Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2001 12:01:06 -0700 (MST) From: Hans Ehrbar <ehrbar-AT-econ.utah.edu> Subject: How to Go On Yesterday I sent you several citations from RTS which assert that Critical Realist philosophical ontology is not just an a priori unproven assumption but has the following basis: it is the only interpretation which is able to explain the practice of modern natural sciences, especially experimental sciences. What are the precise arguments by which this assertion is proved? It is not easy to isolate such arguments. Throughout RTS, Bhaskar gives an interpretation of the scientific process which depends on this ontology. For instance, in the next reading I am going to send you in my next email, Bhaskar says that a criterion for the truth of a scientific theory is not only whether it can explain the given facts, but also whether the mechanisms which it postulates are real. And whenever such mechanisms are found, the next step in the development of science is to look at those mechanisms themselves. For instance, atoms and their valencies explain chemistry; then quantum mechanics explains the orbits of electrons around the atomic nuclei which bind atoms together into molecules, i.e., explain the valencies of the atoms; nuclear physics explains the composition of nuclei, etc. The subject matter of each subsequent science are the mechanism which give the explanation of the earlier science. This sequence of scientific discovery can be understood if one has a depth-realist view, according to which the generative mechanisms are themselves part of reality which can be investigated in their own right. But this sequential process of discovery cannot be explained with flat empiricism which reduces the world to that part of it which humans can experience. Many other arguments in RTS are of a similar nature: they explain the practice of modern science, but they make only sense if one has a depth-realist ontology, and therefore they are an indirect corroboration of this ontology. I want to also finally answer Ruth's argument whether RB means "perceived event" when he speaks of "constant conjunction of events". This argument is convincing to me. The events in the phrase "constant conjunction of events" belong to the empirical sphere, they are events which are accessible to humans sense-experience. This is what empiricism considers the only legitimate basis of science. But I don't think that Bhaskar defines the *actual* as perceivable events only. The actual is anything that happens. The empirical is a historically increasing subset of the actual, since as time goes by humans invent more and better instruments which give them access to more and more events. Does this make sense to you, Ruth? After sending you the reading I just announced, which is again quite short, I would like to have some discussion about the connection between this part of Bhaskar's argument and Marxism. BTW, the text of RTS, from the discussion on the Bhaskar list in 1996, is on the web under http://www.raggedclaws.com/criticalrealism/archive/rts/index.html It is not as nice as the text I am using now, because the text is interrupted by page breaks and footnotes. In the present version, all the footnotes are moved to the end of each installment. I sent Wallace Polsom, the maintainer of raggedclaws, the complete and cleaned-up version of the text, as I am using it now. I assume he is going to put it up instead eventually. -Hans. --- from list seminar-14-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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