Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2000 05:49:57 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Camp David Summit - 2


Dear listers,

On July 28, the NY Times published an article for the
acclaimed Israeli Author, Amos Oz. In it Oz reproduced
his as well as Israel's self-righteousness, and
condemn the Palestinians (again, in the NY Times, not
in Al-Hayat, Al-Ayam, Al-Qods Al-Arabi, Al-Safir, or
Al-Karmel) for missing yet another opportunity for an
extended peace for them. He also expressed fears for
being thrown to the sea by his enemies, the
[barbarian] Arabs (magical mobilizing words for
ignorant/hypocritical American Jews).

I could have posted Oz's article from the Times, but
it costs 2$ to download it. Instead, I prefer to post
the following article, which I received without a
reference, written by some one who bluntly insists on
sticking to the facts



>"Peace Process" Prospects
>-------------------
>By Noam Chomsky
>--------------
>The latest AP report from Camp David (evening, July
25)
>begins: "The Middle East peace talks at Camp David
collapsed
>Tuesday over rival claims to East Jerusalem.
Disappointed,
>President Clinton said he tried several approaches
but could
>not come up with a solution." Clinton expressed hope
that
>the process would continue to a resolution of the
East
>Jerusalem problem, at which point the fundamental
>outstanding issue would have been overcome.
>
>To have a sense of what is taking place, it is useful
to
>back off a few steps and to look at the immediate
events
>from a somewhat broader perspective.
>
>Any discussion of what is called a "peace process" --
>whether the one underway at Camp David or any other
--
>should keep in mind the operative meaning of the
phrase: by
>definition, the "peace process" is whatever the US
>government happens to be pursuing.
>
>Having grasped that essential principle, one can
understand
>that a peace process can be advanced by Washington's
>clearly-proclaimed efforts to undermine peace. To
>illustrate, in January 1988 the press reported
Secretary of
>State George Shultz's "peace trip" to Central America
under
>the headline "Latin Peace Trip by Shultz Planned."
The
>subheading explained the goal: "Mission Would Be
Last-Ditch
>Effort to Defuse Opposition on Contra Aid."
Administration
>officials elaborated that the "peace mission" was
"the only
>way to save" aid to the contras in the face of
"growing
>congressional opposition."
>
>The timing is important. In August 1987, over strong
US
>objections, the Central American presidents had
reached a
>peace agreement for the bitter Central American
conflicts:
>the Esquipulas Accords. The US acted at once to
undermine
>them, and by January, had largely succeeded. It had
>effectively excluded the sole "indispensable element"
cited
>in the Accords: an end to US support for the contras
(CIA
>supply flights instantly tripled, and contra terror
>increased). Washington had also eliminated the second
basic
>principle of the Accords: that the human rights
provisions
>should apply to US clients as well as to Nicaragua
(by US
>fiat, they were to apply to Nicaragua alone).
Washington had
>also managed to terminate the despised international
>monitoring mission, which had committed the crime of
>describing truthfully what had been happening since
the
>adoption of the plan in August. To the consternation
of the
>Reagan Administration, Nicaragua nevertheless
accepted the
>version of the accords crafted by US power, leading
to the
>Shultz "peace mission," undertaken to advance the
"peace
>process" by ensuring that there would be no
backsliding from
>the demolition operation.
>
>In brief, the "peace mission" was a "last-ditch
effort" to
>block peace and mobilize Congress to support the
"unlawful
>use of force" for which the US had recently been
condemned
>by the World Court.
>
>The record of the "peace process" in the Middle East
has
>been similar, though even more extreme. From 1971 the
US has
>been virtually alone in the international arena in
barring a
>negotiated diplomatic settlement of the
Israel-Palestine
>conflict: the "peace process" is the record of these
>developments. To review the essentials briefly, in
November
>1967, under U.S. initiative, the UN Security Council
adopted
>resolution 242 on "land for peace." As explicitly
understood
>by the US and the other signatories, UN 242 called
for a
>full peace settlement on the pre-June 1967 borders
with at
>most minor and mutual adjustments, offering nothing
to the
>Palestinians. When President Sadat of Egypt accepted
the
>official US position in February 1971, Washington
revised UN
>242 to mean partial Israeli withdrawal, as the US and
Israel
