Date: Tue, 6 Apr 1999 13:12:39 -0700 (PDT) From: sumathy-AT-wsu.edu (Sumathy Sivamohan) Subject: Chomsky on Kosovo (fwd) >>Subject: Noam Chomksy on Kosovo (FWD) >> >>The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric >> >>By Noam Chomsky >> >> >> There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning >>primarily US) bombing in connection with Kosovo. A great deal has been >>written about the topic, including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make >>a few general observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously >>contested. >> >> There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and >>applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do these or other >>considerations apply in the case of Kosovo? >> >> >> >> (1) What are the accepted and applicable "rules of world order"? >> >> There is a regime of international law and international order, >>binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent >>resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of >>force is banned unless explicitly authorized by the Security Council >>after it has determined that peaceful means have failed, or in >>self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow concept) until the >>Security Council acts. >> >> There is, of course, more to say. Thus there is at least a >>tension, if not an outright contradiction, between the rules of world >>order laid down in the UN Charter and the rights articulated in the >>Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of the >>world order established under US initiative after World War II. The >>Charter bans force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the >>rights of individuals against oppressive states. The issue of >>"humanitarian intervention" arises from this tension. It is the right >>of "humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the US/NATO in >>Kosovo, and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and news >>reports (in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice of >>terminology). >> >> The question is addressed in a news report in the NY Times >>(March 27), headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for Using Force" in >>Kosovo (March 27). One example is offered: Allen Gerson, former >>counsel to the US mission to the UN. Two other legal scholars are >>cited. One, Ted Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration >>argument" and dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The third >>is Jack Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law >>school. He says that critics of the NATO bombing "have a pretty good >>legal argument," but "many people think [an exception for humanitarian >>intervention] does exist as a matter of custom and practice." That >>summarizes the evidence offered to justify the favored conclusion >>stated in the headline. >> >> Goldsmith's observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that >>facts are relevant to the determination of "custom and practice." >> >> We may also bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian >>intervention, if it exists, is premised on the "good faith" of those >>intervening, and that assumption is based not on their rhetoric but on >>their record, in particular their record of adherence to the rinciples >>of international law, World Court decisions, and so on. That is indeed >>a truism, at least with regard to others. >> >> Consider, for example, Iranian offers to intervene in Bosnia to >>prevent massacres at a time when the West would not do so. >> >> These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact, ignored); if there >>was a reason beyond subordination to power, it was because Iranian >>"good faith" could not be assumed. A rational person then asks obvious >>questions: is the Iranian record of intervention and terror worse >>than that of the US? And other questions, for example: How should we >>assess the "good faith" of the only country to have vetoed a Security >>Council resolution calling on all states to obey international law? >>What about its historical record? Unless such questions are prominent >>on the agenda of discourse, an honest person will dismiss it as mere >>allegiance to doctrine. A useful exercise is to determine how much >>of the literature -- media or other -- survives such elementary >>conditions as these. >> >> >> >> (2) How do these or other considerations apply in the case of >>Kosovo? >> >> There has been a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in the past >>year, overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military forces. The >>main victims have been ethnic Albanian Kosovars, some 90% of the >>population of this Yugoslav territory. The standard estimate is 2000 >>deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees. >> >> In such cases, outsiders have three choices: >> >> (I) try to escalate the catastrophe >> >> (II) do nothing >> >> (III) try to mitigate the catastrophe >> >> The choices are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let's >>keep to a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where Kosovo >>fits into the pattern. >> >> (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department >>estimates, the annual level of political killing by the government and >>its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and >>refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a million. >> Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient of US >>arms and training as violence increased through the '90s,and that >>assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" pretext dismissed by >>almost all serious observers. The Clinton administration was >>particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria, whose >>tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of violence," >>according to human rights organizations, even surpassing his >>predecessors. Details are readily available. >> >> In this case, the US reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities. >> >> (B) Turkey. By very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of >>Kurds in the '90s falls in the category of Kosovo. It peaked in the >>early '90s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds from the >>countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from 1990 to >>1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. 1994 marked >>two records: it was "the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish >>provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal reported from the scene, and the >>year when Turkey became "the biggest single importer of American >>military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When >>human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages, >>the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring >>suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and >>elsewhere. >> >> Colombia and Turkey explain their (US-supported) atrocities on >>grounds that they are defending their countries from the threat of >>terrorist guerrillas. As does the government of Yugoslavia. >> >> Again, the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the >>atrocities. >> >> (C) Laos. Every year thousands of people, mostly children and >>poor farmers, are killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the >>scene of the heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history it >>appears, and rguably the most cruel: Washington's furious assaulton a >>poor peasant society had little to do with its wars in the region. The >>worst period was from 1968, when Washington was compelled to undertake >>negotiations (under