From: Hans Ehrbar <econ-AT-lists.econ.utah.edu>
Subject: Re: Language and the epistemic fallacy
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2001 20:01:05 -0700



Dear Victor,

I really appreciated your connection between Marx's critique
of idealism and Bhaskar's critique of the epistemic fallacy.
I agree with you that they are related.

I will briefly go over the second question I had asked,
and discuss the other two questions in other emails.

Question 2 was:

> What does the epistemic fallacy have to do with the problem
> of which experiences are significant?

I should have asked instead:

> What does the flat empiricist ontology have to do with the
> problem of which experiences are significant?

Bhaskar says on p. 16:

> It is argued in Chapter 1 that the very concept of
> the empirical world embodies a category mistake, which
> depends upon a barely concealed anthropomorphism within
> philosophy; and leads to a neglect of the important question
> of the conditions under which experience is in fact
> significant in science.

In order to have epistemically significant experiences one
needs two things: experimental activity, and knowledge
(i.e., the transitive dimension).  I.e., epistemically
significant experiences are a result, not the starting point
as empiricism believes.  Usually events are, as Bhaskar
says, "out of phase" with the generative mechanisms which
produce them.  Empirical realism cannot conceive of this
because for it, there is nothing underneath the surface.

For empirical realism, the experience of events is not only
the basis for our knowledge about the world, but these
experiencable events are also the real basis of the world
itself.  This is a clear case of the epistemic fallacy.  And
Greg is right, if one holds this view, then one can perhaqps
come to the conclusion that "the more one could experience
an event with ones senses the more significant the event
would be."  But one cannot say that some events are
insignificant or out of phase because these events must be
the ultimate reality, there is nothing deeper behind them.


Empirical realism can also not cope with *misleading*
phenomena as they occur in society, especially in capitalist
society.  On the surface, the exchange between worker and
capitalist seems fair; only if one digs deeper will one see
the exploitation.  There are many places where Marx points
out empirical phenomena which seem to indicate just the
opposite of what is really going on.  All these places are
criticisms of flat empiricism, although Marx does not seem
to have the concept of flat empiricism.



-Hans.


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