From: Clifford Duffy <cwduff-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: Fwd: PIN 55: Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms
Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 22:05:28 -0400





>From: "MERIP Media" <ctoensing-AT-merip.org>
>To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;-AT-mindspring.com;>
>Subject: PIN 55: Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms
>Date: Thu, 19 Apr 2001 09:55:18 -0400
>
>MERIP Press Information Note 55
>
>Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms
>
>Michael Young
>
>April 19, 2001
>
>(Michael Young is a writer and political analyst living in Lebanon. He
>writes a weekly politics column for the Daily Star newspaper and the 
>Cyberia
>website, both in Beirut.)
>
>The most recent Hizballah cross-border attack in the Shebaa Farms area on
>April 14, and the subsequent Israeli air raid against a Syrian radar 
>station
>on the Dahr al-Baidar ridge, have heightened fears of a regional conflict
>between Syria and Israel. These fears are probably unfounded, given the
>reluctance of both Syria and Israel to enter into a major conflagration.
>Instead, the episode further exposed the interlocking -- and at times
>contradictory -- interests of the various actors on the Syrian and Lebanese
>side, including Syrian president Bashar al-Asad, Hizballah and Lebanese
>prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
>
>The Israeli attack followed the latest of a series of Hizballah operations
>in the Shebaa Farms area. Both the Lebanese authorities and Syria argue 
>that
>the farms are occupied Lebanese territory, which justifies resistance
>attacks. Israel responds that the area is Syrian, and will be returned once
>a final peace deal is worked out with Damascus in accordance with UN
>Security Council resolution 242. The UN, in drawing a so-called "blue line"
>last year to confirm the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, 
>concurred
>with this interpretation.
>
>The UN's ruling notwithstanding, Hizballah sporadically attacks the 
>Israelis
>with deadly effect. Last autumn, Hizballah abducted three Israeli soldiers
>in the farms area, and they remain in Hizballah's custody. On February 16,
>Hizballah fired an anti-tank missile at an Israeli vehicle, killing one
>soldier. In the most recent attack, another soldier was killed. Beginning 
>in
>December 2000, both Israel and -- indirectly -- the US repeatedly warned 
>the
>Syrians that Israel would consider them responsible for Hizballah attacks 
>in
>the Shebaa Farms area. Ariel Sharon reiterated the warning upon taking
>office earlier this year.
>
>SEPARATE INTERESTS
>
>Israel's raid on the radar station showed the fundamental vulnerabilities 
>of
>the various Lebanese and Syrian actors. Though Hizballah is the more
>prominent player on the Shebaa Farms front, Syria sets the tone. After the
>Israeli withdrawal last May, Syria was compelled to maintain leverage with
>Israel in the event of resumed negotiations on the Syrian-Israeli track, 
>and
>to provide justification for the continued Syrian military presence in
>Lebanon -- a presence that has sparked recent protest from Lebanese
>political forces. The Shebaa Farms appeared to afford the perfect
>opportunity to do both.
>
>But Syria has maneuvered on weak political foundations. While the Lebanese
>authorities have justified continued resistance in the farms area, the
>attitude among the Lebanese population and internationally has been far 
>less
>supportive. Lebanese civilians are tired of a conflict that can invite
>Israeli raids against Lebanon's infrastructure. The US and the UN have
>repeatedly cautioned Syria and Lebanon not to authorize Hizballah attacks.
>Along with France, the US and the UN have also asked the Lebanese 
>government
>to deploy sizeable units of the Lebanese army along the border. Both 
>Lebanon
>and Syria have resisted the deployment, for fear that the Shebaa Farms 
>would
>cease to be a military flashpoint.
>
>Mixed in with these dynamics has been Bashar al-Asad's assumption of power
>in Syria. It is increasingly evident that Bashar's authority comes from his
>being the lowest common denominator in a Syrian leadership that, in most
>respects, has become a house of many mansions. In Lebanon, this has meant
>that Bashar has been unwilling, or unable, to make changes in the policy
>advanced by his father. Bashar has continued to support military operations
>in the Shebaa Farms area, even though the political and economic cost to
>Lebanon could be prohibitively high.
>
>HIZBALLAH AND HARIRI
>
>Hizballah's interests are served by keeping an open military front in the
>Shebaa Farms area. When Israeli forces withdrew from the south in May 2000,
>Hizballah feared a crisis of relevance. Without a military resistance 
>effort
>to mobilize the party faithful, Hizballah's leadership faced a potentially
>divisive internal debate on the party's future. The farms imbroglio has
>postponed this presumed crisis, ensuring that Hizballah will continue to
>play a paramount role in Syrian policy vis-a-vis Israel in Lebanon.
>
>The outbreak of the intifada strengthened Hizballah's hand. Not only did
>militants in Palestine see the party as a point of reference, but 
>increasing
>regional tensions delayed any prospect of final Arab-Israeli peace
>settlements. Meanwhile, Hizballah's military capabilities have reportedly
>been enhanced, particularly with receipt of long-range Katyusha rockets 
>from
>Iran. Hizballah can now threaten to fire rockets deep into Israel, if
>Israeli retaliation for attacks in the Shebaa Farms area targets civilians.
>The party's main objective is to sustain a low-level conflict contained in
>the vicinity of the farms. Israel's attack on the Syrian radar base was
>designed to change the rules of the game.
