From: rodrigoguim-AT-riseup.net Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2004 18:42:40 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: [postanarchism] non-essentialism Besides Spivak's concept of "strategic essentialism", you could read bell hooks' "Postmodern Blackness" (in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader) for a reflection on the social effects of essentialism/anti-essentialism divisions. Rodrigo > hmmm . . . this is interesting. but the point I'd like to raise is not > really so much about essentialism / non-essentialism, but the idea of > "strategic essentialism," which is something that jason mentioned to me in > conversation this summer in amsterdam but I stupidly enough didn't think > to ask him for any references or further sources of information on. > > what I'm wondering about here is the ways in which essentialist thinking > and theorizing, even if perhaps problematic on a philosophical level - > ends up being very useful on a political level. for instance, one could > easily argue that the zapatista's employ an essentialist conception of > mayan identity in their rhetoric. or, considering the discourse around > feminity used by organizers during the Chipko movement in India in the > 1980's which connected ideas feminity to a greater connection to the > natural world (ie and therefore the defense of it - which led, at least in > part to many women chaining themselves to trees and taking forms of direct > action to stop the corporate plundering the land). > > in both of these instances (and a great deal more) one can see ways in > which essential patterns of thought are being invoked. but I would be very > hesitant to want to go to organizers and say "stop that! you're being > essentialist! naughty naughty naughty . . ." which brings me to where > jason brought up the idea of strategic essentialism, or as I understand it > that essentialism can be useful in political discourse and organizing even > if on some level it is questionable (or at least that's what I think was > being said). > > what do other people think of this? are there authors and theorists who > pursue this line of argument? > > cheers. > Stevphen > > > > > >> not strictly on-topic, but an interesting paper on non-essentialism, >> which is probably worth reading given the frequency with which >> "essentialist" crops up on this list... I've attached the intro... >> >> pj >> >> --------------------------- >> >> http://www.hum.utah.edu/philosophy/faculty/mallon/Materials/NESCTHC.htm >> >> Is Non-Essentialism a Substantial Constraint on Theories of Human >> Categories? >> >> Ron Mallon >> >> University of Utah >> >> >> >> DRAFT - COMMENTS WELCOME - PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE - DRAFT >> >> >> >> In recent years, numerous articles and books in the humanities and >> the social sciences have been devoted to understanding the ascription >> of race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, mental illness, and >> other 'human kind' concepts to persons. What may be more surprising >> given the enormous volume of this research and the diversity of its >> sources is that much of it shares a common commitment, a commitment >> to understanding the categories picked out by these concepts in an >> non-essentialist way. For example, Iris Marion Young (1989) suggests >> of social groups (including races, genders, classes, age groups, and >> ethnicities) that they, >> >> should not be understood as an essence or nature with a specific set >> of common attributes There is no common nature that members of a >> group have. (260) >> >> >> >> The invocation of such a non-essentialism is ubiquitous in social >> theory, and non-essentialism is widely considered an important >> constraint that must be met. Charlotte Witt even suggests that >> "showing a position is 'essentialist' can [in contemporary feminist >> theory] function in and of itself as a good reason for rejecting it" >> (1995, 321). But what does it mean to be non-essentialist about such >> human categories, and what theoretical aims is it meant to achieve?[1] >> >> Essentialism is a doctrine with philosophical roots at least as far >> back as Aristotle, and with a substantial grounding in common sense >> or 'folk' theorizing about the world (Keil 1989, Gelman et al. 1994, >> Hirschfeld 1996). The sort of essentialism and non-essentialism with >> which I am concerned are doctrines regarding categories or types of >> person as opposed to individuals. There is a voluminous philosophical >> literature concerned with the possibility that a property or set of >> properties is necessary to the identity of an individual object. >> Philosophical concern with personal identity is a special case of >> this concern. While there are interesting and deep philosophical >> questions about personal identity raised by an individual's various >> human kind category (e.g. race, gender, ethnicity, class, etc.) >> memberships, these questions are orthogonal to my concern here. >> >> Instead, (and like Witt 1995) I aim to understand and evaluate >> non-essentialism about types of person.[2] In particular, I consider >> whether non-essentialism contributes to accomplishing the theoretical >> aims of anti-essentialists that embrace it. In doing so, I emphasize >> examples of non-essentialism involving race and gender. These two >> categories are especially worthy foci for a number of reasons. Both >> are socially salient, pre-theoretically recognized categories that >> routinely figure in explanations of putatively natural differences. >> Each is the subject of numerous anti-essentialist discussions across >> a wide range of academic fields that, in turn, inform a range of >> other discussions of human categories.[3] Moreover, for reasons that >> will become more clear below, I think non-essentialism is likely true >> of race and gender. In what follows, I challenge the idea that >> non-essentialism is a substantial constraint on a theory of a human >> category, and I argue that a focus on essentialism and >> non-essentialism has resulted both in a failure to address false and >> potentially oppressive non-essentialist accounts as well as an >> unjustified exclusion of plausible accounts of categories from >> consideration. I argue that these failures as stem from a mistaken >> assumption regarding the connection between categories with necessary >> and sufficient conditions and generalizations, and I look to recent >> developments in philosophy of science to illuminate this mistake. >> > >
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