From: "Clifford Duffy" <cwduff-AT-hotmail.com> Subject: Fwd: PIN 55: Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 22:05:28 -0400 >From: "MERIP Media" <ctoensing-AT-merip.org> >To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;-AT-mindspring.com;> >Subject: PIN 55: Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms >Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 09:55:18 -0400 > >MERIP Press Information Note 55 > >Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms > >Michael Young > >April 19, 2001 > >(Michael Young is a writer and political analyst living in Lebanon. He >writes a weekly politics column for the Daily Star newspaper and the >Cyberia >website, both in Beirut.) > >The most recent Hizballah cross-border attack in the Shebaa Farms area on >April 14, and the subsequent Israeli air raid against a Syrian radar >station >on the Dahr al-Baidar ridge, have heightened fears of a regional conflict >between Syria and Israel. These fears are probably unfounded, given the >reluctance of both Syria and Israel to enter into a major conflagration. >Instead, the episode further exposed the interlocking -- and at times >contradictory -- interests of the various actors on the Syrian and Lebanese >side, including Syrian president Bashar al-Asad, Hizballah and Lebanese >prime minister Rafiq Hariri. > >The Israeli attack followed the latest of a series of Hizballah operations >in the Shebaa Farms area. Both the Lebanese authorities and Syria argue >that >the farms are occupied Lebanese territory, which justifies resistance >attacks. Israel responds that the area is Syrian, and will be returned once >a final peace deal is worked out with Damascus in accordance with UN >Security Council resolution 242. The UN, in drawing a so-called "blue line" >last year to confirm the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, >concurred >with this interpretation. > >The UN's ruling notwithstanding, Hizballah sporadically attacks the >Israelis >with deadly effect. Last autumn, Hizballah abducted three Israeli soldiers >in the farms area, and they remain in Hizballah's custody. On February 16, >Hizballah fired an anti-tank missile at an Israeli vehicle, killing one >soldier. In the most recent attack, another soldier was killed. Beginning >in >December 2000, both Israel and -- indirectly -- the US repeatedly warned >the >Syrians that Israel would consider them responsible for Hizballah attacks >in >the Shebaa Farms area. Ariel Sharon reiterated the warning upon taking >office earlier this year. > >SEPARATE INTERESTS > >Israel's raid on the radar station showed the fundamental vulnerabilities >of >the various Lebanese and Syrian actors. Though Hizballah is the more >prominent player on the Shebaa Farms front, Syria sets the tone. After the >Israeli withdrawal last May, Syria was compelled to maintain leverage with >Israel in the event of resumed negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli track, >and >to provide justification for the continued Syrian military presence in >Lebanon -- a presence that has sparked recent protest from Lebanese >political forces. The Shebaa Farms appeared to afford the perfect >opportunity to do both. > >But Syria has maneuvered on weak political foundations. While the Lebanese >authorities have justified continued resistance in the farms area, the >attitude among the Lebanese population and internationally has been far >less >supportive. Lebanese civilians are tired of a conflict that can invite >Israeli raids against Lebanon's infrastructure. The US and the UN have >repeatedly cautioned Syria and Lebanon not to authorize Hizballah attacks. >Along with France, the US and the UN have also asked the Lebanese >government >to deploy sizeable units of the Lebanese army along the border. Both >Lebanon >and Syria have resisted the deployment, for fear that the Shebaa Farms >would >cease to be a military flashpoint. > >Mixed in with these dynamics has been Bashar al-Asad's assumption of power >in Syria. It is increasingly evident that Bashar's authority comes from his >being the lowest common denominator in a Syrian leadership that, in most >respects, has become a house of many mansions. In Lebanon, this has meant >that Bashar has been unwilling, or unable, to make changes in the policy >advanced by his father. Bashar has continued to support military operations >in the Shebaa Farms area, even though the political and economic cost to >Lebanon could be prohibitively high. > >HIZBALLAH AND HARIRI > >Hizballah's interests are served by keeping an open military front in the >Shebaa Farms area. When Israeli forces withdrew from the south in May 2000, >Hizballah feared a crisis of relevance. Without a military resistance >effort >to mobilize the party faithful, Hizballah's leadership faced a potentially >divisive internal debate on the party's future. The farms imbroglio has >postponed this presumed crisis, ensuring that Hizballah will continue to >play a paramount role in Syrian policy vis-a-vis Israel in Lebanon. > >The outbreak of the intifada strengthened Hizballah's hand. Not only did >militants in Palestine see the party as a point of reference, but >increasing >regional tensions delayed any prospect of final Arab-Israeli peace >settlements. Meanwhile, Hizballah's military capabilities have reportedly >been enhanced, particularly with receipt of long-range Katyusha rockets >from >Iran. Hizballah can now threaten to fire rockets deep into Israel, if >Israeli retaliation for attacks in the Shebaa Farms area targets civilians. >The party's main objective is to sustain a low-level conflict contained in >the vicinity of the farms. Israel's attack on the Syrian radar base was >designed to change the rules of the game. > >The third actor in the evolving drama is Rafiq al-Hariri. Since returning >to >office last autumn, the prime minister's priority has been to revive an >economy that