File spoon-archives/postcolonial.archive/postcolonial_1999/postcolonial.9904, message 60


Date: Tue, 6 Apr 1999 13:12:39 -0700 (PDT)
From: sumathy-AT-wsu.edu (Sumathy Sivamohan)
Subject: Chomsky on Kosovo (fwd)



>>Subject: Noam Chomksy on Kosovo (FWD)
>>
>>The Current Bombings: Behind the Rhetoric
>>
>>By Noam Chomsky
>>
>>
>>      There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning
>>primarily US) bombing in connection with Kosovo. A great deal has been
>>written about the topic, including Znet commentaries. I'd like to make
>>a few general observations, keeping to facts that are not seriously
>>contested.
>>
>>      There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and
>>applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do these or other
>>considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?
>>
>>
>>
>>      (1) What are the accepted and applicable "rules of world order"?
>>
>>      There is a regime of international law and international order,
>>binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and subsequent
>>resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the threat or use of
>>force is banned unless explicitly authorized by the Security Council
>>after it has determined that peaceful means have failed, or in
>>self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow concept) until the
>>Security Council acts.
>>
>>      There is, of course, more to say. Thus there is at least a
>>tension, if not an outright contradiction, between the rules of world
>>order laid down in the UN Charter and the rights articulated in the
>>Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a second pillar of the
>>world order established under US initiative after World War II. The
>>Charter bans force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees the
>>rights of individuals against oppressive states. The issue of
>>"humanitarian intervention" arises from this tension.  It is the right
>>of "humanitarian intervention" that is claimed by the US/NATO in
>>Kosovo, and that is generally supported by editorial opinion and news
>>reports (in the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice of
>>terminology).
>>
>>      The question is addressed in a news report in the NY Times
>>(March 27), headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for Using Force" in
>>Kosovo (March 27). One example is offered: Allen Gerson, former
>>counsel to the US mission to the UN. Two other legal  scholars are
>>cited. One, Ted Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the Administration
>>argument" and dismissed the alleged right of intervention. The third
>>is Jack Goldsmith, a specialist on international law at Chicago Law
>>school. He says that critics of the  NATO bombing "have a pretty good
>>legal argument," but "many people think [an exception for humanitarian
>>intervention] does  exist as a matter of custom and practice." That
>>summarizes the evidence offered to justify the favored conclusion
>>stated in the headline.
>>
>>      Goldsmith's observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that
>>facts are relevant to the determination of "custom and practice."
>>
>>      We may also bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian
>>intervention, if it exists, is premised on the "good faith" of those
>>intervening, and that assumption is based not on their rhetoric but on
>>their record, in particular their record of adherence to the rinciples
>>of international law, World Court decisions, and so on. That is indeed
>>a truism, at least with regard to others.
>>
>>      Consider, for example, Iranian offers to intervene in Bosnia to
>>prevent massacres at a time when the West would not do so.
>>
>>      These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact, ignored); if there
>>was a reason beyond subordination to power, it was because Iranian
>>"good faith" could not be assumed. A rational person then asks obvious
>>questions: is the Iranian record of intervention  and terror worse
>>than that of the US? And other questions, for example: How should we
>>assess the "good faith" of the only country to have vetoed a Security
>>Council resolution calling on all states to obey international law?
>>What about its historical record? Unless such questions are prominent
>>on the agenda of discourse, an honest person will dismiss it as mere
>>allegiance to   doctrine. A useful exercise is to determine how much
>>of the literature -- media or other -- survives such elementary
>>conditions as these.
>>
>>
>>
>>      (2) How do these or other considerations apply in the case of
>>Kosovo?
>>
>>      There has been a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in the past
>>year, overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military forces. The
>>main victims have been ethnic Albanian Kosovars, some 90% of the
>>population of this Yugoslav territory. The standard estimate is 2000
>>deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees.
>>
>>      In such cases, outsiders have three choices:
>>
>>            (I) try to escalate the catastrophe
>>
>>            (II) do nothing
>>
>>            (III) try to mitigate the catastrophe
>>
>>      The choices are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let's
>>keep to a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where Kosovo
>>fits into the pattern.
