Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 09:39:09 -0800 (PST) From: "J.M. Adams" <ringfingers-AT-yahoo.com> Subject: [postanarchism] Reinsborough: "Resistance to Information Warfare" (2) In the early 1990s the government of Mexico was pushing a variety of neoliberal economic policies in the Chiapas region such as the elimination of ejido collective land, the implementation of NAFTA, and poor prices for campesino agriculture relative to corporate agribusiness. All of these factored in the eventual rebellion of tribal Chiapas, numbering among the demands to the Mexican government. 2.3 as seen from the United States The network of alliances from which the EZLN emerged communicates in over 60 languages . This gives some idea of how much the form of organization is what many United States theorists of information warfare would call a network. Back in the United States, the "netwar" concept that had been articulated by Ronfeldt and Arquilla suddenly became a big topic, Ronfeldt's work became a flurry of discussion on the Internet in mid-March when Pacific News Service correspondent Joel Simon wrote an article about Ronfeldt's opinions on the influence of netwars on the political situation in Mexico. According to Simon, Ronfeldt holds that the work of social activists on the Internet has had a large influence -- helping to coordinate the large demonstrations in Mexico City in support of the Zapatistas and the proliferation of EZLN communiqu_s across the world via computer networks. After the Zapatista uprising, the military’s concept of netwar was brought to the public as one way to explain and interpret what might be happening. The supposedly subdued left at that time in United States politics were actually very active. According to Ronfeldt, some of the heaviest users of the new communications networks and technologies are progressive, center-left, and social activists... [which work on] human rights, peace, environmental, consumer, labor, immigration, racial and gender-based issues. The revolution in ICTs has made it possible for more disparate and smaller actors to build networks of information and communication through which collective action in disparate locations can be initiated. The role of people like Ronfeldt is to locate the possible lines of these changes, put intellectual labels on them, and help focus the government response, a response organized by the knowledge constructed in this process. 2.4 reaction Government responses to grassroots democracy movements have traditionally been quite negative. In the 1970s Samuel Huntington, an academic at the Harvard University Political Science Department, wrote about an "excess of democracy" in a report commissioned for the Trilateral Commission regarding the grassroots upsurge of the late 1960s and early 1970s, suggesting that journalism and other means that information are distributed might be limited. Basically writing in reaction to the mobilization of people normally isolated from the political process in the 1960s, Huntington argued in 1975 that " some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy... Needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation of democracy." Journalists might be trained to better moderate this excess. Means of free communication could be moderated. A recent example of this is the 1993-4 proposed introduction of the "clipper chip, " a piece of silicon technology, which enabled the U.S. government to see all encrypted messages on the internet. An emphasis on monitoring internet traffic has been justified to some extent by emphasizing the supposed presence of paedophiles (more widely thought to be acceptable targets of scrutiny) on the internet. However internet privacy activists continue to confront attempts at greater surveillance of cyberspace. Other responses to these movements in the United States include the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s notorious COINTEL program targeting civil rights, women’s, environmental and indigenous activists with misinformation, surveillance, disruption, and in several instances assassination. The most recent widely recognized example of this is the bombing of Judi Bari and Daryl Cherney during the 1980s in a Northern California conflict about the lumber economy. These two environmental activists (with memberships in both Earth First! and the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)) helped build crucial links between the environmental movement and the labour movement that later proved an important part of challenging the 1998 attempted conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington. The use of extra-legal military action or support of paramilitary action by the state is generally situated along the potential fault lines of a neoliberal economic agenda. The response that Ronfeldt suggests is not simply "moderation" of the opponent but to enter into "netwar" with the opponent. To fight this, Ronfeldt maintains that the lesson is clear: "institutions can be defeated by networks, and it may take networks to counter networks." He argues that if the U.S. government and/or military is to fight this ideological war properly with the intent of winning -- and he does specifically mention ideology -- it must completely reorganize itself, scrapping hierarchical organization for a more autonomous and decentralized system: a network. In this way, he states, "we expect that... netwar may be uniquely suited to fighting non-state actors." To see how quickly the distance between studying/writing about information-conflict (or what the U.S. warfare theorists call "netwar") and participating (either knowingly or naively) one might examine the document posted openly at spunk.org and entitled "Cyberspace and Ungovernability" in which Harry Cleaver, one of the early cyber activists spreading word about the uprising in Chiapas, describes attempts by Ronfeldt (presumably deceitful but also possibly naïve on his part) to engage with him intellectually in the study of the "netwar" phenomenon. This web-posting, originally an email, is a clear example of the kind of relation building and information sharing within a plane of common interests that characterize grassroots organizing. Cleaver notes for the people to whom he is communicating that information gatherers allied with the military and neoliberal economic regime have begun to collect (and distribute) information on them. He then makes suggestions for the most useful ways to collect and analyse information on the information