File spoon-archives/postanarchism.archive/postanarchism_2004/postanarchism.0407, message 41


Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2004 01:18:29 -0700 (PDT)
From: "J.M. Adams" <ringfingers-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: [postanarchism] Koch: "Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First Poststructuralist?"


Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First
Poststructuralist? 

[Anarchist Studies, October 1997, Volume 5, Number 2,
UK] 


by ANDREW M. KOCH 


Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice

College of Arts and Sciences

Appalachian State University

Boone, NC 28608, USA 

 



ABSTRACT: Most political philosophers have argued that
Stirner‘s concerns are compatible with those put
forward by Hegel and by those influenced by Hegel.
However, there is good reason for disputing this view,
and for understanding Stirner as an original thinker‘
whose ideas in some ways anticipated the concerns of
contemporary post-structuralists. 

 



In 1845 Max Stirner published The Ego and His Own. The
work, as a whole, can best be portrayed as a
individualistic challenge to the legitimacy of the
state. This work stands in stark contrast to other
treatises on anarchism in the late nineteenth century.
While the works of Kropotkin, Godwin, Proudhon, and
others sought to create a philosophy basis for an
anarchist Position that retained the notion of
community, Stirner‘s work defended an anarchist
position based solely on the individual. Stirner
argued that the individual ego is the measure of the
world, which has led Stirner to be criticized by
Hegelians, Marxists, and other anarchist writers.

Stirner is most often discussed as part of the
Hegelian tradition. Hegel‘s writings on philosophy,
politics, and community had a profound impact on
nineteenth and twentieth century political thought,
particularly as the Hegelian tradition was interpreted
by Karl Marx. Stirner‘s connection to this tradition
is problematic, however, given his distrust of
community. Nevertheless, Lawrence S. Stepelvich,
echoing similar claims of David McLellan, argues that
Stirner can be seen as a disciple of Hegel and perhaps
even the ‘last Hegelian.“ Other scholars have
supported this view. Fredrich Engels and Karl Löwith
treated Stirner‘s work as the culmination of the
Hegelian conception of absolute spirit, although Karl
Marx and Sidney Hook saw Stirner as a dangerous
apologist for the failing bourgeoisie.2

The link between Stirner and the Hegelian tradition is
an uncomfortable one. 

It is largely explained, I believe, by Stirner‘s
attraction to some of the ideas of Hegel while a
student in Berlin. In addition, Stirner spent a period
of his life socializing with the group known as the
Young Hegelians. Yet, as Stepelvich recognized,
Stirner does not employ any of the Hegelian concepts
in his work. There are 110 references to the
dialectic, no use of the Hegelian triad, and there is
none of Hegel‘s technical language. Further, The Ego
and His Own can easily be interpreted as an attack on
Hegel. Stepelvich explains his, and others‘ continued
interpretation of Stirner as a Hegelian by employing
Hegelian technique; Stepelvich argues that as the last
Hegelian Stirner completes the dialectical process by
appearing as an anti-Hegelian.

This essay will argue that attempts to understand
Stirner within the structural confines of a Hegelian
ontology cause a serious misreading of Stirner’s work.
While Stirner‘s discussion of the state and the
political order does contain assumptions regarding
human nature that arc essentially individualist in
nature, and might be seen as the culmination of spirit
coming to self realization ~ ‘ego,‘ (an interpretation
that can loosely be called Hegelian) there is
something fundamentally different in Stirner‘s
approach that sets him off from others in the Hegelian
tradition. Stirner‘s criticism of the political
domination of the state does not primarily have its
origins in a discussion of human nature, and the heavy
ontological language of the Hegelian system. The means
by which he attacked the state are primarily
epistemological in character. He is far more
interested in the way state power gains legitimacy
within a system of power/knowledge than he is in
challenging the Hegelian conception of the state as
‘objective spirit.‘

To Stirner, the modern state legitimates itself
through creating disillusion of fixed and essential
ideas, and by convincing the population that it has
‘discovered‘ immutable truth. Only by understanding
Stirner‘s attack 011 what he called the fixed idea‘
will his Position make any sense. In short, rather
than being the ‘last Hegelian‘ Stirner might just as
easily be said to be the ‘first poststructuralist,‘ in
offering the first modern epistemological critique of
the way in which state power is legitimated through
the nexus of power/knowledge contained within the
dominant culture.