>would determine. That unilateral revision is what is
now
>called "land for peace," a reflection of US power in
the
>domain of doctrine and ideology.
>
>The AP report on the breakdown of the Camp David
>negotiations, cited above, notes that the final
official
>statement, "in a gesture to Arafat," said that "the
only
>path to peace was resolutions adopted by the U.N.
Security
>Council after Middle East wars in 1967 and 1973.
These call
>for Israel to relinquish territory won from the Arabs
in
>exchange for secure borders." The resolution of 1967
is UN
>242, calling for full Israeli withdrawal with at most
minor
>and mutual border adjustments; the 1973 resolution
merely
>endorses UN 242 without change. But the meaning of UN
242
>has crucially changed since February 1971, following
>Washington's dictates.
>
>Sadat warned that the US-Israeli rejection of UN 242
would
>lead to war. Neither the US nor Israel took him
seriously,
>on remarkable triumphalist and racist grounds, later
>bitterly denounced in Israel. Egypt did go to war in
October
>1973. It turned out to be a near disaster for Israel,
and
>for the world: the prospects of a nuclear exchange
were not
>slight. The 1973 war made it clear even to Henry
Kissinger
>that Egypt was not a basket case that could simply be
>disregarded, so Washington shifted to the natural
back-up
>strategy: excluding Egypt from the conflict so that
Israel,
>with mounting US support, could proceed to integrate
the
>occupied territories and attack Lebanon. That result
was
>achieved at Camp David in 1978, hailed ever since as
the
>grand moment of "the peace process."
>
>Meanwhile the US vetoed Security Council resolutions
calling
>for a diplomatic settlement incorporating UN 242 but
now
>also including Palestinian rights. The US also voted
>annually against similar General Assembly resolutions
(along
>with Israel, sometimes one or another client state),
and
>otherwise blocked all efforts at a peaceful
resolution of
>the conflict initiated by Europe, the Arab states, or
the
>PLO. This consistent rejection of a diplomatic
settlement is
>the "peace process." The actual facts were long ago
vetoed
>from the media, and have largely been barred even
from
>scholarship, but they are easy enough to discover.
>
>After the Gulf War, the US was finally in a position
to
>impose its own unilateral rejectionist stand and did
so,
>first at Madrid in late 1991, then in the successive
>Israel-PLO agreements from 1993. With these measures,
the
>"peace process" has advanced towards the
Bantustan-style
>arrangements that the US and Israel intended, as
should have
>been obvious to anyone with eyes open, and is
entirely clear
>in the documentary record and, more important, the
record on
>the ground. That brings us to the present stage: Camp
David,
>July 2000.
>
>Throughout the several weeks of deliberations, it was
>regularly reported that the main stumbling block is
>Jerusalem. The final report reiterates that
conclusion. The
>observation is not false, but it is a bit misleading.
>"Creative" solutions have been proposed to permit
symbolic
>Palestinian authority in Jerusalem -- or as the city
is
>called in Arabic, Al-Quds. These include Palestinian
>administration of Arab neighborhoods (as Israel would
>prefer, if rational), some arrangement for Islamic
and
>Christian religious sites, and a Palestinian capital
in the
>village of Abu Dis near Jerusalem, which might be
renamed
>"Al-Quds," with a little sleight-of-hand. Such an
endeavor
>might have succeeded, and might still succeed. But a
more
>intractable problem arises as soon as we ask a basic
>question: What is Jerusalem?
>
>When Israel conquered the West Bank in June 1967, it
annexed
>Jerusalem -- not in a very polite fashion; for
example, it
>has recently been revealed in Israel that the
destruction of
>the Arab Mughrabi neighborhood near the Wailing Wall
on June
>10 was done with such haste that an unknown number of
>Palestinians were buried in the ruins left by the
>bulldozers.
>
>Israel quickly tripled the borders of the city.
Subsequent
>development programs, pursued with little variation
by all
>governments, aimed to extend the borders of "greater
>Jerusalem" well beyond. Current Israeli maps
articulate the
>basic plans clearly enough. On June 28, Israel's
leading
>daily, Ha'aretz, published a map detailing "Israel's
>proposal for the permanent settlement." It is
virtually
>identical to the government's "Final Status Map"
presented a
>month earlier. The territory to be annexed around the
>greatly expanded "Jerusalem" extends in all
directions. To
>the north it reaches well past Ramallah, and to the
south
>well past Bethlehem, the two major nearby Palestinian
towns.
>These are to be left under Palestinian control, but