gatherers. It demonstrates the engaged character of analysis within political action networks. I will return to the specifics of Cleaver’s response in the following section where I argue for distinguishing between "netwar" and what grassroots movements do, but in the meantime, the warning for academics is to note that in an information conflict our work is always situated within the field of conflict. We are located, situated, and we must choose not so much our "side" (which would be a very narrow way to think about conflict) as our relationship to the network of interactions, a dynamic network of numerous actors, positions, and possibilities. An academic builds knowledge and is therefore always a player within the information game. 3.0 an argument for distinguishing information conflict practices from information warfare But what has "netwar" to do with warfare. Is it really an aspect of warfare and if so from who’s eyes is it warfare? Is "netwar" really warfare, or is this nomenclature an appropriation of the realm of political discourse by the military by labeling it a "security" issue? Conflicts that might be resolved within the remit of civil society become the territory of military organizations legitimized as agents of the state. More generally the term "information warfare" has been defined in so many ways as to make it almost meaningless, internet fraud, bombing a military com-centre, and telling your neighbour about what’s happening in Mexico, have all been described as information warfare. From a sociological perspective the characterisation by metaphor of particular activities as warfare is an important gesture. The relationship of the social actor to the activities characterized as such can potentially take on new dimensions. The attached label of "warfare" glamorises the activity and distorts our perspective. There may also be other associated transfer of characteristics of "warfare" to the activity. If "warfare" is traditionally considered to be more the role of men than of women will the activity then begin to generate a similar gender skew in its participants? If the discourse of "warfare" explains itself only in the field of power, leaving no acknowledgement of a role for diplomacy , negotiation, ordinary sentiment, or the role of the body , then will the activity described as "warfare" take on some of these characteristics as well? The functioning of grassroots networks depends heavily upon cooperation, negotiation, focus upon common interests that parties share, and multiple relational interactions that are not so much defined as relational. The role of women in grassroots networks is crucial. Often they are a large percentage of the labour (too often in the form of "invisible work") that sustains these networks. These networks might be seriously compromised by a "militarization" or "masculinization" of thinking, depriving them of some of the fluid character that enables grassroots organizing to be successful. The negation of enemies suggested in the discourse of "warfare" is not precisely the role of a grassroots movement or network. In particular caution can be taken regarding how grassroots networks generate or disable confrontation. Harry Cleaver regarding enemies makes these comments: We, or at least some of us, should keep a careful eye on the activities and discussions of our enemies: HOW they are monitoring us, WHO is monitoring us, what they are SAYING about what we are doing, what COUNTERMEASURES they are taking against what we are doing. We need to do these things because even if we do not want to view them as "enemies" many of them DO view us as enemies and are proceeding accordingly. Counterinsurgency professionals do this for a living and they believe in it. The slippery and multiple use of the word enemy here demonstrates a resistance to enmity as a mode of social relationship imposed by capitalist relations. As far as those who are acting as intelligence providers for institutions like the World Bank but do not think of themselves as our enemies, perhaps even feel they are on our side, well, we can certainly deal with them individually as well-intentioned persons, but it is still important to recognize and watch how the institutions they are trying to influence actually behaves in the light of the information it is provided. The Bank in particular has demonstrated a certain capacity for neutralizing some of its opponents by internalizing them, i.e., giving them jobs as professional curmudgeons within the Bank. We need to watch these things to understand what threatens us and how best to deal with it. It is an important task to distinguish between information warfare (within the mode of resolving conflict by violence) and information conflict practices which are outside the mode of resolving conflict through violence. Transforming the mode of conflict to a medium in which one’s opponent has a clear monopoly upon makes very little strategic sense. The encroachment of the martial imagination into the realm of civil political society (although not always new) is undesirable for grassroots organization. Martial thinking tends to analyse differences in power at the ultimate unit: violence and thus forecloses possibilities like trust or negotiation within conflict or as a form of resolving conflict. The mode in which conflict is resolved often determines the outcome. It is common for grassroots activists to be sceptical that a solution generated by use of violence will provide the basis for peaceful community. 3.2 alternative approach – bottom up information warfare Distancing oneself from the idea of information "warfare" in favour of a more general concept of information conflict has not always been the approach of all counter-hegemonic activists. However, almost all of these people have in some way looked at information conflict differently or called into question the basic principles that are set up by the establishment. One author calls for "bottom up information warfare," and the " negation of dominant corporate-state/military-intelligence IW theory," which should be based on a close examination of the sources of these dominant conceptions, the content and main conclusions, the underlying assumptions and myths, and the context from which IW theory was produced. Primary sources for dominant IW theory/praxis are U.S. academicians, scholars, and analysts from places like the RAND Corporation, the National Defence University, the U.S. Air Force, other branches of the military, public and private