After summarizing Stirner‘s claims about the
illegitimacy of state power this paper will explore
the epistemological basis of this claim. Specifically.
Stirner‘s attack on the ‘fixed idée‘ will be discussed
with reference to some of the concepts used by
contemporary poststructuralist writers. The
poststructuralists assert that in any culture power
legitimates itself through its connection to the
validating mechanism for truth claims. This position
effectively negates all transcendental truth claims by
the state as well as calling into question the
sanctity of collective decision-making. Stirner shares
this point of view, and the parallels will be
elaborated in the discussion. 



1. INDIVIDUALISM, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN STATE 



For Max Stirner the state is an enemy.3 In the state
individuals must sacrifice their labour, body, and
freedom to a collective called the state (pp.
111-116). The government needs money so It takes
property and labour (pp. 100, 115). It subordinates
human beings to its will and crushes them if they
resist. The state is, therefore, the enemy of all
human beings.

Stirner claimed that this is the case even with the
development of modern institutions and the emergence
of democratic political practice. Thus when Stirner
spoke of the liberal political tradition, he spoke
with nothing but disdain. The liberal revolutions of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not free
the individual from the state but made the individual
subservient to the state. Citizenship is the value
promoted in the state. The liberal revolutions created
the idea of the citizen and then subjected the people
to It (p. 111). In what can be read as an attack on
the organic description of the state presented by
Hegel, Stirner argued that social liberalism‘ seeks to
generate the idea that the state has a body. not the
individual (p. 128). That body must be nurtured with
all doing their part to support it. What Stirner
called ‘humane liberalism‘ (more in the tradition of
Kant) sought to obliterate the concept of self and
replace it with a generalised concept, Man,‘ to which
all would owe their allegiance in the modern state
(p.l28).

Both of these forms of liberalism create the dream of
freedom, but the promise cannot be fulfilled. In fact,
this freedom is not real, it lives in the realm of
dreams (p.157). The real is what Stirner called
‘ownness.‘ Ownness is personal and internal. It is not
linked to the authority of the state. ‘1 am my own
only when 1 am master of myself, instead of being
mastered either by sensuality or by anything else
(God. man, authority, law, State, Church> (p.169).‘

Ownness cannot be achieved within the two modern
political traditions (socialism and liberalism). They
reject the idea that the individual is unique. For
Stirner the unique character of each human being is
undeniable and critically important. This conclusion
stern from a resolute ontological position. Stirner
means the ‘individual‘ in the strictest sense of the
word. Only the individual lias real being. Only
organisms think, feel pain. breath, live and
procreate. Each is, therefore, a repository of unique
experience and ideas. To subordinate this uniqueness
to any concept of state, collective union. or society
that would negate this ontological reality would be an
affront to reason.

Even to say ~one‘ is unique because one is part of a
unique group is to return to the safety of the herd
and in sacrifice ontological independence (p.138).
Stirner puts it very directly. Doubtless 1 have
similarity with others, yet that holds good only for
comparison or reflection: in fact 1 am incomparable,
unique. My flesh is not their flesh, my mind is not
their mind‘ (p.l 38). Any structure of authority
resting on a concept that seeks to make the individual
subordinate to a concept or idea beyond this principle
is the enemy.

Liberals do not see man, but only the concept ‘Man‘
(p.173). They do not allow room for individuals. The
individual man is refused, only the general human
being is revered (p.2O5). The true individual must
desecrate all that the state demands (p.l 84). Aware
that the state has power‘ Stirner comments, ‘It would
be foolish to assert that there is no power above
mine. Only the attitude that 1 take toward it will be
quite another than that of the religious age: 1 shall
be the enemy of every higher power (p.l84).