>>
>>      (A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department
>>estimates, the annual level of political killing by the government and
>>its paramilitary associates is about at the level of Kosovo, and
>>refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is well over a million.
>>     Colombia has been the leading Western hemisphere recipient of US
>>arms and training as violence increased through the '90s,and that
>>assistance is now increasing, under a "drug war" pretext dismissed by
>>almost all serious observers. The Clinton  administration was
>>particularly enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria, whose
>>tenure in office was responsible for "appalling levels of violence,"
>>according to human rights organizations, even surpassing his
>>predecessors. Details are readily available.
>>
>>      In this case, the US reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.
>>
>>      (B) Turkey. By very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of
>>Kurds in the '90s falls in the category of Kosovo. It peaked in the
>>early '90s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds from the
>>countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir from  1990 to
>>1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the countryside. 1994 marked
>>two records: it was "the year of the worst repression in the Kurdish
>>provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan Randal reported from the scene, and the
>>year when Turkey became "the biggest single importer of American
>>military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When
>>human rights groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages,
>>the Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring
>>suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia and
>>elsewhere.
>>
>>      Colombia and Turkey explain their (US-supported) atrocities on
>>grounds that they are defending their countries from the threat of
>>terrorist guerrillas. As does the government of Yugoslavia.
>>
>>      Again, the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the
>>atrocities.
>>
>>      (C) Laos. Every year thousands of people, mostly children and
>>poor farmers, are killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos, the
>>scene of the heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history it
>>appears, and rguably the most cruel: Washington's furious assaulton a
>>poor peasant society had little to do with its wars in the region. The
>>worst period was from 1968, when Washington was compelled to undertake
>>negotiations (under popular and business pressure), ending the regular
>>bombardment of North Vietnam.
>>
>>      Kissinger-Nixon then decided to shift the planes to bombardment
>>of Laos and Cambodia.
>>
>>      The deaths are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far
>>worse than land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and
>>maim, and have no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain was
>>saturated with hundreds of millions of these criminal devices, which
>>have a failure-to-explode rate of 20%-30% according to the
>>manufacturer, Honeywell. The numbers suggest either remarkably poor
>>quality control or a rational policy of murdering civilians by delayed
>>action. These were only a fraction of the  technology deployed,
>>including advanced missiles to penetrate caves where families sought
>>shelter. Current annual casualties from "bombies" are estimated from
>>hundreds a year to "an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000,"
>>more than half of them  deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter
>>Barry Wain of the Wall Street Journal -- in its Asia edition. A
>>conservative estimate, then, is that the crisis this year is
>>approximately comparable to Kosovo, though deaths are far more highly
>>concentrated among children -- over half, according to analyses
>>reported by the Mennonite Central Committee, which has been working
>>there since 1977 to alleviate the continuing atrocities.
>>
>>      There have been efforts to publicize and deal with the
>>humanitarian catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is
>>trying to remove the lethal objects, but the US is "conspicuously
>>missing from the handful of Western organisations that havefollowed
>>MAG," the British press reports, though it has finally agreed to train
>>some Laotian civilians. The British press also reports, with some
>>anger, the allegation of MAG specialists that the US refuses to
>>provide them with "render harmless  procedures" that would make their
>>work "a lot quicker and a lot safer." These remain a state secret, as
>>does the whole affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports
>>a very similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region
>>where US      bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.
>>
>>      In this case, the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the
>>reaction of the media and commentators is to keep silent, following
>>theorms under which the war against Laos was designated a "secret war"
>>- -- meaning well-known, but suppressed, as also in the case of Cambodia
>>from March 1969. The level of self-censorship was extraordinary then,
>>as is the current phase. The relevance of this shocking example should
>>be obvious without further comment.
>>
>>      I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and
>>also much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge
>>slaughter of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious form
>>of biological warfare -- "a very hard choice," Madeleine Albright
>>commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her reaction to the
>>killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5 years, but "we think the
>>price is worth it." Current estimates remain about 5000 children
>>killed a month, and the price is still "worth it."
