can say, "these forces, as
they affect me, are felt, at times, as pressures, urgencies, even violences."
It appears that, at these various levels, "there are forces" and "there are

The question of whether or not *there is,* in some analogous sense, "justice"
or "nonviolence" is, as i'm sure you know, one of the subjects of "Violence
and Metaphysics," the piece on Levinas in Derrida's _Writing and Difference_.
The objections to nonviolence as a concept there - the equation of complete
nonviolence to "complete violence" and/or death, for example - are not
trivial. The strongest reading of Levinas probably still only suggests that
"there is a call" inherent in the condition of sociality.  This places us in
a position of respons-ibility, in the sense that we are open to response, and
from more quarters than we can properly account for. If "there is" justice or
nonviolence it is in our experience of that call - which multiplies into
multiple calls, including the "two calls" of whch we have spoken - as
something to be discharged - in a desire to be *responsible to* others. This
desire can manifest itself as a desire to do no violence, or it can manifest
itself as a desire to do necessary violences in some way (with intent, with
grace, as a result of the best calculations, etc) that suits our values. In
this sense, nonviolence is an option among others as to how one is to respond
to that simplest form of responsibility - a fairly high-level operation,
rather some kind of force-of/at-origin.

TMB: I think the move, and you appear to recapitulate it in reference to
Derrida, to totalized nonviolence misses something, has done with
nonviolence in a certain way by taking it only in its totalized form. I
think you remove nonviolence from a kind of "core self" who we are,
distancing nonviolence as "option". I am saying it is more of a part of
this core self than it is taken to be. The concept of call as such may be
very pertinent here. To do "no violence" is not the same as nonviolence:
it is simply totalized nonviolence. I refer to another nonviolence. I
think it is pre-desire, and in a way prevocational. In the core of the
call, in particular, there is something that is not a vocation, but
irruption. Generally, a degradation tends to happen when this isn't
understood. The condition of nonviolence is that violence/harm can not be
understood as "force": it juts through us, and is part of our
vulnerability. Or hearing the call in this regard is founded on being
irruptable and being in irruption in a certain way. This places things in
a register outside of the conditions of "responsibility"/obligation as
they tend to get laid out and set up in these discourses. This is of
crucial importance. How it stands with *mis en scene* of these matters has
to do with how responsibility happens, or doesn't. Our actions cannot be
reduced to "suiting"; "values" as such are problematic. In regard to the
call of theother, to responsibilty, etc., we face a situation of a
relation to the precious, and to the priceless, that can not be reduced to
the notion of "value". I think there is important critique of the concept
of "value" in Heidegger (in his Nietzsche stuff I think).

TMB: a considerable problem lies in the notion of "desire" in this regard.
No doubt this refers as much as anything to desiring to have a conscience.
A problem obtains regarding desire and responsibilty: the urgent, the
needful, the vulnerable, regardless of how we deal with it (violently,
violently with grace, in a robust nonviolence, a poor or undeveloped
nonviolence, etc.) is separated from desire by an abyss. It does not even
belong in many ways to the register of "desire". When desire rules
responsibility, ethics, sociality, etc, these tend to be dominated by
abstraction, intention, etc., so you get strange situations in which
societies broader and smaller may be very "responsible" yet strangely
violent and irresponsible at the same time. I make reference yet again to
the sanctions placed on Iraq as an especially important example in this
regard. I believe they happened in large part because the sociality and
responsibility that dominated was too vocation/desire based and not
irruption and pre-desire based and that the grounding conditions of
nonviolence/nonharm were not adequately clarified. 

TMB: I think you are somehow working to keep clear a "ground zero" in a
certain way, a site for some simplest form of responsibility. I don't
think that ground is so simple. And the problems of nonviolence run far
deeper than you appear to grasp here. They need to be opened up to get at
why they are such problems. This is really in the thick of things. Putting
violence as "mere option" is not enough at all. Mitigating it with "grace"
is not adequate either. It runs so muh deepr and more fundamentally into

TMB: Your "two calls" are every bit as much a "product of consciouness" as
nonviolence. I would say that nonviolence as such and in certain forms
emerges more originally, closer to "ground zero" than the story of
responsibiltiy you tell here, as well as Levinas. I felt this strongly
when reading (some) Levinas. I think the account is poor, and his failure
to make it to nonviolence is quite of a piece. These accounts, I guess I
am being repetitive here, of responsibility are very, very problematic. 