The current system of morality that informs state
practices is groundless. The danger for the individual
within this social, political‘ legal, and philosophic
construction cannot lx overstated. Once any authority
has the power to determine the ideal to which life
should be oriented the individual is in danger. Ideals
get fixed within the laws, code, and practices of the
state. Then... ‘the butchery goes on herein the name
of the law, of the sovereign people. of God, etc!‘
(p.2O5).

Thus, it is impossible to separate Stirner‘s rejection
of the state‘s authority from his comments about what
he calls the fixed idea.‘ The fixed idea is the basis
of modern morality and legality (p.43). Applied in the
law, the construction of fixed ideas creates the basis
for creating the label ‘criminal behaviour‘ by which
the state can justify its existence (p.238).

Criticise the fixed idea and you will have to deal
with a violent and dangerous public that lives by the
herd instinct. ‘Touch the fixed idea of such a fool,
and you will at once have to guard your back against
the lunatic‘s stealthy malice... Every day now lays
bare the cowardice and vindictiveness of these
maniacs, and the stupid populace hurrahs for their
crazy measures.‘ {p.43).

Stirner’s criticism of the state was unwavering. He
denied the concept of authority because he denies that
the state can have any firm footing ca which tu pass
judgement. It creates the illusion he called the fixed
idea, hut Stirner denies that the fixed idea is
anything but a fraud. The state generates power and
illusion. It is, in reality, not constructed on the
firrn foundation of truth that it pretends.

What is unique about Stirner‘s work is that it does
not conform to the normal strategy employed by the
other anarchist writers of the period. Most anarchist
writers of this period began with a construction of
human nature and then proceeded deductively. While
there is some disagreement over how benign these
authors saw the human character,4 generally human
nature was presented in such a way that the state
could lx seen as unnecessary, irrelevant, and
inclusive. (This positive characterisation of human
nature is also perceived to lx one of the major
criticisms against anarchism.) For example, in Mutual
Aid Kropotkin asserts that. in contrast tu Darwin.
species that learn to cooperate are the most
successful. In modern society institutions have
disrupted the natural condition of human beings.5 The
same methodology is employed by Godwin and Proudhon A
Society is spontaneous and natural, and it is the
formal institution of the state that prevents the
natural condition from realising its potential. All of
these conclusions. however. have their origins in a
fixed view of human nature and human essence. Stirner
rejects this strategy suggesting that it is not only
flawed. but dangerous. 



II. STIRNER‘S CRITIQUE OF TRANSCENDENTALISM AND THE
FIXED IDEA 



To understand Stirner‘s attack on the authority of the
state, his attitude toward the Western philosophic
tradition must be examined. Stirner treated the
Western conception of the ~idea‘ as an historical
phenomenon. It has changed from the early Greek
civilisation to the present. The ancient sophists
understood that the mind was a weapon, a means to
survival (p. 17). Truth was generated as the mind
interacted with nature, But the world of nature was
characterised by flux and change. It was not stable.
Therefore, truth must also be in a constant state of
transition.

This is an unsettling position for philosophy.
Philosophy has treated the inability to have fixed and
eternal truth as a fundamental flaw in the human
character. To overcome this weakness, Western
philosophers since Plato have created the illusion of
stability. This ‘error‘ continues within the ‘modern‘
traditions in philosophy as well.

Modern culture has lost touch with the tradition that
Stirner identified with sophism and scepticism. It has
sought the safety of the ‘fixed idea.‘ By a fixed idea
Stirner means a concept, principle, or maxim that
represents some aspect of the human character or that
elaborates an ethical norm or standard which is not
subject to historical circumstance. Fixed‘ means
eternal, unchanging, and absolute. In the contemporary
world, according to Stirner, we have adopted the
belief in this folly.