many assume is destined for collapse. Hariri has little >sympathy for continued Hizballah operations. He legitimately fears that >Israeli retaliation against Lebanon's infrastructure might fatally >undermine >economic confidence. This disagreement over aims has twice provoked public >clashes. Hizballah's February attack came a day after Hariri pledged in >Paris that Lebanon would avoid provoking Israel. The prime minister >condemned the attack, referring to Hizballah's propensity to "monopolize" >the resistance. Hariri's al-Mustaqbal newspaper was among the first to >describe the April 14 operation as unwise. > >WHAT'S NEXT? > >It is unclear why Hizballah attacked Israeli forces at such an apparently >gratuitous moment. The attack was certainly a step in the long process of >imposing ground rules in the Shebaa Farms area. The Syrian "green light" >could have been payback for Hizballah secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah's >speech two weeks earlier, in which he defended Syria's presence in Lebanon. >Perhaps the operation was part of a wider Syrian effort to benefit from the >growing Arab consensus opposing Israel, or even a result of domestic Syrian >pressure on Bashar to act tough in Lebanon. > >Whatever the reason, the attack pushed Syria into Israel's trap. Israel's >decision to limit its retaliation to Syrian forces was audacious. It >revealed that Sharon was again willing to play domestic Lebanese politics, >as he did two decades ago. Not only did the Israeli response emphasize that >the Lebanese authorities cannot control their own policy on Israel, it >played to the growing opposition in Lebanon to Syria's military presence. >Moreover, it affirmed that Lebanon's and Syria's interests were separate -- >indeed incongruous -- an approach that has long been a pillar of Likud's >approach to Lebanese affairs. > >By limiting their response to Syrian forces, the Israelis denied Hizballah >an excuse to bomb Israeli population centers, since Lebanese civilian >populations were spared. The Israeli government did not order its civilian >population in the north to take shelter, suggesting that it did not expect >a >rapid response. Moreover, by pinpointing the attack Sharon avoided serious >international condemnation, and carried through on his earlier promise to >respond to attacks against Israeli soldiers. > >But the radar station bombing will have a more long-term impact in Syria. >Bashar finds himself with three unpalatable options: to pay a domestic >price >for doing nothing, to widen the conflict to northern Israel, possibly >provoking a war Syria does not want, or to wait for a chance to hit back at >the Israelis in the Shebaa Farms area, or elsewhere. The last option >remains >the most likely. But waiting would introduce an imbalance into the >long-standing Syrian-Israeli "strategic dialogue" in Lebanon: Israel has >wide latitude to retaliate against Syrian forces throughout Lebanese >territory, whereas Syrian counterpunches are limited to the Shebaa Farms. > >HAVE THE RULES CHANGED? > >It is too early to affirm, as the Israelis have, that the rules have >changed >in Lebanon. The Syrians will certainly continue to encourage Hizballah >operations, while also contending with the growing anxiety of the Lebanese >government. If Israel again decides to attack Syrian soldiers, a scenario >similar to the one that took place in 1981 might be revived. At the time, >Israel shot down a Syrian helicopter to defend its Christian Lebanese >Forces >allies, prompting the late Syrian president, Hafez al-Asad, to move >anti-aircraft missiles into Lebanon. Fears of war prompted US intervention >to resolve the crisis. But if another Israeli attack compels Bashar to >respond as his father did in 1981, the potential disadvantages could be >immense: US or international mediators would undoubtedly seek to include >the >military neutralization of the Shebaa Farms in any package deal to defuse >the crisis. This would greatly weaken Bashar. > >Current Syrian policy in the Shebaa Farms area seems destined to antagonize >the Bush administration, which appears unwilling to challenge Syria's role >in Lebanon. With Saddam Hussein uppermost in the minds of US policymakers, >the US recently sought to bring Syria into a wider regional arrangement to >contain Iraq. Bashar has not taken advantage of this, even after many Arab >states turned away from Iraq at the recent Arab League summit in Amman. The >Israelis may be successfully pushing Syria into a confrontation with the US >over Lebanon, and the Syrians seem, unwittingly, to be playing along. The >prevailing wisdom is that Hafez al-Asad would not have fallen into this >predicament. > >(When quoting from this PIN, please cite MERIP Press Information Note 55, >"Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms," by Michael Young, >April 19, 2001.) > >----- > >For background on Hizballah's political calculus, see MERIP Press >Information Note 37: Hizballah Outside and In: >http://www.merip.org/pins/pin37.html > >For deep background on Syria's role in Lebanon, see Hisham Milhem, "Syria >Between Two Transitions," in Middle East Report 203 (Spring 1997). The >article is accessible online at: >http://www.merip.org/mer/mer203/hisham.htm > >To order individual copies of Middle East Report or to subscribe, please >call Blackwell Publishers at 1-800-835-6770. > >----- > >Press Information Notes are a free service of the Middle East Research and >Information Project (MERIP). To subscribe to the MERIP PIN distribution >list, simply respond to ctoensing-AT-merip.org and provide your address in the >text message box, indicating "SUBSCRIBE PIN" in the subject line. To >unsubscribe, indicate "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. Thank you! > _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. --- from list postcolonial-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005