>adjoining Israeli territory, and in the case of
Ramallah,
>cut off from Palestinian territory to the east. Like
all
>Palestinian territory, both towns are separated from
>Jerusalem, the center of West Bank life, by territory
>annexed to Israel. To the east, the territory to be
annexed
>includes the rapidly growing Israeli town of Ma'ale
Adumim
>and extends on to Vered Jericho, a small settlement
>bordering on the town of Jericho. The salient extends
on to
>the Jordanian border. The entire Jordanian border is
to be
>annexed to Israel along with the "Jerusalem" salient
that
>partitions the West Bank. Another salient to be
annexed
>farther north virtually imposes a second partition.
>
>The intensive construction and settlement projects of
the
>past years have been designed to "create facts" that
would
>lead to this "permanent settlement." That has been
the clear
>commitment of the successive governments since the
first
>"Oslo agreement" of September 1993. Contrary to much
>commentary, the official doves (Rabin, Peres, Barak)
have
>been at least as faithfully dedicated to this project
as the
>much-condemned Binyamin Netanyahu, though they have
been
>able to conduct the project with less protest; a
familiar
>story, here as well. In February of this year the
Israeli
>press reported that the number of building starts
increased
>by almost one-third from 1998 (Netanyahu) to the
current
>year (Barak). An analysis by Israeli correspondent
Nadav
>Shragai reveals that only a small fraction of the
lands
>assigned to the settlements are actually used for
>agricultural or other purposes. For Ma'ale Adumim,
for
>example, the lands assigned to it are 16 times the
area
>used, and similar proportions hold elsewhere.
Palestinians
>have brought petitions to the Israeli High Court
opposing
>the expansion of Ma'ale Adumim, but they have been
rejected.
>Last November, rejecting an appeal, one High Court
judge
>explained that "some good for the residents of the
>neighboring [Palestinian] villages might spring from
the
>economic and cultural development of Ma'ale Adumim,"
>effectively partitioning the West Bank.
>
>The projects have been carried out thanks to the
benevolence
>of US taxpayers, by a variety of "creative" devices
to
>overcome the fact that US aid is officially barred
for these
>purposes.
>
>The intended result is that an eventual Palestinian
state
>would consist of four cantons on the West Bank: (1)
Jericho,
>(2) the southern canton extending as far as Abu Dis
(the new
>Arab "Jerusalem"), (3) a northern canton including
the
>Palestinian cities of Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm, and
(4) a
>central canton including Ramallah. The cantons are
>completely surrounded by territory to be annexed to
Israel.
>The areas of Palestinian population concentration are
to be
>under Palestinian administration, an adaptation of
the
>traditional colonial pattern that is the only
sensible
>outcome as far as Israel and the US are concerned.
The plans
>for the Gaza Strip, a fifth canton, are uncertain:
Israel
>might relinquish it, or might maintain the southern
coastal
>region and another salient virtually dividing the
Strip
>below Gaza City.
>
>These outlines are consistent with the proposals that
have
>been put forth since 1968, when Israel adopted the
"Allon
>plan," never presented formally but apparently
intended to
>incorporate about 40% of the West Bank within Israel.
Since
>then specific plans have been proposed by the
ultra-right
>General Sharon, the Labor Party, and others. They are
fairly
>similar in conception and outline. The basic
principle is
>that the usable territory within the West Bank, and
the
>crucial resources (primarily water), will remain
under
>Israeli control, but the population will be
controlled by a
>Palestinian client regime, which is expected to be
corrupt,
>barbaric, and compliant. The Palestinian-administered
>cantons can then provide cheap and easily exploitable
labor
>for the Israeli economy. Or in the long run, the
population
>might be "transferred" elsewhere in one or another
way, in
>accord with long-standing hopes.
>
>It is possible to imagine "creative" schemes that
would
>finesse the issues concerning the religious sites and
the
>administration of Palestinian neighborhoods of
Jerusalem.
>But the more fundamental problems lie elsewhere. It
is not
>at all clear that they can be sensibly resolved
within the
>framework of nation-states that has been imposed
throughout
>much of the world by Western conquest and domination,
with
>murderous consequences within Europe itself for
centuries,
>not to speak of the effects beyond until the present
moment.


====

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