In the modern period humans beings have abandoned the
sophist‘s notion that truth does not present itself in
absolutes. Stirner lays much of the blame for this
illusion at the doorstep of Christianity. It is the
risk of Christianity that created the lie of ‘spirit‘
and separated humans from contact with the world
(pp.24~25). Spirit now becomes the focal point of
human 11k and activity. Once we create this folly, the
wheels in the head‘ of spirituality, we are beckoned
to the fixed idea (p.43).

When human beings invented the idea of ‘spirit‘ in
order to give themselves spirituality, the foundation
was laid for the fixed idea. The spirit within the
individual is perceived to be that which endures in
the human being. The spirit transcends the body and
the finite character of corporeal existence. But
spirituality teaches humans not to respect what is in
the individual‘ but to care only for the image of
~Man‘ as a higher enduring essence (p.42). Human
beings come to see each other as ghosts and spirits
rather than flesh and blood.

The spirituality of Christianity is mirrored and
reinforced in the philosophy search for the fixed
idea. Humanism is just the most recent metamorphosis
of Christianity (p.l 73). The common link is
transcendentalism. While Stirner does not specifically
mention Kant, the transcendental philosophy of Kant
elaborates precisely what Stirner finds so offensive.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant develops a
demonstration of how the mind is capable of engaging
in thought outside the natural stimuli from the
environment. Kant claims that reason alone can tell us
that when we take away the sense impression left by an
object it must still have extension in space and
time.‘ This demonstration of transcendental reasoning
also leads to the conclusion that human beings caxmot
know essences from their contact with objects, but
essences Iie only in a transcendental realm beyond our
reach. What Kant hoped to deliver with his project was
a mode of knowing‘ concepts that are fixed and
unchanging.8 In constructing such a system, Kant has
established a secular defence of the fixed idea and
laid the foundation for modern humanism.

In a similar fashion to Christian thought, Kant‘s
creation of a transcendental foundation for thought
establishes the basis for a universalist morality.
Adding only the assumption of free will‘ as the first
principle of morality, Kant was then prepared to give
his universalist formulation of the Categorical
Imperative: ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were
to become by your will a general law of nature, 9and
the more specific Practical Imperative: ‘Act so as to
treat man, in your own person as well as in that of
anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a
means. ‚ ~ It is these fixed, transcendental claims
that lay the groundwork for Kant‘s Universalist claims
in law and politics.

Law can be constructed according to transcendentally
conceived notions that have no relation to experience,
historical condition, or social custom. Reached
transcendentally, conclusions regarding the law arc
not subject to critique based on any experiential
knowledge. Morality and law have been divorced from
actual lived sensation. The result is that the fixed
transcendental idea IIOW his the power to shape human
life. From an anarchist perspective, real human beings
arc now under the power of that which is only an
aberration. This is precisely how Stirner approached
the issue.

This naive transcendentalism also produces political
consequences. Universal ethics also provides the basis
for a universal conception of human history. In the
case of Kant, it is argued that human beings have the
same basic characteristics, especially the equal power
to engage in reasoning. Based on this assumption, a
transcendental moral System can be ‘discovered‘
through reason by which individuals can order their
lives. Further, if human beings have the same
character and are subject to the same unchanging, a
priori principles of action, it is now possible to
create a universal society and a universal history
based on that fact. (11)

Stirner rejected such a strategy. It moves in
precisely the wrong direction. The type of universal
society described by the liberalism of either Kant or
Marx is an affront to the ‘ownness‘ that can only be
within the individual. What is needed, according to
Stirner, is not a society of men, but a union of egos
(p.179). Only such a union could really validate the
distinct character of each individual. Only such an
organisation could really respect the differences
represented by each unique being. 