>>      These and other examples might also be kept in mind when we read
>>awed rhetoric about how the "moral compass" of the
>>ClintonAdministration is at last functioning properly, as the Kosovo
>>example illustrates.
>>
>>      Just what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO
>>bombing, predictably, led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by the
>>Serbian Army and paramilitaries, and to the departure of international
>>observers, which of course had the same effect.
>>      Commanding General Wesley Clark declared that it was "entirely
>>predictable" that Serbian terror and violence would intensifyafter the
>>NATO bombing, exactly as happened. The terror for the first time
>>reached the capital city of Pristina, and there are credible reports
>>of large-scale destruction of villages, assassinations, generation of
>>an enormous refugee flow, perhaps an effort to expel a good part of
>>the Albanian population -- all an "entirely predictable" consequence
>>of the threat and then the use of force, as General Clark rightly
>>observes.
>>
>>      Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to escalate
>>the violence, with exactly that expectation.
>>
>>      To find examples illustrating (III) is all too easy, at least if
>>we keep to official rhetoric. The major recent academic study of
>>"humanitarian intervention," by Sean Murphy, reviews the record after
>>the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 which outlawed war, and then since the
>>UN Charter, which strengthened and articulated these provisions. In
>>the first phase, he writes, the most prominent examples of
>>"humanitarian intervention" were Japan's attack on Manchuria,
>>Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler's occupation of parts of
>>Czechoslovakia. All were accompanied by highly uplifting humanitarian
>>rhetoric, and factual justifications as well. Japan was going to
>>establish an "earthly paradise" as it defended Manchurians from
>>"Chinese bandits," with the support of a leading Chinese nationalist,
>>a far more credible figure than anyone the US was able to conjure up
>>during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini was liberating thousands
>>of slaves as he carried forth the Western "civilizing mission." Hitler
>>announced Germany's intention to end ethnic tensions and violence, and
>>"safeguard the national individuality of the German and Czech
>>peoples," in an operation "filled with earnest desire to serve the
>>true interests of the peoples dwelling in the area," in    accordance
>>with their will; the Slovakian President asked Hitler to declare
>>Slovakia a protectorate.
>>
>>      Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene
>>justifications with those offered for interventions, including
>>"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN Charter period.
>>
>>      In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is
>>the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating Pol
>>Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded the right
>>of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few post-Charter
>>examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge regime
>>(Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous attacks against
>>Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is instructive. The press
>>condemned the "Prussians" of  Asia for their outrageous violation of
>>international law. They were harshly punished for the crime of having
>>terminated Pol Pot's  slaughters, first by a (US-backed) Chinese
>>invasion, then by US imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The US
>>recognized the
>>expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia, because of its
>>"continuity" with the Pol Pot regime, the State Department explained.
>>Not too subtly, the US supported the Khmer Rouge in its continuing
>>attacks in Cambodia.
>>
>>      The example tells us more about the "custom and practice" that
>>underlies "the emerging legal norms of humanitarian intervention."
>>
>>      Despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that
>>circles are square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings
>>further undermine what remains of the fragile structure of
>>international law. The US made that entirely clear in the discussions
>>leading to the NATO decision. Apart from the UK (by now, about as much
>>of an independent actor as the Ukraine was in the  pre-Gorbachev
>>years), NATO countries were skeptical of US policy, and were
>>particularly annoyed by Secretary of State Albright's "saber-rattling"
>>(Kevin Cullen, Boston Globe, Feb. 22). Today, the more closely one
>>approaches the conflicted region,  the greater the opposition to
>>Washington's insistence on force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy).
>>France had called for a
>>UN Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of NATO
>>peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its stand that NATO
>>should be able to act independently of the United Nations," State
>>Department officials explained. The US refused to permit the
>>"neuralgic word `authorize'" to appear in the final NATO statement,
>>unwilling to concede any authority to the UN Charter and international
>>law; only the word "endorse" was permitted (Jane Perlez, NYT, Feb.
>>11). Similarly the bombing of Iraq was a brazen expression of contempt
>>for the UN, even the specific timing, and was so understood. And of
>>course the same is true of the destruction of half the pharmaceutical
>>production of a small African country a few months earlier, an event
>>that also     does not indicate that the "moral compass" is straying
>>from righteousness -- not to speak of a record that would be
>>prominently  reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant to
>>determining "custom and practice."