universities, and `independent` think-tanks. Many anarchist versions of info-war are influenced by the 1970s writings of Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari who posit the "nomadic war machine" as a primordial form of resistance to hegemonic power. Other notable resistance theorists are Peter Lamborn Wilson and Hakim Bey whose concept of a Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) has been taken up widely. Even the term network has been challenged for its cultural basis outside of the networks which (in the example below) Harry Cleaver is writing about, Indeed, one term often used by the participants in preference to "networks" --whose term "net" evokes being caught-- is "hammock," the name of a widely used, suspended sleeping device made from loosely woven string that reforms itself according to the needs (i.e., body shapes) of each user. These networks, which have been developed to interlink peasant and indigenous communities, not only connect villages in the countryside but also reach into the cities where neighbourhoods created by rural-urban migrants retain close relations with their rural points of origin. A.C. Hobbs' book, Locks and Safes: The Construction of Locks, published in 1853, might offer (by negation) a clue about where the resistant "theory" exists: A commercial, and in some respects a social doubt has been started within the last year or two, whether or not it is right to discuss so openly the security or insecurity of locks. Many well-meaning persons suppose that the discussion respecting the means for baffling the supposed safety of locks offers a premium for dishonesty, by showing others how to be dishonest. This is a fallacy. Rogues are very keen in their profession, and know already much more than we can teach them respecting their several kinds of roguery. Rogues knew a good deal about lock-picking long before locksmiths discussed it among themselves, as they have lately done. If a lock, let it have been made in whatever country, or by whatever maker, is not so inviolable as it has hitherto been deemed to be, surely it is to the interest of honest persons to know this fact, because the dishonest are tolerably certain to apply the knowledge practically; and the spread of the knowledge is necessary to give fair play to those who might suffer by ignorance. It cannot be too earnestly urged that an acquaintance with real facts will, in the end, be better for all parties. This nineteenth century locksmith demonstrates why hegemonic powers like the United States military and their associated think tanks are quite interested to talk about how information warfare might work to unlock the secrets of their reign of neoliberal authority. The counter hegemonic power in this story is the rogue, who if she discovers a trick, is hardly going to publicize it. 4.0 conclusions Neoliberal economic policies (being broadly pushed by institutions like the World Trade Organization at the global level or the U.S. and Mexican governments at a more regional and national level) create the conditions for developing networks of resistance to grow and to cooperate, in a decentralized and effective manner. The Zapitista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), although a particularly graphic example of this process, is by no means unique, as evidenced by the diverse solidarity from other social groups who find themselves in a sympathetic situation. The defence intelligencia of the US military establishment are attempting to describe these modes of conflict as a new form of warfare and hence arguing to extend the logic of martial encounter into the civil and political realm. Grassroots resistance to this type of encroachment includes a sociological caution about fetishizing martial exchange. For this reason I have made a careful argument for being able to distinguish between information conflict practices and the more specific subset of these, information warfare, which takes organized violence as its primary unit of analysis. 5.0 bibliographies Arquilla, John and David F. Ronfeldt "Cyber War Is Coming" in Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, p141-165 (1993) Arquilla, John and David F. Ronfeldt. "Cyberwar and Netwar: New Modes, Old Concepts, of Conflict" at RAND. Campen, Dearth & Goodden (eds) Cyberwar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age. AFCEA International Press: Fairfax, Virginia (1996) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) Number 3210.01, dated 02 January 1996 Cleaver, Harry "The Chiapas Uprising and the Future of Class Struggle in the New World Order" (February, 1994) at gopher://mundo.eco.utexas.edu/00/hmcleaver Cleaver, Harry, "Cyberspace and ‘Ungovernability’" at http://www.spunk.org/texts/comms/sp001000.html Grey, Chris Hables, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. Routledge: London (1997) Ignatieff, Michael Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond. Chatto & Windus: London (2000) Jessop, Bob. "Cyberwar" Unpublished Lecture Notes (2003) Jessop, Bob. The Future of the Capitalist State Blackwell: Oxford, Malden (2002) Kingsnorth, Paul. One No, Many Yeses: A Journey to the Heart of the Global Resistance Movement. Simon & Schuster: London & Sydney De Landa, Manuel. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. Zone Books: Cambridge and London (1991) Libicki, Martin May, Todd. The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park (1994) Morton, Adam. "La Resurrección del Maíz": Some Aspects of Globalisation, Resistance and the Zapatista Question http://www.isanet.org/archive/morton.html Ronfeldt, David F. & John Arquilla, Graham Fuller, Melissa Fuller The Zapatista "Social Netwar" in Mexico, RAND publications (1998) Scarry, Elaine. Chapter 3: "War" in The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1987) Schwartau Winn, Information Warfare, Chaos on the electronic superhighway, (Thunder’s mounth press 1994) http://www.infowar.com/freednlds/Chaos_IW1.zip Toffler, Heidi & Alvin, Third Wave Bantam Books (1991) Tzu, Sun The Art of War Wehling, Jason "Netwars and Activists Power on the Internet" http://www.spunk.org/library/comms/sp001518/Netwars.html ===="Being at one is god-like and good, but human, too human, the mania Which insists there is only the One, one country, one truth and one way." - Friedrich Hölderlin, 1799 __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Finance Tax Center - File online. File on time. http://taxes.yahoo.com/filing.html
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