 



101

III. POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
WITH THE FIXED IDEA 



The stress on the uniqueness of the individual is a
cornerstone of Stirner‘s work, but it is not the
complete picture. Stirner‘s confrontation with the
fixed idea represents a confrontation with all
philosophic and theological transcendentalism in the
Western tradition. The fixed idea is a maxim,
principle, or standpoint that has determined us
(p.63). The fixing of ideas makes us prisoners to
thought rather than creators of thought.
Transcendentalism takes the fixed idea and then wies
to shape the world in its image. Ultimately the ‘idea‘
has subjected the human being to itself (p.43).

Stirner‘s epistemological position is not an isolated
aberration. His argument is a modern formulation of an
epistemological attack on the Western tradition in
metaphysics and philosophy that extends from the
ancient sophists to the twentieth century. To fully
understand what Stirner is trying to say it is useful
to examine what comes after Stirner in this tradition.
Of critical importance to this task is Fredrich
Nietzsche. While there is some debate over whether or
not Nietzsche was familiar with Stirner‘s work, there
is no doubt the two authors shared an epistemological
concern over the integrity of the metaphysical
foundation of the Western tradition. (12)

Nietzsche shared Stirner‘s distaste for both
transcendentalism and the Christian tradition in
morality. What Nietzsche adds to the discussion is the
genealogical method by which the material origins of
moral belief can be identified as products of history
and culture23 For Nietzsche transcendental morals Set
human beings against themselves, denying their true
natures. As Stirner put it, what a person does is
human, not because it conforms to a concept, but by
the very fact that a human does it (p.178).

For Stirner, the state is founded on the lack of
independence (p.224). It is the condition of living in
the herd (p.223). This claim is echoed in Nietzsche
who argued that the state is created by the
superfluous people.‘4 The herd creates morality
against the strong and independent.‘5 The herd invents
the myth of equality and heralds its god as the
categorical imperative.‘ ~ It is the death of real
people, creative individuals capable of excellence,
innovation, and, as Nietzsche states in The Use and
Abuse of History, the ability to engage in dialogue
with giants over the course of history2‘

For both Stirner and Nietzsche, when the
transcendental masks that hide human beings from
themselves are stripped away power‘ is revealed. But
here power must be understood in a very specific sense
and can only have meaning in relation to a general
notion of property. To Stirner, private property is a
reflection of personal power (p.25tS). Personal
property is the measure of individual power. Such
measure i‘s upset within the state because of the
rules and regulations that make no one‘s property
their own (pp.251-52). True property is the
_expression of unique individual power. To Nietzsche,
property. broadly 

construed, would include the creative acts of
individuals and also represent the measure of the
character. Acts arc our own. They arc products of
uniqueness, not to be diminished by the collective.
Fixed and generalised concepts diminish what is our
own.

Stirner, Nietzsche, and the contemporary
poststructuralists assert a similar criticism of the
fixed idea. AU deny the possibility of demonstrating
the validity of fixed, transcendental, universals.
There can be no demonstration of universals that
cannot be shown to have its validity rest on the
assumed validity of another universal. With no
validating mechanism other than the connection to
other transcendental assertions back through history,
such tcxts have no original moment in which their
truth can be verified.1~ All such fixed ideas,
therefore, lack epistemological validity.

In Stirner the fixed idea is responsible for the
fundamental moral and political error that has been
perpetrated on individuals by the state. However,
Stirner never developed the language to go into
greater depth on the construction, functioning, and
consequences of the fixed idea. Language for such an
inquiry is introduced by Nietzsche, but can-ied to its
full fruiti on widi the poststructuralists.

In The Will to Power Nietzsche echoes something
mentioned by Stimer. In The Ego and us Own Stirner
recalled a time in which the mind confronts the world
to make sense of it for survival (p.l 8). Nietzsche
gave a naturalist Interpretation to this claim,
suggesting the human need to interpret the world as an
act necessary for survival“> But Nietzsche makes It
very clear that ‘interpretation‘ is something linked
to history, context, and need. Perceptions, logic, and
reason, developed because they were useful for life,
not because they were true or accurate portrayals of a
transcendental reality.20 Thus, like Stirner,
Nietzsche claimed there can be no basis for
maintaining the belief in fixed ideas.

