Date: 18 May 1994 22:55:51 -0800 (PST)
From: XSMEINKING-AT-CCVAX.FULLERTON.EDU
Subject: Paul Virilio
To: technology-AT-world.std.com


 
The subject/object unity crisis has received some extensive attention as
of late, especially within the debate between Malgosia and I.  It is 
interesting that at the same time, many debates about dualisms have been
occurring - particularly on KANT-L.  I would like to discuss this topic
further in relation to Virilio.  
 
In a prior post I attempted to give a short, and hopefully insightful,
historical sweep of the subject/object problem in philosophy.  As I will
be drawing on that brief assessment, here is a brief recall of its major
points:  a)  that the subject/object episteme found its historically
significant voice in the philosophy of Descartes; b) that passivity and 
a unilateral (linear) dynamic is its primary component; c) the subject/
object problem emerged in the German philosophical tradition as empiricist
residue; and d) Virilio's metaphysical misunderstandings are a result of 
the conclusions which derive from this subject/object episteme.  Allow me
to reiterate, that Virilio's paper, the ordinates of his statements as well
as their dispersal, are at their core trapped in this, now diffused, 
subject/object episteme.  
 
Malgosia:
 
Malgosia claims:
 
>I believe tht when Virilio contrasts "subject" with "subjected", he is 
using "subject" in the same sense in which we use it in the subject/object
dichotomy.  In this dichotomy, "subject" _does_ have an active role -- it
is that which "acts" upon the object; so I am not sure why you say "this is
hardly what subject really means."  It means _all_ of these things -- and
this is exactly what Virilio plays with when he puts "being the subject"
next to "being subjected".<
 
As I demonstrated in my previous post, and restated above, "subject" is
used in the subject/object dichotomy in a completely passive form.  
Descartes is anxious that he is being deceived by a _malign genie_; Locke,
Berkeley and Hume speak of sensations, impressions and associations 
resulting _from_ the world; Kant is the first to demonsrate active reality
construction, but transcendental idealism fully depends on sensory data;
in Hegel _Geist_, which can be recognized in the _linear_ movement of world
history, encompasses the subject and object in the dialectic; Marx is the 
first to have what appears as a _physically_ acting subject who produces
objects through labor, but is alienated in the loss that action signifies;
Brentano and Husserl expand on the Cartesian and Kantian _conceptual_ theme
with the intentionality of consciousness that still submits to the sensory
imposition of the world.  It is only in the twentieth century, with figures
like Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Gadamer, as well as Deleuze and
Guittari that philosophy finally begins to decimate the subject/object
problem.  So I beg you to point out to me, WHERE IN THE HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY DOES A SUBJECT "ACT" IN THE SENSE THAT VIRILIO USES THE
TERM?  I'll save you the trouble of digging - nowhere.  "Subject" does
not mean "all of these things".  And Virilio is not playing.  Malgosia:
>The way I read Virilio, the "critical transition" concerns the very notion
of what "active" means.<  This statement is precisely correct.  The reason
Virilio is concerned with activity is the same reason he summons the 
"motorized handicap" - Virilio does not understand action.  He is
trapped, trapped in the pitfalls of a fallen episteme.  
 
Torsen (please forgive me if I do not have your correct name, you didn't
leave one in your post) has Virilio pinned to the wall.  And Teikling's
comments concerning the telephone are also on the right wavelength.  Both
postings reveal Virilio's primary shortfall beyond his failure to
understand action, which is that he does not understand our relationship
to technology.  
 
The above might aid in some further statements on the "doom and gloom"
point.  Malgosia commented in another posting:  
 
>Both you and Steve seem to imply that considerations of "the cost 
associated with innovations" are somehow pointless, that they are just 
nostalgic complaints.<
 
Perhaps you should read my previous postings more carefully.  This 
implication is far from my approach to Virilio.  I have effectively
demonstrated that Virilio is both a) wrong in his metaphysical analysis and 
exposition of our relationship to technology and b) wrong for the added 
reason that he is functioning on an ethical prejudice derived from his 
metaphysical misunderstandings, which is exemplified in the "motorized 
handicapped" metaphor.  My statements about Virilio, as I have declared from 
time to time in my previous postings, are not the result of a disagreement 
because I support the opposite extreme of his view.  Rather, I frugally 
attempt to abstain from making value-judgments at all.  In this turn, I took 
a Foucauldian, even Deleuzean and Guittarian approach to the issue by 
presenting the view that was absent from Virilio's account, i.e. I was 
playing.  IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT I SUPPORT THE VIEWS I DEFEND.  I'm simply 
pushing for a synthesis.  I agree with you, Malgosia, that humanity should 
assess technology with critical analysis, however "critical" only appears in
Virilio pejoratively.  
 
Yours in discourse,
 
 
Steven Meinking
California State University, Fullerton
xsmeinking-AT-fullerton.edu
 
P.S.  I did not interpret a flame in Malgosia's response to Torsen.  I, for
one, deeply value Malgosia's contributions.  Without them this list would
have been dead for the past three weeks.
 
P.S.S.  This is for Rutherford:  In my first post regarding Virilio,
I raised the issue of bio-power and surveillence (Foucault), but there
was no interest in it.  I, too, would like to see Habermas or the Frankfurt
School in the debate.  Why don't you work them into a discussion about some
of our readings.  Guittari is next up - I can hear Weber or Marcuse calling.