popular and business pressure), ending the regular >>bombardment of North Vietnam. >> >> Kissinger-Nixon then decided to shift the planes to bombardment >>of Laos and Cambodia. >> >> The deaths are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far >>worse than land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and >>maim, and have no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was >>saturated with hundreds of millions of these criminal devices, which >>have a failure-to-explode rate of 20%-30% according to the >>manufacturer, Honeywell. The numbers suggest either remarkably poor >>quality control or a rational policy of murdering civilians by delayed >>action. These were only a fraction of the technology deployed, >>including advanced missiles to penetrate caves where families sought >>shelter. Current annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from >>hundreds a year to "an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000," >>more than half of them deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter >>Barry Wain of the Wall Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A >>conservative estimate, then, is that the crisis this year is >>approximately comparable to Kosovo, though deaths are far more highly >>concentrated among children -- over half, according to analyses >>reported by the Mennonite Central Committee, which has been working >>there since 1977 to alleviate the continuing atrocities. >> >> There have been efforts to publicize and deal with the >>humanitarian catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is >>trying to remove the lethal objects, but the US is "conspicuously >>missing from the handful of Western organisations that havefollowed >>MAG," the British press reports, though it has finally agreed to train >>some Laotian civilians. The British press also reports, with some >>anger, the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to >>provide them with "render harmless procedures" that would make their >>work "a lot quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state secret, as >>does the whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports >>a very similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region >>where US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense. >> >> In this case, the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the >>reaction of the media and commentators is to keep silent, following >>theorms under which the war against Laos was designated a "secret war" >>- -- meaning well-known, but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia >>from March 1969. The level of self-censorship was extraordinary then, >>as is the current phase. The relevance of this shocking example should >>be obvious without further comment. >> >> I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and >>also much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge >>slaughter of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form >>of biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine Albright >>commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction to the >>killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we think the >>price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000 children >>killed a month, and the price is still "worth it." >> These and other examples might also be kept in mind when we read >>awed rhetoric about how the "moral compass" of the >>ClintonAdministration is at last functioning properly, as the Kosovo >>example illustrates. >> >> Just what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO >>bombing, predictably, led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the >>Serbian Army and paramilitaries, and to the departure of international >>observers, which of course had the same effect. >> Commanding General Wesley Clark declared that it was "entirely >>predictable" that Serbian terror and violence would intensifyafter the >>NATO bombing, exactly as happened. The terror for the first time >>reached the capital city of Pristina, and there are credible reports >>of large-scale destruction of villages, assassinations, generation of >>an enormous refugee flow, perhaps an effort to expel a good part of >>the Albanian population -- all an "entirely predictable" consequence >>of the threat and then the use of force, as General Clark rightly >>observes. >> >> Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to escalate >>the violence, with exactly that expectation. >> >> To find examples illustrating (III) is all too easy, at least if >>we keep to official rhetoric. The major recent academic study of >>"humanitarian intervention," by Sean Murphy, reviews the record after >>the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 which outlawed war, and then since the >>UN Charter, which strengthened and articulated these provisions. In >>the first phase, he writes, the most prominent examples of >>"humanitarian intervention" were Japan's attack on Manchuria, >>Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler's occupation of parts of >>Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied by highly uplifting humanitarian >>rhetoric, and factual justifications as well. Japan was going to >>establish an "earthly paradise" as it defended Manchurians from >>"Chinese bandits," with the support of a leading Chinese nationalist, >>a far more credible figure than anyone the US was able to conjure up >>during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini was liberating thousands >>of slaves as he carried forth the Western "civilizing mission." Hitler >>announced Germany's intention to end ethnic tensions and violence, and >>"safeguard the national individuality of the German and Czech >>peoples," in an operation "filled with earnest desire to serve the >>true interests of the peoples dwelling in the area," in accordance >>with their will; the Slovakian President asked Hitler to declare >>Slovakia a protectorate. >> >> Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene >>justifications with those offered for interventions, including >>"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN Charter period. >> >> In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is >>the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating Pol >>Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the right >>of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few post-Charter >>examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge regime >>(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks against >>Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The press >>condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for their outrageous violation of >>international law. They were harshly punished for the crime of having >>terminated Pol Pot's slaughters, first by a (US-backed) Chinese >>invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The US >>recognized the >>expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia, because of its >>"continuity" with the Pol Pot regime, the State Department explained. >>Not too subtly, the US supported the Khmer Rouge in its continuing >>attacks in Cambodia. >> >> The example tells us more about the "custom and practice" that >>underlies "the emerging legal norms of humanitarian intervention." >> >> Despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that >>circles are square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings >>further undermine what remains of the fragile structure of >>international law. The US made that entirely clear in the discussions >>leading to the NATO decision. Apart from the UK (by now, about as much >>of an independent actor as the Ukraine was in the pre-Gorbachev >>years), NATO countries were skeptical of US policy, and were >>particularly annoyed by Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling" >>(Kevin Cullen, Boston Globe, Feb. 22). Today, the more closely one >>approaches the conflicted region, the greater the opposition to >>Washington's insistence on force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). >>France had called for a >>UN Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of NATO >>peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its stand that NATO >>should be able to act independently of the United Nations," State >>Department officials explained. The US refused to permit the >>"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final NATO statement, >>unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and international >>law; only the word "endorse" was permitted (Jane Perlez, NYT, Feb. >>11). Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a brazen expression of contempt >>for the UN, even the specific timing, and was so understood. And of >>course the same is true of the destruction of half the pharmaceutical >>production of a small African country a few months earlier, an event >>that also does not indicate that the "moral compass" is straying >>from righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be >>prominently reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to >>determining "custom and practice." >> >> It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of >>the rules of world order is irrelevant, just as it had lost its >>meaning by the late 1930s. The contempt of the world's leading power >>for the framework of world order has become so extreme that there is >>nothing left to discuss. A review of the internal documentary record >>demonstrates that the stance traces back to the earliest days, even to >>the first memorandum of the newly-formed National Security Council in >>1947. During the Kennedy years, the stance began to gain overt >>expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that >>defiance of international law and the Charter has become entirely >>open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, which >>would be on the front pages, and prominent in the school and >>university curriculum, if truth and honesty were considered >>significant values. The highest authorities explained with brutal >>clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become >>irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they did in the >>early postwar years. >> >> One might then adopt the official position. That would be an >>honest stand, at least if it were accompanied by refusal to play the >>cynical game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the despised >>principles of international law as a highly selective weapon against >>shifting enemies. >> >> While the Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the >>defiance of world order has become so extreme as to be of concern >>even to hawkish policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading >>establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that >>Washington is treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the >>world -- probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is >>"becoming the rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest >>external threat to their societies." Realist "international relations >>theory," he argues, predicts that coalitions may arise to >>counterbalance the rogue superpower. >> >> On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be reconsidered. >>Americans who prefer a different image of their society might call for >>a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds. >> >> Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It >>leaves it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as >>it explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence -- >>"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet another blow >>against the regime of international order, which does offer the weak >>at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for the >>longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible observation >>is that "every bomb that falls on Serbia and every ethnic killing in >>Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and >>Albanians to live beside each other in some sort of peace" >>(Financial Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes >>are extremely ugly, as has not gone without notice. >> >> A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not >>simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One >>choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no >>harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary >>principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be >>considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end. >> >> The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more >>frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification, maybe >>not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an >>era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly >>respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court, which >>explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the United >>States, its essentials not even reported. >> >> In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and >>international law it would be hard to find more respected voices than >>Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that "Particular >>states or groups of states that set themselves up as theauthoritative >>judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others, >>are in fact a menace to international order,and thus to effective >>action in this field." Henkin, in a standard work on world order, >>writes that the "pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force >>are deplorable, and the arguments to legitimize the use of force in >>those circumstances are unpersuasive and dangerous... Violations >>of human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible >>to remedy them by external use of force, there would be no law to >>forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any other. >>Human rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other >>injustices remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door >>toaggression and destroying the principle advance in international >>law, the outlawing of war and the prohibition of force." >> >> Recognized principles of international law and world order, >>solemn treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court, considered >>pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these do not >>automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to be >>considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards of >>Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to meet in >>undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of the principles >>of international order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to >>be shown, not merely proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The >>consequences of such violations have to be assessed carefully -- in >>particular, what we understand to be "predictable." And for those who >>are minimally serious, the reasons for the actions also have to be >>assessed -- again, not simply by adulation of our leaders and their >>"moral compass." _ >> >> >> > sumathy --- from list postcolonial-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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