Nietzsche also confronts this issue in a slightly
different manner in The Use and Abuse of History.
There Nietzsche makes reference to the problem of
epistemological closure in speaking of the ‘shifting
horizon of truth.‘2~ Epistemological closure is
created when an object is given a stable identity. The
representation of objects always cornmits an error of
omission. Something is always left out in order to
dose the system of identities. It there arc oniy
interpretations of the world, there is no fixed truth
and no possibility of stable representation.22 A
priori truths arc only provisional assumptions.23 The
resuIt of all diis is the conclusion that rather than
having only one truth, the world is seen to have
countless meanings. (24)

The contemporary movement in French philosophy known
as poststructuralism pursues the problem of
epistemological closure in its critique of
‘representation.‘ Representation is a structural
illusionlplain 25 created by closing off a concept
from its muItifaceted nieaning. This epistemological
closure grants power 10 texts through creating the
illusion of stability. Stability generates a clear
boundary between meaning and nonmeaning.26 It is
precisely this gesture in the act of generating
concepts that produces the fundamental error 

 

 

 

 



103 

of the fixed idea. From the perspective of
Stirner,Nietzsche, the poststmcturalists, and the
sophists, such stability is epistemologically unsound.
Its value is political. Fixing a concept or idea
within a closed system of identities and meanings
lends authonty to utterances. This process is a nieans
of generating power.

What Stirner, Nietzsche, and the poststructuralists
claim is that the authority generatedby the fixed idea
is not the authority of truth, but the authority
ofpower. The fixed idea is a fiction created because
it legitimates power. Fixed ideas do not have
transcendental validity. They have only a utility
function in the nexus ofpower/knowledge. As a utility,
fixed ideas grant authority to words.
Transcendentalism in speech is what causes both
Stirner and Demda to identify such fixed systems with
theology.“ To both of these authors, truth must be
treated as something historical. 

 



IV. THE POLITICS OF THE SELF 



The fixed idea provides the illusion that there are
fixed universals around which human life can be
constructed. It generates a belief in stable
representations and expectations that are ‘naturally‘
human. Fixing a stable representation of the human
being is precisely what Stirner meant by the
generalised concept ~Man. ~(p.75) Once the human being
is represented as a stable objective concept he or she
becomes replaceable.28 As objectified subjects, the 1‘
has lost its power. There is only a mass. As Jacques
Demda put it, the process of objectification turns a
world of unique individuals into the material for
production units, police computers, and concentration
camps.29 As Todd May describes the
poststructuralistproject, all assertions of human
essence, even humanism, mtlst be rejected.30

As is the case with the poststructuralists, Stimer
also rejected the possibility that any totalising
concept of ‘Man‘ could do justice to the unique
character of each individual. What Links this position
to the criticism of the state is the relationship
between the construction of truth and the conditions
of power in society. If truth is an historical
construction and if it does not have any Link to a
transcendentaL ahistoricaL universal ‘law‘ or
condition, then the structures from which truth is
generated cannot be separated from the institutions of
power which make them possibLe.3~

Hence, Stirner draws the only logical conclusion
possible based on his premises. that it is the state
that maintains the generalised concept, or ideal, to
which the individual must conform, and it is the
state, therefore, that niust be resisted. Power
attaches identities to people. Power imposes a law of
truth that ties people to power.32 Hence, Michel
FoucauIt concluded that the real political battLe is
not over the content of truth, but over the status of
claims to truth. u This is precisely what Stirner
recognised in rejecting the ‘fixed idea.‘

The state reinforces the fixed idea by imposing a code
of conduct and discipline on the population. The
generalised concept ‘Man‘ is the bearer of the idea of
normalcy. Normalcy provides the foundation for the
code of disciplineY Discipline takes the form of
control over individual bothes. It is the state that
carries out the imposition of what humanistic culture
demands.