>>
>>      It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of
>>the rules of world order is irrelevant, just as it had lost its
>>meaning  by the late 1930s. The contempt of the world's leading power
>>for the framework of world order has become so extreme that there is
>>nothing left to discuss. A review of the internal documentary record
>>demonstrates that the stance traces back to the earliest days, even to
>>the first memorandum of the newly-formed National Security Council in
>>1947. During the Kennedy years, the  stance began to gain overt
>>expression. The main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that
>>defiance of international law and the Charter has become entirely
>>open. It has also been backed with interesting explanations, which
>>would be on the front pages,  and prominent in the school and
>>university curriculum, if truth and honesty were considered
>>significant values. The highest authorities explained with brutal
>>clarity that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become
>>irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they did in the
>>early postwar years.
>>
>>      One might then adopt the official position. That would be an
>>honest stand, at least if it were accompanied by refusal to play the
>>cynical game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the despised
>>principles of international law as a highly selective weapon against
>>shifting enemies.
>>
>>      While the Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the
>>defiance of world order has become so extreme as to be of concern
>>even to hawkish policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading
>>establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns that
>>Washington is treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of much of the
>>world -- probably most of the world, he suggests -- the US is
>>"becoming the rogue superpower," considered "the single greatest
>>external threat to their societies."  Realist "international relations
>>theory," he argues, predicts that coalitions may arise to
>>counterbalance the rogue superpower.
>>
>>     On pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be reconsidered.
>>Americans who prefer a different image of their society might call for
>>a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds.
>>
>>      Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It
>>leaves it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action which, as
>>it explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and violence --
>>"predictably"; a course of action that also strikes yet another blow
>>against the regime of international order, which does offer the weak
>>at least some limited protection from predatory states. As for the
>>longer term, consequences are unpredictable. One plausible observation
>>is that "every bomb that falls on  Serbia and every ethnic killing in
>>Kosovo suggests that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and
>>Albanians to live beside each     other in some sort of peace"
>>(Financial Times, March 27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes
>>are extremely ugly, as has  not gone without notice.
>>
>>      A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not
>>simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One
>>choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First, do no
>>harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that elementary
>>principle, then do nothing. There are always ways that can be
>>considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at an end.
>>
>>      The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more
>>frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification, maybe
>>not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy. In such an
>>era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the views of highly
>>respected commentators -- not to speak of the World Court, which
>>explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision rejected by the United
>>States, its essentials not even reported.
>>
>>      In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and
>>international law it would be hard to find more respected voices than
>>Hedley Bull or Leon Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that "Particular
>>states or groups of states that set themselves up as theauthoritative
>>judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others,
>>are in fact a menace to international order,and thus to effective
>>action in this field." Henkin, in a standard work on world order,
>>writes that the "pressures eroding the prohibition on the use of force
>>are deplorable, and the arguments to legitimize the use of force in
>>those circumstances are      unpersuasive and dangerous... Violations
>>of human rights are indeed all too common, and if it were permissible
>>to remedy them  by external use of force, there would be no law to
>>forbid the use of force by almost any state against almost any other.
>>Human rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other
>>injustices remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the door
>>toaggression and destroying the principle advance in international
>>law, the outlawing of war and the prohibition of force."
>>
>>      Recognized principles of international law and world order,
>>solemn treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court, considered
>>pronouncements by the most respected commentators -- these do not
>>automatically solve particular problems. Each issue has to be
>>considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt the standards of
>>Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof to  meet in
>>undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of the principles
>>of international order. Perhaps the burden can be met, but that has to
>>be shown, not merely proclaimed with passionate rhetoric. The
>>consequences of such violations have to be assessed carefully -- in
>>particular, what we understand to be "predictable." And for those who
>>are minimally serious, the reasons for the actions also have to be
>>assessed -- again, not simply by adulation of our leaders and their
>>"moral compass." _
>>
>>
>>
>

sumathy




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