> I must remember, remember to remember, nonviolence. The movement
> against the neutrality of metaphysical concepts also constitutes, at the
> same time, an essential violence of anarchy, which is, at the same time,
> its impotence.

Shawn: Again, it's not at all clear that "the movement against the
neutrality of metaphysical concepts" is in any way "essential" to anarchy.
But, then, i'm not entirely sure what the phrase means anyway. As a
diagnosis, "the impotence of anarchy is its movement against the
neutrality of metaphysical concepts," would require a great deal of
elucidation before it could even be responded to.

TMB: When anarchy attempts simply to negate, as in negating "archy",
archical structures, hierarchy, government, and in paralle and of a piece,
metaphysical conceptuality, it is violent and this violence fails. The
failure of this violence is a call, practically speaking, but refers us to
fundamental questions concerning the nature of violence and certain
fundamental problems that obtain in it. You keep the usual domesticated
form of violence (with the "grace" thing mitigating it), but don't make
some important steps. Violence fails due to certain impossibilities, not
just because it may "lose a battle". It wins plenty of battles, too. There
are certain things it *can not do*. 

> The logics of this essential violence have to be opened up.
> It is urgent.

Shawn: Then so is some clarity about what is at stake...

TMB: Yeah I am only able to do this well for whatever it is worth.
Literaly. Probably not much from your end. This is a dirty spinning as I
say repeatedly. 

Shawn: I'm not sure what a "thematic engagement" is. I do know that a
phrase like "like a woman, well beyond any political strategics" rings all
sorts of warning bells.

TMB: Ok, fine, warning bells. I'm not meaning to be misogynist or
whatever, just to describe what appears to be the way nonviolence is put

> In any case, I don't understand your comment. The "neutrality" I
> spoke of above was about the "masculinity of the concept", and if you
> like, simply look at the "openness to the worst" in Derrida. Really, what
> could be more masculine? And in this context, what could be more womanly
> than to question this....

Shawn: This particular deployment of gender simply confuses me, as it's
obviously an appeal to some groups of "essences," but not to any of the
critical essentialisms (strategic or otherwise) with which i'm familiar.
Couldn't we just as easily say, particularly in a conversation that
started with reference to psychoanalysis, that it was precisely "feminine"
to be "open"? Isn't the critique of phallogocentrism built in part on just
this sort of approach?

TMB: I guess.

Shawn: But the question about violence was about the potentially
colonizing nature of wanting to be "dark and womanly." Where does such an
essentializing desire take us?

TMB: I don't know how it is/ or what is/ essentializing desire. I do think
that there is some way we can describe a nonviolence as "dark", not
"White", etc. You really going to give me the nth degree for invoking a
notion of "white" and simply using some rough figures to describe a
marginalization? The gender stereotypes I think are good references: The
womanly in Nietzsche in response to a certain masculinity in, say, Kant;
Gandhi's extolling of the virtues of women over men in the context of
nonviolence; Derrida writing of a desire to "write like a woman"; a sense
of invagination of the text, etc. All in all, I am describing a very
general way in which nonviolence is put out of the discourse, aside from
the "real, basic things", in a violent world in which tough (albeit
graceful) decisions must be made. Nonviolence remains handmaiden when the
"violence option" is kept so open. I think right now of a panel discussion
of the problem of violence in the Middle East. The woman on the panel
introduced the problem of violence (as such, indepentent of the issues).
It made so much sense, all were inclined to agree, the audience clapped.
It was so *called* for, then the men *apporpriateed this* in "agreement"
and proceded, in a matter of minutes, to get "back to reality" and reframe
it all backin the terms of certain battles, keeping violence as a
secondary issue, a mere option. But to open the *question of
(non)violence* does more than open an option. Anyone really opening the
question knows this more and more. The consequences of the opening of that
particular question are very radical. I don't think you see this.