Intellectuals have been the bearers of the liberal
humanist tradition, and can be identified with its
oppression. Denying the possibility of the
transcendental removes the intellectual from the
privileged place granted since Plato‘s Republic. Since
intellectuals can no longer be seen as the bearers of
truth, they arc seen by Foucault as occupying a
specific place in the power hierarchy.35 They are the
legitimators of the totalising concepts within the
structure of power, whether in the name of theology or
science.

At this point epistemological critique and political
commentary come together. If ‘I am not the flesh and
blood. thought and desire, that is someone else‘s ‘1,‘
then i must be unique. According to Stirner, my value
is that 1 am an 1‘ (pp.365-66). lf this is the case
then the entire Enlightenment project. what Stirner
would include as both social liberalism and humane
liberalism. must be mistaken. ‘1‘ cannot be
generalised. What is important in the understanding of
‘1‘ is not universal but unique. The ‘F must generate
a politics of ‘difference.‘

A politics built around what is different and unique
is all that can emerge based on the anti foundational
premises of Stirner, Nietzsche, and the
poststructuralists. Thus when Stirner denounces the
state and calls for a ‘Union of Egos‘ in itS place
(p.179). It is a claim in favour of respecting the ‘1‘
not the generalised concept Man. Respect for
difference creates a positive political stance toward
the individual. It does not degrade human nature hy
reducing it to the lowest common denominator. It puts
human beings beyond the grasp of any single concept.

Any assertion that human beings can be defined by any
assertion of ‘essence, ‘identity‘ or ~human nature‘
must be rejected. Critique does not set dogmas. It
crushes fixed ideas and OppOSCS Systems (p.147). What
is designated as generalised essence is not me.‘ but
is only a name (p.366). 1 am at every moment creating
myself (p.150). Or, as Michel Foucault put it, each
i~fc is a work of art in progress.36 



CONCLUSION

The basis of Stirner‘s claims was epistemological.
Therefore, the assertion that he is the culmination of
the Hegelian tradition cannot be sustained. Hegel‘s
defence of the state as the reflection of universal
spirit was, to Stirner, just another fantastic
aberration in order to justify the state’s domination.
In the Hegelian state, there can be no ‘1‘. Nothing
could be more abhorrent to Stirner. He is far more an
anti-Hegelian than, as some authors suggest, the
pinnacle of the Hegelian tradition. Is Stirner the
first poststructuralist? In a sense, this is an absurd
question that only has meaning within the confines of
linear history. Stirner is part of a perspective that
goes back to the earliest Western civilisations. The
sophists understood that the mind was to be used as a
means to a pleasant life, not to become a source of
tyranny against the body (p17). With transcendentalism
came a transformation in philosophy. As Foucault
described it, after Plato, the idea of true and false
discourse replaced open inquiry.37 The idea of fixed
and universal truth had supplanted dynamic critique.
The stage was set for the folly that has been Western
philosophy.

Stirner, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism
all share this view. Further, they are concerned for
what this condition of knowledge means in social life.
They believe that any fixed representation of the
human character .is both epistemologically flawed and
politically dangerous. Ideas cannot be fixed. Truth is
plural, dynamic, and contingent. When the human being
is ascribed a fixed and general nature, rather than
being protected under the ‘Rights of Man‘ suggested by
liberal humanism, they lose their unique identities
and become objects of domination. The transcendental
ideal pits the body against the intellect. We become
slaves to the conceivable posing as truth. Difference
is negated in favour of the general. The value of true
individualism cannot be realised where the 1 does not
represents a unique set of experiences and ideas.

 

NOTES 



1 Stepelvich l985; McLellan 1969.

2 Sepelvich 1985, pp. 6O4-5.

3 Stirner. The Ego and His Own. 1973. p. 179. Future
references to this work will be given in the text.

4 For example. note the contrast between the positions
of Todd May (1994) and David Hartley (1995).

5 Kropotkin. Mutual Aid. 1987. p. 83.

6 See Godwin. Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and
Proudhon. What is Property.>.

7 Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason, 1958, p.27.