>
>The third actor in the evolving drama is Rafiq al-Hariri. Since returning 
>to
>office last autumn, the prime minister's priority has been to revive an
>economy that many assume is destined for collapse. Hariri has little
>sympathy for continued Hizballah operations. He legitimately fears that
>Israeli retaliation against Lebanon's infrastructure might fatally 
>undermine
>economic confidence. This disagreement over aims has twice provoked public
>clashes. Hizballah's February attack came a day after Hariri pledged in
>Paris that Lebanon would avoid provoking Israel. The prime minister
>condemned the attack, referring to Hizballah's propensity to "monopolize"
>the resistance. Hariri's al-Mustaqbal newspaper was among the first to
>describe the April 14 operation as unwise.
>
>WHAT'S NEXT?
>
>It is unclear why Hizballah attacked Israeli forces at such an apparently
>gratuitous moment. The attack was certainly a step in the long process of
>imposing ground rules in the Shebaa Farms area. The Syrian "green light"
>could have been payback for Hizballah secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah's
>speech two weeks earlier, in which he defended Syria's presence in Lebanon.
>Perhaps the operation was part of a wider Syrian effort to benefit from the
>growing Arab consensus opposing Israel, or even a result of domestic Syrian
>pressure on Bashar to act tough in Lebanon.
>
>Whatever the reason, the attack pushed Syria into Israel's trap. Israel's
>decision to limit its retaliation to Syrian forces was audacious. It
>revealed that Sharon was again willing to play domestic Lebanese politics,
>as he did two decades ago. Not only did the Israeli response emphasize that
>the Lebanese authorities cannot control their own policy on Israel, it
>played to the growing opposition in Lebanon to Syria's military presence.
>Moreover, it affirmed that Lebanon's and Syria's interests were separate --
>indeed incongruous -- an approach that has long been a pillar of Likud's
>approach to Lebanese affairs.
>
>By limiting their response to Syrian forces, the Israelis denied Hizballah
>an excuse to bomb Israeli population centers, since Lebanese civilian
>populations were spared. The Israeli government did not order its civilian
>population in the north to take shelter, suggesting that it did not expect 
>a
>rapid response. Moreover, by pinpointing the attack Sharon avoided serious
>international condemnation, and carried through on his earlier promise to
>respond to attacks against Israeli soldiers.
>
>But the radar station bombing will have a more long-term impact in Syria.
>Bashar finds himself with three unpalatable options: to pay a domestic 
>price
>for doing nothing, to widen the conflict to northern Israel, possibly
>provoking a war Syria does not want, or to wait for a chance to hit back at
>the Israelis in the Shebaa Farms area, or elsewhere. The last option 
>remains
>the most likely. But waiting would introduce an imbalance into the
>long-standing Syrian-Israeli "strategic dialogue" in Lebanon: Israel has
>wide latitude to retaliate against Syrian forces throughout Lebanese
>territory, whereas Syrian counterpunches are limited to the Shebaa Farms.
>
>HAVE THE RULES CHANGED?
>
>It is too early to affirm, as the Israelis have, that the rules have 
>changed
>in Lebanon. The Syrians will certainly continue to encourage Hizballah
>operations, while also contending with the growing anxiety of the Lebanese
>government. If Israel again decides to attack Syrian soldiers, a scenario
>similar to the one that took place in 1981 might be revived. At the time,
>Israel shot down a Syrian helicopter to defend its Christian Lebanese 
>Forces
>allies, prompting the late Syrian president, Hafez al-Asad, to move
>anti-aircraft missiles into Lebanon. Fears of war prompted US intervention
>to resolve the crisis. But if another Israeli attack compels Bashar to
>respond as his father did in 1981, the potential disadvantages could be
>immense: US or international mediators would undoubtedly seek to include 
>the
>military neutralization of the Shebaa Farms in any package deal to defuse
>the crisis. This would greatly weaken Bashar.
>
>Current Syrian policy in the Shebaa Farms area seems destined to antagonize
>the Bush administration, which appears unwilling to challenge Syria's role
>in Lebanon. With Saddam Hussein uppermost in the minds of US policymakers,
>the US recently sought to bring Syria into a wider regional arrangement to
>contain Iraq. Bashar has not taken advantage of this, even after many Arab
>states turned away from Iraq at the recent Arab League summit in Amman. The
>Israelis may be successfully pushing Syria into a confrontation with the US
>over Lebanon, and the Syrians seem, unwittingly, to be playing along. The
>prevailing wisdom is that Hafez al-Asad would not have fallen into this
>predicament.
>
>(When quoting from this PIN, please cite MERIP Press Information Note 55,
>"Walking into Israel's Trap? Syria and the Shebaa Farms," by Michael Young,
>April 19, 2001.)
>
>-----
>
>For background on Hizballah's political calculus, see MERIP Press
>Information Note 37: Hizballah Outside and In:
>http://www.merip.org/pins/pin37.html
>
>For deep background on Syria's role in Lebanon, see Hisham Milhem, "Syria
>Between Two Transitions," in Middle East Report 203 (Spring 1997). The
>article is accessible online at:
>http://www.merip.org/mer/mer203/hisham.htm
>
>To order individual copies of Middle East Report or to subscribe, please
>call Blackwell Publishers at 1-800-835-6770.
>
>-----
>
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