> --- Well, clearly if Derrida does anything, it is to demonstrate and
> disseminate (I guess) the way not to take a position,

Shawn: Really? "Clearly?" How does this clear demonstration relate, for
instance, to the ongoing discussion of position-taking in Derrida's work,
of which the 1971 interviews in _Positions_ might be taken as an important

TMB: Well, I don't know! Maybe I am way off there. I didn't think that
derrida simply avoided position-taking. But I do think that there is some
wayin which a lot of his writing appears to me to involve disrupting some
highly positional texts. Maybe I am wrong about that.

Shawn: What is the, um, "Derridean thing" keeping closed, exactly, and

TMB: I think you hit it off somewhere in here, about the scene of basic
responsibiltiy, the two calls, etc. I think he is keeping the mis en scene
of decisions closed, as well as nonviolence, according to some agenda, I

> --- I got *no* problems with casting suspisions on nonviolence/violence,
> traditions, etc. However, the casting of the suspision operates out of a
> nonviolence itself, which is just another condition of inescapability.

Shawn: Nonsense. Seriously. You are stopping (if you're not blazing on
through) just short of attributing all of philosophy to "a nonviolence."
If by some stretch of logic and definitions you could show this to be
true, what would it gain you?

TMB: Nope, not nonsense. In a way, a nonviolence is a gravity within all
philosophy. There is nothing wrong with pointing that out and seening what
that has to do with other things, I think. TO say that "nonviolence is
everywhere" can be like saying that "gravity is everywhere". It is in a
way part of the *gravitas* of the ethical,and yes, it is everywhere, to
some degree. I honestly do not see what is wrong with pointing this out.
Just a a dancer might take an inventory of *weight* ("well, even my pinky
finger has weight, but let's think about weight, in each movement, arm,
leg, torso,swing, movemnet, feel weight, feel lightness"), and this
inventory may inform and enrich, so can it happen with nonviolence. It is
hermeneutic, but it is no simply "product of consciousness". If anything
is an empty concept, it seems to me that that is, since everything we say
here or there or whereever is a "product of consciousness". I think here
your reading is just unfair. 

> *This* nonviolence is about as hard to see as Heidegger's Being. No,
> harder. It might be something one might call "ur-nonviolence" or
> Nonviolence (capital N), etc. To be clear: your move to situate and
> relativize nonviolence is not a neutral operation: it's nonneutrality is
> nonviolence (to truth, to other things).

Shawn: OK. I'm now completely confused about what you imagine the
relationship between neutrality and nonviolence is. At some points,
nonneutrality seems to be a great sin, and at others a great virtue. WTF?

TMB: Pharmakon and responsibiltiy? Pharmakon and gravity? Listen, maybe I
don't use the word "pharmakon" in just the way Derrida does. Maybe he
means some *particualr* pharmakon! Just as I don't use "the gift" as he
does. Maybe he means thisor that particular gift, some reference or other. 

Shawn: And, again, to attribute the fact that i value truth and logic to
some "nonviolence" simply renders the term almost meaningless. Your
ur-nonviolence will then become the means of justifying every necessary
violence. This makes the "property destruction is nonviolent because it
doesn't target people *directly*" dodge seem both philosophically astute
and politically fortunate (neither of which i believe it to be.)

TMB: Your formulation isn't quite clear to me here (what "it" is in the
parenthesis), but I would say that a greater opening of the question of
(non)violence, affirmationg and exploring its conditions
phenomenologically, thoughtfully, etc., would enable clarifying many more
forms of violence for what they are. Just again, to use the dancer
example, as the dancer may variously enrich understandings of "weight",
and yes, it is everywhere, so can the thinker understand multiple forms of
violence and nonviolence, including the play of dangerous illusion that
usually accompanies a more naive sense about violence: i.e., that property
damage is not violence, that forms of violence that aren't "direct" or not
involving physically attacking immediately or oneself, that economic
violence is merely economic, that "sanctions" are merely "diplomatic"
measures that stop short of war as such (even though they probably killed
over a million people in the case of Iraq), etc.And a thinking in
nonviolence does more than multiply understandings of what can be violent,
it does more to open up *why violence dosn't work as well as it tends to
think it does, even when mitigated by 'grace', why it is usually an
attempt coerce and force, why such forcing is less effective in the long
run a great deal of the time,why it tends to force illusions of
cooperation, why opppressive states use it so much, etc.*