8 Ibid.. p. 36.

9 Kant. ‘The Metaphysical Foundation of Morals‘, 1949.
pl70.

10 Ibid., p.178

11 See idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan
Intent‘ in Friedrich edition of Kant 12 Two diverse
positions are presented by James Martin in the editor
s introduction to The Ego and His Own. and James
Huneker in The Egoists: A Book of Supermen, 192O.p.
351.

13 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals.

14 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 1971. p.77.

15 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, 1967, p.156.

16 Ibid.,p.157.

17 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History, 1988.
p.59.

18 Derrida, Dissemination.

19 Nietzsche. The Will to Power. p.272.

20 Ibid.,p.276.

21 Nietzsche, The (Use and Abuse of History, p.8. 22
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p.267.

22 Nietzsche. The Will to Power. p.267.

23 Ibid.,p.273.

24 Ibid.,p.267.

25 Derrida, Dissemination, p.297.

26Ibid.,p.316.

27 See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1976, pp.1 2-13, and
Stirner, The Ego and His Own, p.176.

28 Derrida 1982, p.3l1.

29Ibid.,p.317.

30 May, 1994, p. 75.

31 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980, p.1 31.

32 Foucault, .‘The Subject and Power‘, 1983, p.2 12.

33 Foucault. Power/Knowledge, p.l 32.

34 Compare the discussion by Foucault in
Power/Knowledge. p.l 06, and Language Counter-memory,
Practice, 1977, pp.209-2 11, and Stirner, The Ego and
Ws Own,

pp.2lS-219, 238.

35 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 132.

36 Foucault, ‘The Genealogy of Ethics‘, afterword in
beyond Structuralism and

Hermeneutics, p.236.

37 Foucault 1971, p.25. 



 

REFERENCES 



Derrida, Jacques 1976. Of Grammatology. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press.

Derrida, Jacques 1981. Dissemination. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

Derrida, Jacques 1982. Sending: On Representation‘,
Social Research 49.

Foucault, Michel 1977. Language, Counter-memory.
Practice. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Foucault, Michel 1980. Power/Knowledge. New York:
Pantheon.

Foucault, Michel 1983. ‘The Subject and Power‘.
Afterword in Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Godwin, William Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1971:

Hartley, David 1995. ‘Communitarian Anarchism and
Human Nature .Anarchist Studies 3.

Huneker, James 1920. The Egoists: A Book of Supermen.
New York~: Scribner‘s Sons.

Kant, Immanuel The Critique of Pure Reason. New York:
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Kant, Immanuel ‘The Metaphysical Foundation of Moral,
and idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan
Intent‘, in The Philosophy of Kant, edited by Carl J.

Friedrich. New York: Modem Library. 1949.

Kropotkin, Peter. Mutual Aid. London: Freedom Press,
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May, Todd 1994. The Political Philosophy of
Poststructuralist Anarchism. University Park: Penn
State University Press.

McLellan. David 1969. The Young Hegelians and Karl
Marx. London.

Nietzsche, Friedrich The Genealogy of Morals. New
York: Vintage, 1989.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Middlesex, England: Penguin. 1971.

Nietzsche, Friedrich The Will to Power. New York:
Random House, 1967.

Nietzsche. Friedrich The Use and Abuse of History. New
York: Macmillan, 1988.

Proudhon. Pierre What is Property? New York: Howard
Fertig, 1966.

Stepelvich, Lawrence S. 1985. Max Stirner as
Hegelian‘, Journal of the history of Ideas.
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Stirner, Max The Ego and us Own. New York: Dover,
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===="What war is not a private affair, and, inversely, what wound is not a war that comes from society as whole?"

- Gilles Deleuze, Logique du Sens (1969)


		
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