TMB: This opening doesn't happen in Derrida. I continue to maintain that,
while his texts are overwhelmingly difficult, he controls and seizues too
many things according to too much of an agenda. Given your
recommendations that I read Derrida better and your references to 150
years of tradition, there is no way one really an get through such
materials in order to finally forward any these along these lines. There
are other, fairly accessible/obvious reasons why such situations of
tradition and literature are terribly overburdening and problematic,
too. In any case, this situation is part of why I am usuing this
difficult, dirty approach, which I think is just a little bit better than
you are granting. In anycase you want to mention, my reading is not good
enough. But you aren't grasping the problem of reading well enough at all,

Shawn: Honestly, where do you get off talking about a "limping of action,"
let alone attributing it to a particular "philosophical error." There's a
combination of self-deprecation and self-righteousness in all of this that
is extremely irritating.

TMB: Well it's not self-deprecation, it's just arrogance, since I don't
find my own actions to be very limping. But in terms of a lot of major
progressive themes in which, on a political end, I see anarchism "taking a
stand" (I man some big causes in the last several years), I see
action/activism as limping. It is not hard, or arrogant, to make this case
here. I'm sorry to irritate you, but I think you aren't seeing generally
enough here. 


Shawn: One of these days, i want to meet "the traditional western


Shawn: It's funny to hear Gandhi spoken of as "not a player" at a time
when other elements in the activist community have taken up arms against
"pacifism as a pathology" because they believe the tradition of nonviolent
direct action is too dominant. Nonviolence is one of the dominant dogmas
of anarcho-punk. Nonviolence is not "marginalized" in Derrida's work - it
was, quite early, rejected as an adequate response to the question of
violence. Similarly, i am personally unconvinced that it is an
philosophically adequate response, despite much useful study of Ghandi,
the Quakers, several generations of nonresistants, etc. On the other hand,
as a result of my researches on the history of anarchism, i'll always
grant the importance of organized nonviolence in the movement. In fact,
i'm rather impatiently awaiting a work on the Universal Peace Union which
i expect to provide some key bits of history.

TMB: "Other elements": does this mean that "anarhism" is an element in
"the activist community"? In any case, my position hereis that the way in
which nonviolence operates, and this includes "pacifism as pathology", is
very bad right now. I say this as an advocate of very serious
nonviolence, civil disobedience, etc. As a "dogma" in anarcho-punk, it is
quite poor and is dogma (and practice) only at a superficial level, I
believe. In the "peace and justice" community it remains scarcely given to
thought. What I say here is as critical of activism as it is of major
thought formations. It is probably just as dirty, and just as muh a
spinning of a Gandhian thread. The history of nonviolence and in
particular the history of the "study of Gandhi" often as not a history of
a failure or even inability to study Gandhi; very few get him, I believe,
and he tends to get terribly corrupted. The level of thought in Gandhi is
much more active than is granted. It is so fundamentally problematic an
issue that in the end, or the beginning, nonviolence can't really happen
in the usual registers of "thouht" or "action" as such: it must happen in
a hybrid condition, which I call "thoughtaction" but which Gandhi referred
to as "satyagraha"; the term was coined for a reason and the very fact
that they could do so is evidence for the degree of freedom they had. Very
few now are even remotely capable of achieving some aspects of this kind
of thought or thoughtaction.I know how arrogant that sounds. In any case,
the "rejection of nonviolence as an option" in Derrida is very far from
what it means to raise the question of it better;  in this regard, I hold
that it may be that the quetion of nonviolence wasn't really raised in/for
Derrida, and remained as hidden as the question of Being pre-Heidegger.

Shawn: This business of reducing philosophies and ideologies to something
like vectors (which end up being the same, apparently, no matter their
direction) just doesn't seem adequate to any of the language games
(history, philosophy, etc) that seem to be in progress here - and as
poetry, i can't say that it speaks to me. The relationships between
Hegel's thought and that of Marx, or between the ideologies and dynamics
of capitalism and marxism, are only matters of "standing things on their
heads," "righting" them, or otherwise reversing them, in the most general
terms, and then only in given regards.

TMB: I was only making room for the simple admissiblity of making a point
in that direction not for totalizing things that way. I am not tryin to
reduce philosophies and ideologies to vectors.

Shawn: "There is a sequence: an-+ arche, where arche is a positivity, an-a
negativity." Is the sequence in the word? Is the word, appropriated by
Proudhon (among others), to then encompass the movement? Anarchists have
been talking about the problems inherent in the word and the ideals -
plural - for which it has been made to stand, for over 150 years now (and
other prefixes have certainly been suggested). What makes you imagine this
etymological play matters at all? Why are we talking in the vaguest terms
about the history of nonviolence within anarchism - a subject which has a
history more or less easily researched?

TMB: Yea it's in the word. The word colors the world. It forms "the
movement", it has a powerful cache and inherent conceptual operation. It
speaks volumes. It matters a great deal. People, many who read very
little, are drawn to anarchism. As a concept and heading for "a movement",
an "ism" (indeed), people experience something in *the very idea*. It is
possible to talk about that idea somewhat freely, without having to (or
perhaps even being able) to always do a big research project or come into
line with certain rules for compliance to the cannon. This is no mere
matter of practicallity only. It has serious theoretial consequences. I
believe I address these in a certain appeal to "think", which I think I
issued to you in previous posts(s): it is a weird thing, but it is an
invitation, to spin threads without quite paying one's taxes...I suggest
only that there is more to this gesture than a cheapening...

> --- I resect your charge, as hereby so treated in response. I believe it
> is adequate, in this setting, toacterization, even rhetoric, was not
> excessively violent.

Shawn: This seems like kettle logic. When asked about the "small violence"
of deploying essentialist ethnic and gender types as philosophical tropes,
the retreat is from nonviolence to "no excessive" violence, to the origin
of this violence in nonviolence at any rate.


Shawn: Then what the sam hell is it? Seriously, it gets frustrating to try
to respond when everytime i use a word with a prefix you add another
unexplained en-word. You don't appear to care nearly as much about the
sense of what i'm writing as whether i'm using on of your prohibited
prefixes. You "required" an answer to your question about the "two calls"
and writing - an impertinent gesture at best, probably. So i answer, and
the response is enalphabet soup.

TMB: I am not meaning to arbitrarily demand some compliance to some terms
I demand use of. I can only as you to think for youself what *entrication*
might mean, as opposed to extrication. Thought in terms of the two calls,
the space of entrication would mean going into more than the scene of
responsibilitiy as being a matter of two scenes, it would mean more than
making decisions, more than "being responsible". Extrication means pulling
out of a situation, right? Before thereis extrication, there is some kind
of being implicated or involved in something. Entrication, however, is a
kind of movement into involvement, but from a position that is not simply
"caught in circumstancjes" nor pulled out of them. The "en" of it happens
in that way, and I stillcan't put its operation into words well. But I
mean to say we have a responsibilty to put ourselves into more than scenes
of social responsiblity and into the work of how we manage, arrange,
choreograph,take responsibility for the broader settings of those scenes.A
very useful example is of prisons and prison design. The famous Stanley
Milgram experiment should that students could turn into very violent
people in roles of guards in some settings of their prison experiment. A
responsibility for design happens there that *exceeds the situation of
simple decision and responsibility* for the students in the experiments.
No Derridean activation of responsibiltiy and decision can handle this
well enough. THey "guard student" has a responsibility to entricate
himself *into* the overall setting: why is this designed like this? how do
my options and choices operate as a function of overall setting, how can I
open the *mis en scene* of this all? How is this dreadful violence relatd
to this? How is this "justice", how are prisons "just"? Why are prisons
such able instruments of violent states? How can we *entricate* ourselves
in new ways beyond the usual roles we are to take: "make the right
decision and stay out of jail, makethe wrong decision and go to jail", or,
being a judge, "enter the madeness of the moment of decision and sentence
people to jail more authentially and less calcualtively"...In the last
case, I am saying that the whole prison things calls for a much more
fundamental treatment of questions of violence and justice, that a more
nonviolent justice is needful, that it depends on philosophically opening
the question of violence, with a decided *nonviolence agenda*, that it
must lead to developing concepts like *mis en scene* and
*entrication*,where we put and invest ourselves, etc. much more. 


Shawn: > From where i'm sitting, the level looks like it combines a very

TMB: dirty...

Shawn: approach to complicated thought with an almost complete lack of
attention to history, combined with a slight fixation on the prefix "en."
That's harsh, i realize, but probably no more than tit for tat for the
admitted "arrogance" of your rhetorical play.

TMB: I'm not paying the taxes... It's no simple fixation and if there are
fixations they are clearly multiple...


Shawn: It seems to me that you're treating "postality" here precisely as
if there was no discourse, had been no discourse about it.

TMB: Why not just think postality, why always reference discourses so
much? I'm really wondering about this, about the archives, about having to
read so many things. I realize this looks pretty irresponsible, but I
think there is also something irresponsile in *not* dealing with this
problem of the sheer burden of there being so many texts, how to read them
well enough, how to participate in an increasingly rarified and referenced
cannon, a massive "tradition",etc. I see something horribly constraining
in this overall approach. I don't mean some simple shucking of

> --- I don't know. Must urgently go and do somthing about the patriot
> act...

Shawn: An opportunistic appeal to "action," as opposed to talk...? If
you're too busy to actually talk about this stuff, then i'll bail out


TMB: This last comment is really unfair. I mean I wrote a bunch of stuff
and literally had to get going to a panel discussion held in my area. I
was only playing on this and referring to the patriot act for pretty
obvious reasons, as legislation that really gives some dangerous powers to
the government, and was making a pretty transparent (I think) reference to
that as, in some way, a condition of urgency in some way. If I had looked
at your entire response and wrote back that onoe line only, I think that
would suggest such an opportunism here. Here I think there is something a
bit messed up. Not sure. I think you're not being generous enough.

TMB: Further, as regards so many generalities and bad readings, I think in
a way I'm trying to figure out just that: *how to read badly*, among other



This part I think is kinda good:

> But if there is a post-postmodernism (as I claim), how would it
> relate to post-anarchy? If anarchy was already postmodernism all along,
> just not inhabiting the right spaces, then post-anarchy could be in the
> position of post-postmodernism. I suggest that post-pomo is: a certain
> opening and realization of nonviolence. Is that the case for post-anarchy?
> I am too ignorant here, but: is there a post-anarchism that emerges out of
> a nonviolence? Why nonviolence? And if there is a "getting postal on
> anarchy" in the form of "enarchy", what does this mean? Look: here is
> something: the *post postal* emerges as a turn on (and some bit of
> against) a *negative operation of beyond*: It is the turn on the an- of
> anarchy, the de- of deconstruction, the meta- of metaphysics, as
> essentially negative operations positing, eSTABLishing, anchoring a thing
> and setting off its closure in some way or other. Post-anarchy would be: a
> turn on postality itself. Anarchy = postarchy, with a hardon.
> Post-anarchy finds itself, "happens" when postality is given to thought
> and nonviolence both as justice. There is no evolution to post-anarchy
> that is not one whose theoretical moment has not crossed the border into a
> becoming-substantive (no DG reference intended), just as a Kuhnian
> metaparadigmaticity eventually becomes *part of the scene, part of
> science*, a situation of formidable complexity and urgent necessities (if
> for no other reason than that complexity allows "the worst" certain ground
> to seize with reduction, regression, etc.). Yet the logics of
> *intercession* as constitutive confronts a history of "revolution" and
> "progress". The pause given, a great shudder thoughout theories,
> movements, worlds, has first articulated itself in neutral terms
> (post-anything), and slowly finds itself as "ur-nonviolence", that is to
> say, in an *inextricable* condition of *nonviolence* that is envolutionary
> and becoming substantive as primordial as being and time. There is no
> ground for this nonviolence.
> best regards,
> Tom


Driftline Main Page


Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005